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BECOMING ONE SPIRIT: ORIGEN AND EVAGRIUS PONTICUS ON PRAYER
Origen and Evagrius present a theology of prayer that provided the spiritual foundation
for later monasticism, both in the East and in the West. Indeed, the influence of Origen and
Evagrius on Christian spirituality is perceptible even today. Yet the works of both writers were
repeatedly condemned by ecumenical councils, beginning with the Second Council of
Constantinople in 553. In this thesis, I attempt to shed light on this paradox by setting the
spiritual works of each writer within the context of the theological controversies of his time. When
Origen’s works are seen in relation to the Church’s third-century effort to refute the theologies of
Marcion and the Gnostic schools, such aspects of his thought as Platonic mythic cosmology, the
pre-existence of souls and subordination within the Trinity come into clearer focus as aspects of
his insistence on the importance of freedom against the determinism of the Gnostics. For
Origen, God’s grace works with human freedom, and God’s providence allows for human
freedom. In On First Principles and in his Commentary on Romans, Origen explores the moral
responsibility of the individual soul to make the right choices; these are a challenge even with
the help of God. Yet, God is always present, working through Christ and the angels to help the
Christian return to holiness. Prayer is a key strategy for the Christian who wants to make
progress, as well as the place of meeting for the human spirit with God. Thus, against the
Gnostics, Origen is really a de-mythologizer. We also see that his allegorical approach to
Scripture exposes the shallowness of the exegesis of Marcion, who sought to cut the Old
Testament and much of the New from the Christian canon.
Writing a century and a half later, Evagrius systematizes Origen’s cosmology, as well as
his concept of freedom and grace. At the same time, against the Eunomian Arians of his day, he
reinterprets the Trinity, following his friends and mentors, the Cappadocian Fathers, in his stress
on an apophatic approach to the One and the Three. In the trajectory of Origen’s Commentary
on Romans, Evagrius further analyzes the machinations of the demons, seriously-fallen spirits
who hate and envy both human beings and God, hence work with human cognition and the
human heart to prevent the process of prayer and the learning of good moral habits. For
Evagrius too, prayer is the meeting “place” between God and the human spirit and finally, the
only lens through which created reality can be truly seen.
With this theological background in mind, we can see that the points which the Church
later judged to be heterodox do not outweigh each writer’s deeply Christian spirituality.
This thesis may be duplicated.
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I. The Anthropological Foundations of Prayer: Historical Overview
Origen and Evagrius both conceive of prayer as “conversation with God.” In our time,

conversation with God is presupposed as an aspect of prayer, and programs that train spiritual
directors focus on ways of assisting others to converse freely with God. It is possible that we speak
of such conversation too easily. For Origen, writing On Prayer in about 230 C. E. and for Evagrius,
writing in the 390s, prayer is hardly mere chat. Prayer is a work of the whole heart, a turning of the
whole mind to the God who is infinitely transcendent, infinitely holy. We can pray only by the
redeeming will of the entire Trinity. We can pray well only after a good deal of moral preparation.
Origen and Evagrius were not the first to view prayer as the whole person’s response to
redemption. They develop the tradition begun by Clement of Alexandria in Stromateis, Book 7.
Clement distinguishes between the outward act of talking to God and the inner cry of the heart:
_στιv . . . _μιλία πρ_ς τ_v Θε_v _ ε_χή.1
Prayer is . . . converse with God. Though whispering . . . and not opening the lips, we speak in
silence, yet we cry inwardly. For God hears continually all the inward converse. So also we raise
the head and lift the hands to heaven and set the feet in motion . . . following the eagerness of the
spirit directed towards the intellectual essence; and endeavoring to abstract the body from the
earth along with the discourse, raising the soul aloft, winged with longing for better things, we
compel it to advance to the region of holiness, magnanimously despising the chain of the flesh.2

1

Stromateis, 7. 7. 39. 6 - 7. 7. 40. 1. The Greek text is that of Alain Le Boulluec, trans., Clément d’Alexandrie: Les
Stromates, 7, SC 428 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1997).
2

In this thesis, I will be using the English translation of Stromateis at http://newadvent.org/fathers/02107.htm.
Variations will be my own and will be placed in square brackets. Since this translation uses chapter numbers only, I will supply
the section numbers from Le Boulluec’s edition.
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Paradoxically, for Clement, the whole body is involved in the effort to raise the soul above the realm
of physical reality. Body, soul, and spirit are to reach toward the intellectual essence of God with
longing and generosity. This prayer is a “conversation” of the entire person as the feet and hands
move, the spirit eagerly longs for God, and the soul flies, letting go of its earthly preoccupations.
Plato might recognize an echo of his conception of the soul as a charioteer driving two winged
horses in Phaedrus, 246a- 248b. Because one of the horses prefers earth, Socrates says, it takes a
great deal of self-discipline to rise above the hubbub of earthly opinions to the knowledge of
intelligible reality.3 Clement warns that in order to pray, we must be ready to let go of all conflicting
desires. Inner “work” is a necessary preparation for prayer, as we shall see.
Origen develops this theme, noting that the hands we raise must be “holy”; that is, we must
be free of anger and quarreling (On Prayer, 9. 1) so that we can see the Lord’s glory. For him,
“conversation” with God flows from the mind’s contemplation of God: “For the eyes of the mind
(_φθαλμoί τo_ διαvoητικo_) are lifted up from their preoccupation with earthly things . . . and they arrive

at the sheer contemplation of God and at conversing (_μιλε_v) with Him reverently and suitably as He
listens” (Prayer, 9. 2).4 Following Origen and Clement’s definition but abstracting it from their
contexts, Evagrius simply states that prayer is “conversation (_μιλία) of the mind with God (De Orat.
3).5 However, he agrees with Clement and Origen that conversation with God depends on the
mind’s purification; for without moral readiness, the mind is incapable of “reaching out unwaveringly
toward its own Lord, to converse with him . . . who is above all perception” (De Orat. 3-4). Again, the
mind must be willing to get rid of anger and other earthly preoccupations. Otherwise, mundane
3

Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1997).
4

Rowan Greer’s translation, Origen, The Classics of Western Spirituality edition (Mahwah: Paulist Press,
1979) 99. The Greek refers to Peri Euch_s, ed. Paul Koetschau, Origenes Werke I (J. C. Hinrisch’sche
Buchhandlung, 1899) 318. Citations of Origen’s On Prayer will be taken from these editons. In order to avoid confusion,
I will refer to the English translation of Origen’s work as On Prayer (abbreviated as Prayer) and to both Greek and English
versions of Evagrius’s text as De Oratione.
5

Simon Tugwell’s translation and Greek edition (Oxford, 1987). These will be the texts to which citations of
Evagrius’s De Oratione (abbreviated as De Orat.) refer.
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preoccupations would preclude both recognition of God’s presence and understanding of God’s
communication. In De Oratione, 62, Evagrius expands this idea:
When your mind gradually withdraws, as it were, from the flesh in great yearning for God, when it
turns away all the thoughts (voήματα) that come from brooding or memory or bodily temperament,
being filled with reverence and joy, then you should consider that it has drawn near to the borders
of prayer.

The thoughts must die, at least temporarily, that reverence and joy in God’s presence may take
their place. To thoughts and to Clement’s discussion of prayer, we shall return.
From the Church’s developing belief that Christ is both divine and human, Origen and
Evagrius inherit two approaches to contemplation. We have just seen their focus on contemplation
(theoria) as the intellectual vision of Truth or the Good which they inherited both from Plato and
Clement, as well as from St. Paul, who speaks of the man caught up into the third heaven to hear
unspeakable words (_ρρητα _ήματα).6 According to Thomas Keating, however, the Greek Fathers
incorporated into the term theoria “the meaning of the Hebrew word “da’ath”. . . experiential
knowledge that comes through love”.7 Bernard McGinn calls attention to the Jewish apocalyptic
tradition of 1 Enoch, in which one is united with God through “walking with God” (Gen 5. 24),8 that
6
7
8

2 Cor 12. 2-4.
Thomas Keating, Intimacy with God (New York: Crossroad, 1994: rpt. 2005) 39.

In Jewish apocalyptic literature, such as 1Enoch, a text from the 3rd century B. C. E., Enoch ascends to
heaven and beholds the Great Glory of God; he is also the man who “walks with God” in earthly life. See Bernard
McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991) 13-14. For the derivation of the figure of the
holy ascetic “abba” from the seer of Jewish apocalyptic texts such as I and II Enoch, see also Alexander Golitzin,
“The Vision of God and the Form of Glory: More Reflections on the Anthropomorphite Controversy of AD 399" in
Abba: Festschrift for Bishop Kallistos Ware of Diokleia (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003) 279.

9

is, through service which gradually deifies us, thereby uniting us with God and enabling us to
contemplate God. Origen and Evagrius both understand theoria, contemplation, as intellectual vision
united with love of God. They also assert that “love of God” is inseparable from love of neighbor. For
Origen, love of neighbor is essential both here in this life and in the next because we are all
connected to each other through Christ, who is sick with those who are sick and in prison with those
who are in prison (Matt 25. 35-40). Christ, in fact, counts all sufferings as his own (On Prayer, 11. 2).
In his Letter on the Faith, Evagrius shows the Son, voluntarily subordinating himself not
merely to the Father, but also to us by assuming our sinful human nature and sharing our
deprivations “in fellowship with us” (8. 18-26).9 Christ, Son of God and Son of Man is therefore the
model of the Christian contemplative. The mode of service can vary with one’s role in life. Evagrius
defines the role of the Christian Knower (gnostikos), for example, as “salt for the impure and light
for the pure” (Gnostikos, 3).10 In a variety of ways, the one who knows more is to serve others. As
we will see in more detail later, this service is a means to contemplation because it is through
service that we enter into the human nature of Christ; but service also flows from and perfects our
contemplation of the divinity of Christ and the mystery of the Trinity. As Tillich puts it, “truth in
Christianity is something which happens . . . is something new, something which is done by God in
history, and, because of this, something which is done in the individual life.”11
For Origen and Evagrius, this “something” which God does in the individual life is
transformation; God gives us the grace to move from our fallen nature, with its soiled image of God,
to our spiritual nature which is in the likeness of the God who is charity. By interpreting Genesis 1.
26 to signify a movement from creation in God’s image to re-creation in God’s likeness, Origen and
9

I am using the English translation at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3202008.htm. Variations from this will be my
own and will be placed in square brackets. Greek references are to Saint Basile: Lettres I, trad. Yves Courtonne (Paris: Société
d’Édition, 1957). References will be to section numbers. Until recently, Letter on the Faith was ascribed to Basil and is still
found as Basil’s 8th Letter.
10

Évagre le Pontique: Le Gnostique, trans. Antoine Guillaumont and Claire Guillaumont, SC 356 (Paris: Les Éditions
du Cerf, 1989).

10

Evagrius integrate into their conception of prayer both the intellectual vision of God and the idea of
participation in God’s life. Thus, they bring together intellectual contemplation and Christian service.

11

“Doing the Truth,” The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948) 116.
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How well did Evagrius know Origen in the first place? What heritage did Origen pass on?
Certainly they shared a commitment to understanding the truths of Scripture and assisting others to
be united with the love of Christ. In order fully to understand their contributions to a theology of
Christian prayer, it will be helpful to survey the relevant aspects of their lives as each struggled to
know God in contemplation and to find the connection between knowing and doing. Born of
Christian parents in 185 C. E. and growing up in Alexandria, Origen was educated both in the
Hellenistic philosophies and in Scripture and the Christian life. He studied under Ammonias Saccas
(as did Plotinus, his younger contemporary)12; and his works show that he had digested the
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle as well as the teachings of Stoicism. They were all an on-going
aspect of Origen’s educational background, with the result that he could call on them at will. We
shall see his philosophical versatility as this study progresses.
However, Origen did not reject, but chose to contribute to the Christian tradition in which he
grew up. Clement of Alexandria, who ran a Christian catechetical school, was his tutor.13 Origen was
therefore formed by Scripture and by the Church’s project of distinguishing Christian doctrine from
Gnostic and Marcionite perversions, as well as by the recurring persecutions of the church of his
time. When Origen was seventeen, his father was put to the test by being asked to sacrifice; he
chose martyrdom for Christ. After that, for Origen the possibility of being called to make the same
choice was never far off.14 With the ever-present possibility of persecution came the overshadowing
responsibility to make a choice for martyrdom. Although Origen technically did not die a martyr, he

12

Mark Edwards argues that there are two Origens, the (pagan) Platonist and the Christian theologian. Each
studied under an Ammonius, the pagan Origen under Ammonias Saccas and the Christian Origen under Ammonius
the Peripatetic. Edwards does not offer this theory as dogma but finds it probable because he does not see the
Christian Origen as a Platonist. Whether or not there were two Origens, Edwards rightly cautions against labeling
Origen as “a Platonist”; for Origen works with several philosophical traditions. See his Origen against Plato (Aldershot
and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2002) 54-55.
13

The only teacher that Origen mentions is his Hebrew teacher, and he does not mention him (or her?) by
name. See Edwards, 12.
14

Eusebius eulogizes Origen’s bravery as a young man when he would accompany martyrs to their
executions, narrowly escaping being lynched or stoned himself (History of the Church, VI. 3, trans. G. A. Williamson
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1975).
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came close, dying in 254 from injuries sustained in the Decian persecution. It is understandable
that the freedom of the will and human responsibility for choice would be major themes for Origen.
A year or two after the death of his father, Origen took over the catechetical school, which,
as Edwards reminds us, was not a modern school, with a campus and a set curriculum, but was an
informal gathering of interested people, including both men and women. Occasionally Origen also
gave public lectures.15 Because he soon became a controversial figure, his bishop, Demetrius of
Alexandria, intervened in the school, assigning him to teach only advanced students and giving the
others to Heraclas, one of Origen’s former students.16 Even so, Demetrius’s suspicion of Origen
continued. Possible reasons are his speculations in On First Principles, his allegorical approach to
Scripture,17and perhaps also his radical commitment to Christian action, to the point of martyrdom if
necessary. Opposed by Demetrius but supported by two bishops in Palestine, Alexander of
Jerusalem and Theoctistus of Caesarea, who had ordained him priest against Demetrius’s wishes in
234, Origen moved to Palestinian Caesarea, eventually settling there permanently.18
Origen considered his main task as teacher and writer to be the exegesis of Scripture, the
Word of God. Because he makes use of common philosophical tools and concepts, such as Stoic
constructs of logic and Platonic epistemology and cosmology, the question arises whether his
Christianity ruled the philosophies or the philosophies ruled his Christianity. According to Heine,
Demetrius was in some doubt about Origen’s use of the philosophies, with the result that On First
Principles “had the effect on the conflict with Demetrius that gasoline has on fire.”19 Particularly

15

Edwards, 18.

16

Ronald Heine argues that Origen’s assignment to the more advanced more probably arose from
Demetrius’s efforts to gain control of the school than from Origen’s own decision. Introduction to Origen: Homilies on
Genesis and Exodus, Fathers of the Church 71 (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1982) 12.
17
18
19

Heine, Homilies, 14.
Heine, Homilies, 15.
Heine, Homilies, 14.
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problematic was Origen’s adaptation of Plato’s creation myth in the Timaeus in Book 2 of On First
Principles. It will clarify the discussion below to sketch both Plato’s myth and Origen’s use of it now.
In contrast to the biblical creation by God in Genesis 1, in Plato’s Timaeus, the Eternal, the
Good, or the highest principle, is not the creator. Rather, the eternal world (of the Forms) provides
an eternal model for the creation. Because eternal, incorporeal Forms cannot be involved with
matter, the actual creator of the universe is the demiurge (δημιoυργός, or craftsman), an emanated
second cause. The demiurge fixes his gaze on the Eternal and creates the universe after the model
of the Eternal (29 a).20 Gazing on the Eternal, he creates the cosmos in Time, itself “a moving image
of eternity” (37 d). Time moves according to number, introducing plurality and change in an ordered
manner that imitates the unchanging order of eternity. Eternity, in contrast, “rests in unity.” Receiving
the the patterns of all living creatures from the demiurge and bringing them forth in time, the cosmos
itself is a living image of the Eternal: “The universe resembles more closely than anything else that
Living Thing of which all other living things are parts, both individually and by kinds” (Timaeus, 30 c).
Thus, just as a person consists of body and soul, the universe itself consists both of body
(the visible universe) and soul (the invisible life of the universe). “[The demiurge] put intelligence in
soul and soul in body, and so he constructed the universe” (Timaeus, 30 b). The universal soul
shares in the reason and harmony of the eternal (Timaeus, 37 a). As a microcosm of the universal
soul and body, each human being has a soul as its living principle by which to participate in the
eternal (Timaeus, 44 d - 47 e). Yet, human beings are also mortal; for in Plato’s system, only the
eternal Forms are beyond change. The human body, consisting of matter as well as form, is subject

20

Citations are to Donald J. Zehl’s translation of the Timaeus in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S.
Hutchinson Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
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to change and death. We must therefore nourish our minds, our immortal part.21

21

See, for example, Phaedrus, 248 b - c.
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In the Timaeus, Plato posits that after death, souls are reborn to a life that is either wiser and
more virtuous than the previous life or more bestial— it depends on one’s pursuit of wisdom and
excellence in the present life (90 a - e). To think “immortal thoughts” is to “partake of immortality” (90
c). Therefore, through the proper use of the mind, all persons have the resources to rise above
chance and death. The first step toward immortality is to achieve order through a balance of power
between body and soul. We are “not to exercise the soul without exercising the body, nor the body
without the soul, so that each may be balanced by the other and so be sound” (Timaeus, 88 b).
Without this dual program of exercise, the desiring part of the soul (epithum_tikon) gets out of hand
and involves the body in the search for pleasure.22 The proper role of the body is not to wallow in
pleasure, but to stay healthy in order to contribute to the soul’s health, just as the soul should
contribute to the body’s health by caring for it.
As we achieve this balance of body and soul, the second step to immortality is natural: we
begin to direct our lives by the intelligence (nous), the highest part of the soul. The nous is the
aspect of humanity which has the capacity to participate in immortality:
If a man has seriously devoted himself to love of learning and to true wisdom . . . then there is
absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine . . . And to the extent that
human nature can partake of immortality, he can in no way fail to achieve this (Timaeus, 90 b-c).

Moreover, this participation is knowledge, “learning and wisdom.” For Plato, human beings are
knowers; indeed, they are meant to be lovers of wisdom and learning. There is an ontological
dimension of knowledge as well, since pursuit of higher knowledge requires the philosopher to
acquire a resemblance to the Good, both through virtuous action and the discipline of dialectic
(_λεγχoς).23 Knowledge involves “conformation of subject with object,” as in the Timaeus, “vision
results from the confluence of ‘the pure fire within us, which is akin to that of day, with the kindred

22
23

Here, I am adding material from the Republic, 9. 588 c - 589 b.

By examining the assumptions that underlie one’s thinking, one purifies the nous of the conventional opinion that
may be driven by earthly desires and prepares for higher levels of reality. See Robert Cushman, Therapeia: Plato’s Conception
of Philosophy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1958) 73.
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fire without” (Timaeus, 45 b-d).24 As we purify our thoughts, we grow in the capacity to know the
Good because we activate our kinship to it.

24

Cushman, 154.
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Plato’s anthropology really incorporates two tripartite models, both of which support his
epistemology. In the Timaeus, he uses the schema of body, soul, and intelligence, or nous. The
body serves the soul by exercising and staying healthy. The soul has lower and higher parts. As the
higher aspect of “soul,” the intelligence (nous) can receive knowledge and immortality. Plato
specifies further in the Republic that the nous has a special function as the “eye of the soul”
(Republic, 7. 533d), which, when seeing properly, gives human beings knowledge of their kinship to
the Good which guarantees their share in immortality.25 However, the nous can be diverted from its
pursuit of wisdom by other parts of the soul. In order to understand this possibility, elsewhere in the
Republic and in the Phaedrus, Plato develops another tripartite model that pertains only to the soul.
The “lower”soul consists of two parts: the thumos, or spirit, and the epithum_tikon, or desire. For two
reasons, the nous (intellect) is the highest of the three: its resemblance to the incorporeal world of
the Forms and its innate proclivity toward the Good. Ideally, the nous recognizes true values and
governs the other two parts of the soul so that the whole person can grow to be more like the Good.
To this end, the thumos supplies the energy and spirit necessary for moral and intellectual growth;
the epithum_tikon, however, is a hindrance. Our desires go out towards earthly goals insatiably and
mislead the nous toward false values, with the result that the nous becomes blind. Serving the
pursuit of false values, the thumos degenerates into irrational anger. Thus, desire, for Plato, is a

25

Cushman, 147.
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“many-headed beast” (Republic, 9. 588b-589a).26
Inheriting Plato’s anthropology and epistemology, along with all the commentary since
Plato’s day, Origen transforms Platonic thought, both correcting it and integrating it into his own
Christian proclamation. With some qualification, he accepts the Platonic view that the temporal world
corresponds to and reflects the eternal world. He also has the Stoic conception of the rational
intellect in mind. However, he derives the whole vision scripturally, from Genesis 1. 26, “Let us make
humankind in our image, according to our likeness,” rather than from a deduced eternal world of
forms. Correcting Plato, he transfers the creation itself to God the Father, who creates all things in
and through the Son, who is God’s Wisdom and Word. Therefore, the whole creation reflects God’s
wisdom and God’s Word. For Origen, the Son is not Plato’s emanated demiurge, mediator between
the transcendent forms and matter, but rather, the second hypostasis of the Trinity. The Son is
inseparable from God the Father, himself God, exact image of the Father, eternally begotten (Princ.
1. 2. 9). The Son is the agent of creation because the Son is also Wisdom, as in Proverbs 8. 27:
“When he established the heavens, I was there.” Moreover, the Son is Word, as in John 1. 1: “In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

26

G. M. A. Grube’s translation, rev. C. D. C. Reeve, Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S.
Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). Of this “many-headed beast,” more later.
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With a little help from Stoic thought and some qualification, Origen accepts Plato’s valuation
of the soul and the intellect over the body. In On First Principles, 2. 9. 2, he posits a two-stage
creation of which the first stage is the creation of intellects, or logikoi, rational beings.27 God creates
them all equal. They are all intellects able to contemplate God; but unlike Plato, Origen posits that
God gives the intellects the freedom to move, to choose whether or not to continue contemplating
God. Note that motion is a metaphor for choice. With the exception of the intellect of Jesus, all tire
of turning their attention toward God and “wander away.” This choice, in itself, is the Fall. As a
consequence, by act of God’s providence, the Son creates the worlds and bodies that are suitable to
each creature in relation to the depth of its fall. The result is the world of the angels, who did not fall
far, the world of human beings, who fell too far to become angels, and the world of the demons, who
fell too deeply to become human beings.

27

Z_on logikon is Marcus Aurelius’s term in To Himself (7. 11) and Origen’s in On First Principles 3. 1. 3. Lampe’s
entries in the Patristic Greek Lexicon indicate that this term was common to many philosophies, so I wouldn’t want to push it as
“Stoic” too hard. Stoic traces in On First Principles, 3 will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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Although placement in a body and in a world is a punishment, this punishment itself is not
retributive, but pedagogical; the purpose is that all may learn (from straitened circumstances) to turn
away from sin and return to being with God, in contemplation. For creatures retain their freedom to
choose and to move; in fact, creatures must “move”; it is impossible to live without making one
choice after the other.28 In the end, indeed, God will bring all beings, angels, human beings, and
demons, into the eschatological restoration (_πoκατάστασις), which means both “return” and “restored
state.” In On First Principles 3, Origen makes it clear that God progressively brings about this
restoration by responding to the creature’s use of the freedom of its will. As creatures are ready to
receive teaching, God gives them true doctrine, working through angels, human teachers, and
Scripture. As each creature encounters temptation to evil, God sends human and angelic ministers
to help. In each situation, God works with the individual soul, anticipating and aiding its rejection of
sin and return to God.
Was Demetrius’s concern about Origen’s Platonism warranted? It may seem so if we do not
remember the philosophical cast of Origen’s society. Alistair Stewart-Sykes distinguishes between
pagan Platonism and Origen’s use of Plato for the purpose of expounding Christian truth:
The difference between Origen and his pagan contemporaries was that . . . for Origen, Plato
simply supplied the intellectual framework by which the sacred text, namely the Bible, made
present on earth in the person of Jesus, might come to be understood, whereas for pagan
28
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Platonists Plato himself was the sacred text.29

29

Alistair Stewart-Sykes, trans. Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen: On the Lord’s Prayer (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. Vladimir’s
Seminary Press, 2004) 101.
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In his use of Plato and other philosophers, Origen actually follows the lead of Clement, his tutor,
who held that philosophy is “Hagar” to Christianity, which is “Sarah.” In other words, the philosophies
contain some truth and help us prepare for true wisdom. But the true Teacher is Christ; and the
Christian knower (gnostic) must correct the philosophies. For example, Clement asserts that “the
world of ideas in Plato is the Logos of the Scriptures, who is also Jesus Christ the Word of
God”(Strom. 4. 25. 155).30 Fundamentally agreeing with Clement, Origen “corrects” the partial truth
of Plato’s account of the creation, showing that the world was not made by a second cause but by
God. Again, Origen finds partial truth in Plato’s belief that the intellect is the essence of human
nature: we are (in Rufinus’s translation) essentially rationabiles naturae, rational natures. The
particular myth in the Timaeus also allows him to focus on the will of God to make creatures both
intellectual and moral. We resemble our primordial ancestors in having minds and wills of our own,
as well as in the need for both vision and choice. For Origen, the creation-myth of the Timaeus
provided a gloss on Genesis 1. 26. We are created in the image of God, who is the source of all
intellect and moral choice; despite the Fall, our destiny is to move into, that is, to choose for
ourselves, likeness to God by growing in goodness and wisdom.

30
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Origen saw the need to justify free the use of Hellenistic philosophies for the purposes of
scriptural exegesis and theology; and he does so in the Prologue of On First Principles: Not all
“decrees of faith” were directly communicated or even formulated by the apostles. Some truths
were indirectly stated or left to be worked out later; other truths have yet to be defined and are open
to free discussion (Prol. 3-4).31 Indeed, some tenets of present-day Christianity were not yet
decrees of faith. Origen says, for example, “In regard to the Holy Spirit it is not yet clearly known
whether he is to be thought of as begotten or unbegotten, or as being himself also a Son of God or
not” (Princ. Prol. 4). Therefore Origen often floated possibilities for doctrines not yet settled.
Although Edwards rightly says that, “what Origen took to be a decree of faith he was obliged, like all
other Christians, to cherish as an axiom in the course of all encounters with other systems,”32 issues
that were not yet decrees of faith could be investigated freely. Writing for educated people, Origen
wants his hearers to think for themselves and to have access to the best philosophical tools
available so that each can integrate the truths of Scripture with full conviction. As we have already
seen, this view of Christian education was controversial even in his own time.
Evagrius was also a controversial figure, to some extent, in his own lifetime and certainly
after his death. Born in Ibora in Pontus (modern Turkey) about ninety years after Origen’s death in
345, Evagrius was also educated in the Hellenistic philosophies and in Scripture, for his father was a
country bishop (chorepiscopos).

It is significant that at three different stages of his life he

encountered the works of Origen. Moreover, he encountered Origen’s works through or with a wide
variety of written sources, teachers, mentors, and friends. First he studied with Basil of Caesarea
and Gregory Nazianzen, who had collected excerpts from Origen’s works into a florilegium entitled
the Philocalia. Evagrius, then, would have studied Origen through the Cappadocian Fathers’
perspectives on the Trinitarian (Arian) controversies of the second half of the fourth century. Basil,
31

Origen: On First Principles, ed. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973). English citations will
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who ordained Evagrius lector, was a more remote figure for Evagrius than Gregory, who ordained
him deacon and served as a personal mentor.33 Yet, Basil’s modifications of Origen’s thought on the
Trinity proved a major influence on Evagrius. He was personally closer to Gregory, however.
Evagrius revered him as “wise teacher,” as, for example, in Praktikos, 89, where he refers to the
“sophos didaskalos” who distinguished the three parts of the soul and the virtues that belong to
each.34 In 379, Evagrius accompanied Gregory to the First Council of Constantinople (381) and
assisted him there.35 Gregory’s modifications of Origen’s thought, particularly in Oration 29, are a
source for Evagrius’ model of the spiritual journey, even though Evagrius disagrees with his wise
teacher on the limits of human vision.
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Later, still in Constantinople after Gregory had left the Council, flaunting anti-Arian polemic
and stymied by a messy emotional affair with the wife of a noble official,36 Evagrius had a dream. In
this dream, the Lord sends angels to him dressed like the prefect’s soldiers. They arrest him without
telling him the charges; but he thinks (privately) that the husband of the noble official has accused
him to the prefect. Afterwards, an angel, now appearing as one of his friends, asks him why he has
been arrested. Evagrius evades the truth, conjecturing instead that someone who was jealous of
him must have denounced him to the judge. The angel does not probe but tells him that the city is
unsafe for him and directs him to swear by oath to leave at once and to have a care for his soul.37
Upon leaving Constantinople for Jerusalem and arriving at the monasteries of Rufinus of
Aquilea and Melania the Elder, Evagrius would have found a circle of educated people who were
involved in reading and discussing the works of Origen as well as those of Basil and Gregory; for
this group too was opposed to Arianism.38 Moreover, as both Melania and Rufinus had experienced
Egyptian monasticism, Melania learning from Abba Pambo and Rufinus studying with Didymus the
Blind, the group would have made a serious effort to relate Origen’s works to their own ascetic lives.
When Evagrius, not ready to settle down to ascetical choices, continued his former style of life in
Jerusalem, he eventually made himself sick. Melania and Rufinus therefore sent him on to the
Egyptian desert.39 At Kellia, Evagrius encountered Origen again. Although some of the monks at
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Kellia, having no time for his erudition, put him in his place,40 he joined the Tall Brothers (and
perhaps others) who, like Melania and Rufinus, were studying Origen and integrating his ideas into
their lives. Gradually Evagrius became the central figure in this group. 41 Evagrius would also have
read the Life of Antony by Athanasius, as well as Antony’s Letters, both of which incorporate
Origen’s thought on spiritual warfare against demons.42
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As a result of all this reading and shared study of Origen among different groups of mentors
and friends, Evagrius came to understand the practical life of the desert, the ascetic struggle against
passions and temptations in which the monastics of the Egyptian desert were engaged, through the
lens of Origen’s views of temptation and spiritual progress in On First Principles. Origen taught that
in this life the human soul can admit different energies, those of either good or evil spirits. The evil
spirits (the created intellects who most decisively rejected God in the Fall) work to take control
through all kinds of depraved suggestion, while the good spirits move the soul toward God (Princ. 3.
3. 4). Souls that habitually devote themselves to God find themselves in communion with God;
those who habitually follow the opposing spirits end up filled with their powers (Princ. 3. 3. 3). For
Evagrius it is the consistent habit of inner awareness that with God’s help ultimately defeats the
demons; and the point of transition to communion with God is the state he called apatheia. By this
he does not mean modern apathy or a kind of emotional deadness, but a quieting down, a
detachment, and a freedom from external distractions, internal defenses and knee-jerk emotional
reactions.43 Then, as he says in the Praktikos, we learn to perceive the principles of spiritual
warfare (Pr. 83), to practice charity (Pr. 84), and to progress through knowledge of the visible and
invisible levels of creation (theoria physike) to the ultimate knowledge of God which is “theology” (Pr.
84).44
Because Evagrius had absorbed diverse perspectives on Origen’s thought, he had as deep a
knowledge of “Origen” as Origen had of the philosophies. Moreover, Evagrius had also studied the
philosophies for himself during his education. Therefore, although the many correspondences
between Origen’s works and those of Evagrius could lead to the assumption that Evagrius is a
43
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carbon copy of Origen, this perspective is too simple. Evagrius has modified some of Origen’s ideas
and even rejected others, to form his own synthesis, adapted first to the developments in Trinitarian
doctrine during the Arian Controversy, then to his life in the desert, with its ascetic practices of work,
prayer, inner vigilance and radical dependence on God. Thus he accepts and even develops
Origen’s conception of the creation, fall, and return. However, as a student of Basil and Gregory
Nazianzen, Evagrius rejects Origen’s subordinated processions in the Trinity. Origen’s anthropology
highlights either the Platonic stress on the intellect’s pursuit of the Good, the Stoic stress on
governing reason (h_gemonikon or logos), or St. Paul’s model of body, soul, and spirit (1 Thess. 5.
23), which he sometimes conflates with the model of spiritual warfare between flesh and spirit in
Galatians 5. 17. Evagrius, in contrast, makes most use of Plato’s tripartite model of the soul from the
Republic and the Phaedrus, relating it at times to Paul’s conception of body, soul, and spirit.45
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Origen and Evagrius both addressed some of their works to specific people, such as
Origen’s friends, Ambrose and Tatiana, and Evagrius’s friends, Anatolios and Melania. However,
Evagrius’s general audience differs significantly from the urban hearers and readers of Origen,
many of whom are not monastics or ascetics, though Origen hopes to increase their commitment to
Christian life as he expands their understanding. Origen addresses his audience as fellow inquirers
with him. Evagrius, on the other hand, writes for other monastics who have already committed
themselves to asceticism and separation from the ordinary world and are having trouble. Like
Origen’s audience, they have reached various levels of progress, ability, and education; but
Evagrius presumes that all struggle and that many have little understanding of the commitment they
have made. He therefore expresses his thought, for the most part, in easily memorable46 gnomic
statements (kepahlaia), intended to educate by startling the hearers/readers out of the selfdestructive ruts in their thinking, whether despondent or vainglorious, so that they may replace
destructive thoughts (logismoi) with the constructive thoughts in Scripture. Columba Stewart points
out that Evagrius’s style does vary, however. The kephalaia decrease in length as the teachings
they contain become more difficult. In the most advanced teachings, such as the Kephalaia
Gnostika and the Reflections (Skemmata), “the texts become extremely dense, and are often koanlike in requiring focused meditation in order to crack them.”47 As the difficulty increases, the
kephalaia retain the interest of more advanced students; the “code” also prevents “access by the
46

Columba Stewart, “Evagrius Ponticus on Monastic Pedagogy” in Abba: Festschrift for Bishop Kallistos Ware of
Diokleia, ed. John Behr, Andrew Louth, and Dimitri Conomos (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003) 259.
47

Stewart, “Monastic Pedagogy,” 260.

30

uninitiated.”48 The “unitiated” might include monks unsympathetic to Evagrius’s use of Origen or
monks not yet ready for advanced contemplation. Evagrius felt that those disciples still entangled in
the passions need to persist in the task of self-awareness and not escape their own issues to pursue
contemplations that would, in any case, be beyond their capacity.49
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Even in the more expansive elementary works, such as the Praktikos and On the Thoughts,
though, there are few unnecessary words to distract the hearer from the process of inner
awareness; Evagrius does not want his words to get in the way of the hearer’s conversion and
transformation. Proceeding in a different way from Origen, he also encourages even beginners to
acquire a basic understanding of the psychological and spiritual struggle in which they are engaged.
In Praktikos, 43, for example, Evagrius urges his students to be aware of “the differences between
demons and to notice their different occasions” in order to be able to “speak to the thoughts” and,
with God’s help, deprive them of their power by naming them.50
Despite these differences, the freedom of the will and human responsibility constitute as
central a theme for Evagrius as they do for Origen. Although neither writer has the “faculty
psychology” developed in scholastic thought or a clear concept of an entity called “the will,” both
explore human freedom and responsibility. As it is for Origen, for Evagrius the freedom to choose is
the gift of God’s creation which which allows us to progress and to keep the progress we have
made, or instead, allows us to regress. By the intellect we see, but by our choices we move.
Freedom interacts with the intellect; if not, we fail to improve. We are visionaries, both literally and
figuratively; and we are equally choosers, movers, and do-ers. We have to do the truth (John 3. 21)
as well as see it. And in the doing we may not see; obedience takes some trust. There is necessarily
a dimension of not seeing (but believing) to the Christian concept of contemplation.
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Origen, priest and teacher in Alexandria and Palestinian Caesarea, and Evagrius, deacon of
Constantinople, anchorite of Kellia, and student of the Cappadocians and Origen— these two
Christian thinkers laid the foundations for a Christian theology of prayer which would combine the
intellectual vision of God with a relational union with God. Beginning with their emphasis on the will,
the paradoxical notion of doing the truth began to characterize Christian contemplation and take it
beyond the Platonists’ gaze at an eternal archetype.51 Plato, of course, assumed that the
philosophers would serve the city by helping to rule it according to the forms of justice and truth that
they had seen. For Origen and Evagrius, however, the hypostaseis of the Trinity themselves extend
charity toward us which enables us both to love God and to love each other in the Holy Spirit. The
Trinity is therefore more than an eternal archetype and model. Union with the Holy Trinity is eternal
life for us, both now and hereafter. One of the main entrances to eternal life is prayer, the act of
paying attention to God. Before prayer can be conversation with God, it must be paying attention,
i.e., turning one’s heart toward God in obedience.
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Works as diverse as the anonymous Cloud of Unknowing and Teresa of Avila’s Interior
Castle and Way of Perfection reveal the heritage left by Origen and Evagrius. Yet twice, at the turn
of the fifth century, and again in the mid-sixth, the teachings of Origen and Evagrius were
condemned. In all, the Anti-Origenists comprised a wide variety of people: Coptic monks in 399,
sixth-century Palestinian monks, several bishops, one emperor, and two women, Jerome’s friends,
Paula and Marcella.52 The bishops began the controversy as early as the 370s. Epiphanius of
Salamis wrote two works, the Ancoratus (374) and the Panarion (376), in which he accused Origen
of providing the basis of Arianism by teaching that the Son and the Holy Spirit are subordinate to the
Father within the Trinity.53 Following Methodius, Bishop of Tyre (d. 311), Epiphanius also rejected
Origen’s allegorical approach to Scripture and his doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul.54
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Despite these considerable Trinitarian and anthropological issues, no official action was
taken against Origen’s teachings for approximately twenty-five years. Origen remained under
suspicion, however. In 394, Epiphanius attacked again with a letter to John of Jerusalem, warning
him to protect his flock against Origen’s teachings. He now denounces Origen’s treatment of the
body and widens his concerns to three more of Origen’s anthropological tenets: “the original
bodiless condition of humans and their fall into bodies in the ‘second creation,’” the ultimate
salvations of demons and the devil, and Adam’s loss of the image of God.55 John of Jerusalem,
however, took no action. He had no axe to grind against Origen, and he did have reason to oppose
Epiphanius, who in Palestine, part of John’s jurisdiction, had ordained Jerome’s brother without
John’s consent.56 Epiphanius’s charges had more effect on Jerome, a student of Origen up to now.
In the 380s, indeed, Jerome had translated several of Origen’s works and even modeled his
women’s ascetic study group on Origen’s coeducational school. At that time, Jerome “took for
granted the profound identity of the minds of men and women,” and with such learned and
interested women in Rome as Marcella and Paula, he was able to make “the person of Origen his
own.”57 But when Origen was impugned, fearing guilt by association, Jerome turned against Origen
(and his own earlier educational convictions) and dissociated himself from him as early as 396.58
Later, as the Pelagian Controversy heated up in the early years of the fifth century, Jerome blames
both Origen and Evagrius for supplying Pelagius with the foundation for his heresy.59 In Letter 133,
To Ctesiphon, (written in 415), Jerome says that: “Evagrius of Ibera in Pontus . . . has published a
55
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book of maxims on apathy . . . a state in which the mind ceases to be agitated and— to speak
simply— becomes either a stone or God.”60 Having, perhaps sarcastically, misinterpreted Evagrian
apatheia as either total lack of feeling or the delusion of becoming God, Jerome dismisses it as
Pythagorean doctrine.61 Earlier in the same letter, Jerome rightly ascribes Evagrius’s stress on
overcoming the passions to Stoic doctrine but without in this context mentioning Evagrius by name.62
So far as I know, this letter contains the only mention of Evagrius’s connection with the Origenist
Controversy at the turn of the fifth century.
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Friend of both Jerome and Evagrius and student of Origen, Rufinus was in the middle of the
conflict; and he refused to abjure Origen. Continuing to translate Origen’s works, Rufinus was
convinced that where they veered toward heresy, his manuscripts had been altered by heretics.63
Jerome never forgave him. Thus, in the late 390s, battle-lines were being drawn, though still no
official action had been taken. In 399, the conflict came to a head. First, Pope Siricius, who was
sympathetic to the possibility of Origen’s orthodoxy, died. His successor, Pope Anastasius, lost no
time in condemning Origen’s works.64 Next, in the last days of 399, Egyptian monks,
“anthropomorphites,” approached Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria, to complain about their
Origenist confrères, for teaching that God is immaterial. The Anthropomorphites “following
descriptions of God in Scripture and the affirmation that human beings are made in God’s image and
likeness (Gen 1. 26),” believed that God had a human form (μoρφή).65 When Theophilus, who
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admired Origen’s theology, issued a letter refuting anthropomorphism, the monks returned to
threaten him with physical attack unless he condemned Origen.66 Theophilus gave in and
condemned Origen’s doctrine of God; and the Origenist Controversy formally began.67
66

For a different interpretation of “Anthropomorphism,” see Golitzin, 289-294. As represented in the Life of Apa
Aphou of Pemdje, the imago dei, mentioned in Genesis 1. 26, was, through Second Temple Jewish mystical tradition and later,
Clement of Alexandria, connected with the “divine form” of God ascribed in early Christian tradition to the Son, who supplies
the “form” of the human body. In partaking of the “Body of the Glory” in the Eucharist, Aphou argues that Christians “become”
that body and anticipate “that day when [all] shall be fed by the light of the Body of the Glory” (295). Both before the
incarnation and after the resurrection, the Son has a heavenly form, which to us is “light unapproachable.” It supplies the form of
our physical bodies nonetheless (293). There is a connection between “eating,” “knowing,” and “becoming” which Evagrius also
makes, e.g., in Gnostikos, 14. However, following Philo, Origen had moved the “heavenly form” from the body to the mind, a
move which Evagrius and Cassian both endorse (286-288). This article belies the common Origenist caricature of the antiOrigenist monks as uneducated bumpkins, expressed by Cassian in Conf. 10, though Golitzin allows that some may indeed have
been uneducated (294).
67

From 401 on, Theophilus condemned several other teachings of Origen: subordinationism in the Trinity, the
restoration of demons and the devil, and the possibility of another fall after the restoration. Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia
Gnostika’ d’Évagre le Pontique (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962) 98.

38

The final condemnation of Origenism, however, came only a century and a half later. A
conflict broke out in Palestine between the monks of the New Laura, who were students of Origen
and Evagrius, and those from the Great Laura and the Laura at Mar Saba (founded by St. Sabbas)
who were disturbed because Origenist ideas, taken mostly from Evagrius’s Kephalaia Gnostika,
were spreading rapidly.68 There were two groups of Origenists at this time: the Isochrists, who
believed that because Christ, like us before the Fall, is a created intellect, we will all be equal to
(isos) Christ in the Restoration, and the Protoctistes (πρ_τoς, first, plus κτιστός, created), who believed
that Christ is always superior to us because he was created first. The other monks were alarmed by
the strange christologies of both groups. Emperor Justinian had already issued an edict against
Origen’s doctrines in 543, basing ten anathemas mostly on On First Principles. Now, in 553,
Justinian felt that Origenism should be brought before the Second Council of Constantinople.
However, the doctrines brought to the Council, though recognizably related to Origen’s teachings,
were not the same as those condemned in 543. Guillaumont has shown that in fact, the fifteen
anathemas in 553 were aimed at the christology of Evagrius.69 The main anathemas of the Council
are as follows:
·

against anyone affirming the fabulous pre-existence of souls and the monstrous restoration
(apocatastasis) that follows from it (#1),

·

against anyone saying that the creation consists only of immaterial intelligences that gave themselves
over to other inclinations than the contemplation of God and so took on bodies; that
some took human souls, and some became demons according to the depth of their wickedness (#2-5),

·

against anyone saying that Christ had pity on the divers falls of the spirits who had been united in the
same unity (of which he himself is a part), and that to restore them he passed through divers classes,
had divers bodies, and has . . . finally taken flesh (#7),

·

against anyone saying that God the Word is so only in an inaccurate manner and because of the Fall
of the intelligences (#8),

·

against anyone saying that the consubstantial Trinity did not create the world, but rather “the working
68
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intelligence (Nous demiourgos)” which is more ancient than the world (#6),
·

against anyone saying that it was not the Divine Logos who descended into hell and ascended into
heaven, but that it was the Nous that did this, called Christ by virtue of his knowledge of the Monad
(#9),

·

against anyone saying that the heavenly powers and all humans and the devil and evil spirits are
united with the Word of God in all respects . . . and that the Kingdom of Christ shall have an end (#12),

·

against anyone teaching the two-stage eschaton which ends in the restoration (apocatastasis) of all
the intellectual beings (including the demons and Satan) to unity with God and the final destruction of
bodies, number, names, and worlds (#1, 11, 14),

·

and against anyone saying that the life of the spirits at the end shall be like their life at the beginning,
so that the end is just like the beginning (#15).70

Guillaumont shows that the sharp distinction which these anathematized teachings make
between the uncreated Son and Christ is traceable to Evagrius’s Kephalaia Gnostika. In this work
Christ is a created intellect (nous), equal essentially to all the other created intellects in the original
Unity, distinct from them only in strength of will, since the intellect that was Christ remained focused
on God when all the other intellects fell away. Rather than the Word assuming humanity, the created
intellect of Christ cleaves to the Word, willing only to contemplate (know) God. Cleaving to God, he
is united with the Word through this choice. As a result, there is a moral union, but no clear
ontological union between the human nature of Christ and God the Son; nor is there a clear
ontological distinction between Christ and the rest of us. It is not even clear that the created soul of
Christ is human, as the created intellects fell to three degrees, or into three ranks, angels, human
beings, and demons. According to the Council of Chalcedon, Christ is consubstantial (homoousios)
with God and consubstantial with humanity; therefore, we are able to participate in Trinitarian life in
Christ. However, we are never “equal” to Christ, whose human nature is joined to the uncreated Son
70
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of God in the hypostatic union. In ascribing the union to the created will of Christ, Evagrius
inadvertently embraces a version of adoptionism and aligns himself with Arius. He had different
reasons for thinking of Christ as a creature than those of Arius; that is, Evagrius does not, like Arius,
have the aim of upholding the monarchy of the One God (the Father). Rather, following Origen’s
lead, Evagrius upholds the importance of Christ’s free choice to cleave wholly to the Word. Origen’s
antagonists were the Gnostics and other types of fatalists, however; hence, Origen needed to insist
on moral freedom. Writing at the close of the Arian Controversy, Evagrius needed to stress Christ’s
ontological union with both God and humanity. When he sets forth his own doctrine in the Letter on
the Faith, Evagrius resolutely opposes Arius, as well as his philosophical descendants, Aetius and
Eunomius, and clearly asserts Christ’s union with God and with us. Nevertheless, by Chalcedonian
standards, the christology of the Kephalaia Gnostika leaves some fatal loopholes for heresy.
Despite the omission of the name of Evagrius in the anathemas of 553, it is obvious that both
Origen and Evagrius were implicated and recognized; for after the Second Council of
Constantinople, their works were suppressed. As a result, we know them only in part. Much of
Origen’s work was lost, both the original Greek versions of works that we now have only in Latin
translations and many of the works which had not been translated. Latin translations were also lost:
notably, Jerome’s “literal” translation of On First Principles.71 Of the remainder, in Greek we have
portions of On First Principles, eight books of the Commentaries on Matthew and John, twenty
homilies of Jeremiah, On Prayer, The Exhortation to Martyrdom, Against Celsus, Basil and Gregory
Nazianzen’s collection of works in the Philocalia, and Greek fragments of a previously unknown
book of the Commentary on Romans, discovered in 1941. Before the first wave of the Origenist
Controversy flared up, Jerome translated into Latin several homilies on the Song of Songs, Isaiah,
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Jeremiah, and Luke. These we still have.72 Because Rufinus continued his translations despite the
controversy, we also have Latin translations of On First Principles, ten books of the Commentary on
Romans, four books of the Commentary on the Song of Songs, and numerous homilies on Genesis,
Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Joshua, Judges, and Psalms. However, even some Latin translations
have been lost, among them Jerome’s literal translation of On First Principles.73
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Because Rufinus sometimes shortened Origen’s text, corrected it when it veered toward
heresy or seemed ambiguous, and translated for the general sense rather than word for word, a
major question of scholarship has been the reliability of his translations.74 To me it seems
reasonable to accept Heine’s conclusions: that Rufinus transmits the sense, but “except in those few
places where Rufinus retains the Greek word in his translation [or in those places where the Greek
version coexists, as in some parts of On First Principles], it is not possible . . . to ascertain with any
confidence Origen’s precise words.”75 Rufinus says himself that he corrects where Origen’s texts
have been changed by heretics.76 In correcting, he may have supplied fourth-to-fifth-century
answers to questions that Origen left open. We need to be especially careful with Rufinus’s
translations of statements about the Trinity and the resurrection of the body. Where we have both
Greek and Latin versions, we can compare them. But it seems probable that when no Greek
version exists, we can trust that Rufinus has transmitted at least the gist of Origen’s thought. New
discoveries are always possible. According to Maureen Beyer Moser, for example, the Tura papyrus,
discovered in 1941, has revealed Greek fragments of Origen’s Commentary on Romans; and where
they can be compared with the Latin version, they have established that Rufinus’s translation is
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more reliable than scholars had thought.77
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Evagrius’s writings had already begun to disappear from view in the early fifth century as a
result of Jerome’s attack in his Letter to Ctesiphon, which probably resulted in Cassian’s decision
not to credit Evagrius with the schema of the eight principal faults and his change of the concept of
apatheia to that of purity of heart.78 Jerome’s denunication was offset, however, both by Palladius’s
positive presentation of Evagrius in the Lausiac History and by Rufinus’s Latin translations, as well
as his eulogy of Evagrius in the Historia Monachorum.79 Since Evagrius wrote practical works, such
as the Praktikos, On the Thoughts, On Prayer, and several others, it was not absolutely necessary
to confront his Origenist speculations, although there are traces of them even there. Indeed, the
Latin world knew Evagrius only from his practical works despite what Jerome had written.80
Evagrius’s gnomic style may also have made it easier to regard him as orthodox. That is, Evagrius
tends to allude cryptically to his speculative theology rather than spell it out, so that its presence in
the practical works is encoded, so to speak. As far as we know, he expresses it “directly” in only two
works: the Kephalaia Gnostika and the

Letter to Melania. After the Second Council of

Constantinople, however, Evagrius’s works in Greek were suppressed; and Evagrius suffered what
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Clark and Guillaumont have termed a damnatio memoriae.81 Not only were the Greek versions of
these two works lost, but also many of the practical works. In addition, his sayings in the
Aphophthegmata Patrum were reduced and sometimes ascribed to others.82 In short, his name, his
literary presence, and his sayings almost disappeared. It is also probable that Palladius’s account of
Evagrius in the Lausiac History was shortened and expurgated.83
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Yet it was not until the Lateran Council of 649 that the name of Evagrius was added to
Origen’s when that council affirmed the anathemas of 553.84 However, even after the Third Council
of Constantinople reaffirmed the anathemas for the second time in 680, people did not want to
suppress Evagrius’s works entirely because they had become so central to the monastic way of life.
Some were preserved in Greek under a different (orthodox) name, especially that of St. Nilus, or
translated into Syriac, Armenian, Coptic, and other languages, with the Origenist speculations
sometimes removed or toned down.85 In “Nestorian” and “monophysite” areas of the Church86—that
is, in the Church of the East87 and in the Oriental Orthodox Churches,88— there was more openness
to the value of Evagrius’s writings and less respect for the authority of Greek church councils
because of the doctrinal schisms after the promulgation of the christological formula of Chalcedon.
For example, Babai the Great, a theologian of the Church of the East writing at the end of the
seventh century, thought that the true heretics were those who had condemned Evagrius,89 while in
the tradition of the Oriental Orthodox Churches, in a letter that has been lost, Philoxenus warned a
young theologian, Stephen Bar Soudaïli against reading the Kephalaia Gnostika because it
contained some deviant theological formulas. Later, in the 12th century, Denys Bar Salibi writes that
in reality, Philoxenus meant that the Kephalaia Gnostika should be read only by the advanced
84

Guillaumont, ‘Les Kephalaia Gnostika,’ 136.

85

Guillaumont compares and translates unexpurgated and expurgated versions of the Kephalaia Gnostika in Les
‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962).
86

“Nestorian” and “monophysite” are now considered to be reductive and highly offensive terms. Though they are still
in use in theology text books as a kind of shorthand or mnemonic device, it is better to avoid them.
87

The “Church of the East” (the Holy Apostolic and Catholic Assyrian Church of the East) opposes the rulings of
Ephesus and Chalcedon that Mary is “Theotokos” and claims a special relationship with the apostle Thaddeus. See
http://www.jmahoney.com/eastern.htm for further detail.
88

These include the Armenian and Syrian Churches as well as the Coptic Churches of Egypt and Ethiopia. While they
reject the christological formula of Chalcedon, they do not, as is commonly believed, teach that Christ has only a divine nature.
Rather, they stress the perfection of the union of divinity and humanity, not sufficiently expressed by the Council of Chalcedon
in their views. See again http://www.jmahoney.com/eastern.htm.
89

Guillaumont, Un philosophe, 88.

47

because it was not for “sages” of the exterior realm, but only for those whose intellects were
sufficiently purified to understand it.90 In the end, even in Chalcedonian Christianity, Evagrius’s
works were not entirely suppressed because they were too foundational to monasticism and simply
too good. Instead, many of them were integrated into the teachings of others, such as Cassian,
Diodochus, and Maximus the Confessor, or circulated under other names, such as that of St. Nilus.
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Guillaumont notes the profound influence of Evagrius’s works on Christian spirituality,
especially his vocabulary for the practical and contemplative stages of spiritual growth, such as, for
example, theoria (contemplation, with its different stages), apatheia (impassibility, purification of the
passions), and hesychia (designating the silence and solitude necessary for prayer)91 as well as the
eight thoughts (logismoi) which obstruct spiritual progress. In the Institutes and Conferences,
Cassian introduced the logismoi to the West (with their remedies), while in the East, John Climacus,
Maximus the Confessor, and Dorotheus developed them further. At the turn of the seventh century,
Pope Gregory the Great reduced their number to seven and they became the Seven Deadly Sins of
medieval penitential handbooks and general literature.92 Evagrius is also the spiritual ancestor of
Gregory Palamas and others, who “saw” the divine light in the intellectual vision of God, devoid of
form and concept.93
Origen too had an enormous influence on Christian spirituality, from biblical exegesis to
Trinitarian doctrine to anthropology to the theology of prayer and the relation of all of these to the
ordinary life of the Christian. Thus we have a contradictory situation. De jure, the Church said “No”
to their cosmology, anthropology, soteriology, and to certain aspects of their Trinitarian teachings,
affirming the anathemas of the Second Council of Constantinople both in 649 and in 680. Yet, de
facto the Church said “Yes” to Origenist spirituality and even to one tenet of Origen’s doctrine of the
Trinity: the Father’s eternal generation of the Son. As a result, there has been an implicit disjunction
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between their (heretical or dangerous) doctrines of God and salvation, on the one hand, and their
(orthodox or acceptable) spirituality on the other. Neither for Evagrius nor for Origen was truth
divided, however. Though revealed on many levels and in different ways to different people, truth is
one. In his Commentary on the Gospel of John, Origen makes this point explicitly:
“For every person imaginable would admit that the truth is one. . . . Now if truth is one, it is clear
that its elaboration and demonstration, which is wisdom, would reasonably be thought of as one,
since . . . [it] would not properly be called wisdom if it did not possess the truth (2. 39).”94

Indeed, as Jaroslav Pelikan reminds us, in the first four centuries of Christianity, everyone believed
that he was defending the one truth: “one’s opponents were not merely espousing a different form of
Christian obedience, they were teaching false doctrine.”95 Always at stake was salvation, which
everyone agreed was jeopardized by a faith that does not come down to us from the Apostles, but is
a deviation from that norm.
How, then, are we to account for the fact that two theologians, declared heretical at several
points, gave the basic framework and much of the vocabulary for understanding Christian life in
general and Christian prayer in particular? In answering this question, I will argue that Origen and
Evagrius both saw Christian prayer as the “intersection” of the knowledge of God and the knowledge
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of the self as creature. Accordingly, Origen and Evagrius both had to deal with the difficult issues of
who God is and who “we” are. In order to clear the way for all Christians to pray, Origen had to
refute the arguments of both the Gnostics and the Marcionites that the God of the Old Testament,
who created men and women in the image of God, was a brutal, lesser deity than the God of the
New (in whose image, it was argued, we are not created). In order to defend the unity of the
Christian Scriptures, Origen developed his typological and allegorical approaches to Scripture, in the
process, demonstrating that “higher truths” lie concealed in the very parts of Scripture that his
opponents rejected. Origen also needed to refute all forms of fatalism and to assert that salvation is
available for anyone who desires and seeks it. As long as we believe that we are fated, either to be
saved or to be condemned, we will not believe that it makes sense to pray. But God created us “in
the image,” thereby giving all people the freedom to turn to God voluntarily and thus move into
“God’s likeness,” which is charity (agap_). As we become like God in holiness and love of one
another, we become capable of knowing God and of understanding the ways in which God teaches
us, whatever level we have reached.
Therefore, divine and human freedom are both crucial to Origen’s doctrine of God as
Creator. In God’s goodness, God chose to create intellectual beings and to endow them in turn with
the goodness and the freedom to make the choices that are analogous to God’s own creative
choices (Princ., 2. 9. 2). In Origen’s view, Plato had a partial idea of the truth when he posited that
the demiurge created the world out of his will to spread the excellence of the Good by creating a
world as much like himself as possible (30a). In the light of Clement’s striking description of the
whole person in prayer in Stromateis 7. 7, it is probable that Origen developed his conception of the
will on a trajectory suggested by Clement. Using the metaphor of physical movement to express the
intellect’s choice of focus, Origen posits that the created intellects were free to move in the direction
they chose. When they withdrew their attention from God, they moved away from God and “fell” into
the worlds and bodies which God created for them, both as their punishment and as their
pedagogical situation. In other words, God planned both the appropriate world and the path of
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return for each creature, in response to each decision that each creature would make. For all
creatures who follow this path of return, there is a correlation between making the right moral
choices and knowing the glory of God in contemplation. This correlation means that even to read
Scripture with understanding requires confronting one’s own temptations both of thought and deed.
The mysteries of God can be understood only by those who have prepared themselves morally
through the practice of confronting temptation. To see how we confront temptation is to begin to
know who we are. Apart from learning to know ourselves, we cannot understand the divine love
which the Scriptures proclaim.
The strength of Origen’s vision consists in its inclusiveness and in its absolute avoidance of
dualism. The term “created intellects” includes all beings who are now angels, human beings, and
demons. That is, a demon is not some demonic essence that would be opposed to God’s goodness
by its very nature, but a created intellect who chose to turn away from God to such a degree that it
now has a demonic body and identity. But God respects the will of even a demon and gives it a
chance to change direction and return. The weakness of Origen’s vision consists in the loopholes it
leaves for heretical interpretation and in its failure to reckon with the exclusive tendency in human
nature: that is, many theologians lacked Origen’s inclusive spirit. Jerome and others, for example,
did not like the idea of redemption being open to demons. They wanted an ontologically defined
separation from demons as well as complete separation from them in eschatological life. In my
view, the strengths outweigh the weaknesses. Granted, Origen’s stress on freedom led to the
Trinitarian and christological challenges which Origen could not have foreseen, given the context of
his time. But his conception of freedom also opened the possibility for us to conceive of God as a
teacher who works very personally with each of us, both in life and in prayer, through the choices we
make, given the possibilities we have.
In taking Origen’s system as his framework, Evagrius keeps the cosmological account of the
Creation (that is, its two stages, the original intellectual creation and the second creation as a
consequence of the Fall) and develops Origen’s metaphor of movement for choice. Recall that he
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does not talk about “the will” as an inner entity so much as he analyzes its movements. For example,
we try to move toward God; but the demons, being opposed to this movement, do what they can to
drag us away from God and “down” to their level. Evagrius needs the whole spiritual geography
which he inherited from Origen in order to treat the full subtlety of the conscious and unconscious
choices of the will. The concrete metaphor of movement, adopted from Origen, is a more flexible
way of dealing with choice, sin, and grace than an abstract theological language would be because,
as we shall see in Chapter Two, it allows him to survey both the conscious and unconscious realms
in one view and at the same time to suggest viscerally the damage done to the human person by
sin. That is the strength of Evagrius’s Origenism. Its weakness is once again Trinitarian and
christological problems of which Evagrius, educated by the Cappadocian Fathers, seems at times to
have been aware; for example, in his treatment of the eschatological unity of the rational creation
with the Trinity, as we have already seen.
Why did he not resolve such questions as these? Although we cannot know for certain, I
think that Evagrius may have been upholding the promise of 1 Corinthians 15. 28: “When all things
are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to the one who put all things in
subjection under him, so that God may be all in all.” Evagrius refers to this passage in the Letter to
Melania (5. 165):
There will be a time when the Father, the Son, and the Spirit and their rational creation which
constitutes their body will cease to be separate. . . this can be concluded from the text, ‘God will
be all in all.’”96
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In addition, Evagrius explored the meaning of a formless, imageless type of prayer that takes the
person praying beyond human words and concepts to a knowledge of God and a unity with God. It
has been well established that Evagrius held that the mind must discard visual concepts and
depictions, beginning with those that are impassioned.97 Biblical and theological concepts are a
more complicated issue. Although Evagrius is not an antinomian who rejects Biblical and theological
concepts as valueless, for him, such an immediate union with God demands a letting go of all
concepts to the “uncircumscribable” reality behind the concepts. While his trajectory may be NeoPlatonic, he also owes it to the Cappadocians’ response to Eunomius in the Arian Controversy. As
we shall see, this letting go is not a rejection of theological concepts but a recognition of their
ultimate limitations. Thus in the end, his approach to prayer is more radically apophatic than
Origen’s and is probably more similar to that of Gregory of Nyssa, as expressed in the Life of Moses.
Unlike Gregory, whose theology escaped censure, Evagrius did not cast aside Origen’s problematic
cosmology because it was too useful for him in his project of viewing human sin and delusion in the
perspective of the amazing creativity and love of God.
Jaroslav Pelikan points out that the formation of Christian doctrine is conditioned by the
opponents against whom one is fighting. In the first four centuries, Christianity competed against
several philosophies which offered not only an understanding of human existence and the world,
but also a way of life. Therefore, in the early Christian centuries, apologists for Christianity had to
argue against several forms of dualism and an equal number of forms of fatalism.98 It is important to
consider the relationship between Origen’s concept of freedom and his doctrine of God against the
backdrop of the theological controversies of his day, the disputes with the Gnostics and with
Marcion. Of course, the disputes provide only the direction against which Origen worked; the
positive direction was provided by Scripture. However, a closer look at the disputes clarifies
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Origen’s direction: that is, his reasons for choosing “movement” as his central metaphor for choice.
As we shall see, for Origen, the freedom of choice is as essential to the image of God in human
beings as is the intellect. Human freedom is grounded in Origen’s thought about the Trinity.
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In the second generation of the Arian Controversy, one of the main issues is whether God is
knowable. Evagrius stands on the shoulders of both Basil and Gregory Nazianzen as he formulates
his own answer, works out his own teaching on the Trinity in his Letter on the Faith, and formulates
his thought on imageless prayer. Once the Arian controversy was settled, however, christological
issues and the anthropological issue of sin and grace, began to come to the fore; and Christian
theology was unsettled once again.99 On the one hand, Evagrius continued to uphold Origen’s
conviction that freedom of choice is part of being human. He therefore would seem to line up with
Pelagius. On the other hand, he would have radically disagreed with Pelagius that each person is
born in Adam’s original state of innocence.100 Evagrius agreed with Origen that the creation of the
material world results from the Fall. He did not reach Augustine’s conclusion, however, that
humanity can do nothing to contribute to the process of salvation because the human will is
terminally enslaved to sin.101 With Origen and (later) Cassian, he would have assumed not only that
we can cooperate with God’s grace, but that the freedom to choose to cooperate with grace defines
us as human.
Like Origen, Evagrius asks the question of “how far” a creature has fallen, whereas for
Augustine, “fallen” is “fallen,” separated from God and helpless to rise. To discuss the degree to
which different individuals might have fallen would, for Augustine, be pointless.102 Evagrius’s
anthropology is more pessimistic than either Origen’s or Cassian’s, however. In his effort to analyze
the human struggle with negative thoughts and demons, Evagrius had to face the damage done by
sin to the human person. Sin blinds, deceives, enslaves; and we share the responsibility for doing
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these things to ourselves. Conversion to God is therefore a narrow path with many wrong turns.
Because of the constant danger of self-deception, Evagrius came to see human freedom as fragile
indeed. Prayer, therefore, is crucial because it teaches us to see the principles of the struggle, that
is, to know the price of our salvation in contrast to the price of rejecting it.

II. Chapter One: How Do We Know the One True God?

A. Sources of Understanding: Scripture and the Hellenistic Philosophies
A fitting preface to an exploration of any doctrine of God is provided by Catherine Mowry
LaCugna’s introduction to God for Us: “For Christian theology, the mystery of God can be thought of
only in terms of the mystery of grace and redemption. We can make true statements about God . . .
only on the basis of the economy, corroborated by God’s self-revelation in Christ and the Spirit.”103
In other words, we cannot speak metaphysical truth about God in se separately from God’s plan of
salvation, carried out in history and revealed in Scripture. Nor can we divorce this “salvation history”
(oikonomia) from who God is in se (theologia) . The first option would result in a doctrine of God
having no relation to human experience; the second would result in unanswerable questions about
whether the God revealed in Scripture is truly God.104 Because we necessarily read the record of
salvation history in Scripture through the lens of our own history, there is always need to reinterpret
the relation between oikonomia and theologia. Ecumenical councils and papal definitions define the
limits and possibilities of orthodox doctrine, but they cannot exhaust the meaning of revelation.
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Because each generation has new concerns which result in new readings of Scripture, the relation
between oikonomia and theologia (in the above strict sense) can never be taken for granted.
Origen and Evagrius both make serious attempts to relate the realm of oikonomia to that of
theologia. There are two aspects of this challenge. They need to answer not only the question of
who God is, but also the related question of how we can know God. As we have seen, they work in
a Platonic context which serves them well; for Plato too struggled with the problem of how anything
real could come to be known in a world characterized by constant change.105 We will also find
Origen and Evagrius adverting to Stoic thought and to Aristotle’s categories and logical paradigms,
both in themselves and in their later development by the Stoics.
Aside from the account of creation which Origen borrowed from the Timaeus, there is one
other Platonic construct that is essential to an understanding of the way in which Origen and
Evagrius understand knowledge of God: the divided line of knowledge in Book Six of the Republic.
Having established that the Good is both the object of knowledge and the source of knowledge (as
the sun is both object and source of eyesight), Socrates maps the intelligible world and the visible
world on an unequally divided line, then divides each realm in two according to the same ratio. The
result is four ways of knowing arranged from the highest to the lowest: Understanding (no_sis),
Thought (dianoia), Belief (pistis), and Imagination (eikasia). Use of thought and understanding will
bring us into knowledge (epist_m_) of intelligible reality; but we also need belief and imagination,
even though the knowledge they reveal is uncertain, because they are necessary stages of learning.
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Two points of Plato’s analysis are important for our exploration of Origen and Evagrius. First,
the human mind (nous) is intrinsically oriented to the Good. The Good is both the final object of
knowledge and the source of the mind’s power to know. The human nous corresponds to reality;
indeed, the reality of the Good is co-extensive with the human nous. Thus, as the mind becomes
more capable of knowing, it finds truer objects of knowledge. By the time one is able to know the
Forms and the overarching Good, there is “such conformity between nous and its Object that all
further questions are rendered meaningless . . . the true First Principle of thought” has been
found.106 The process of ascending to truth is complex, however, because the ascent is not merely
intellectual, but also moral. The whole person must prepare both body and soul to receive truth, first
by engaging in appropriate diet and exercise, then by living a life of virtue. For Plato, physical health
supports moral virtue; and moral virtue is a pre-requisite for the knowledge of the Good from which
all virtue stems.107
Second, each level of knowledge provides an image (or copy) of the superior knowledge in
the level just above it: “As the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to the thing it is like”
(Republic 6. 510 a).108 Thus, the visible world provides an image of the intelligible world; and belief
provides an image of thought, which itself is an image of true understanding. In an extended sense,
the entire knowable world is ordered to the need of the human nous to apprehend the Good. Both
the visible world and intelligible reality form a ladder of knowledge. At the bottom, imagination is
uncertain, comparable to the shadows cast by the firelight in the cave, according to Plato’s
instructive myth in Book Seven of the Republic. Because we perceive through our senses, even
images have their use. But it is dangerous to be content with images; for they are untrustworthy, as
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can be seen by the fact that a stick, partially inserted in water, appears bent. The same
deceptiveness characterizes conventional opinion, which might judge, according to appearance, that
the stick actually is bent.
Above sensible knowledge is the lower intelligible level, where conclusions are reached by
the use of generally accepted postulates, as in mathematics. Mathematical knowledge is not about
particular squares and rectangles, etc. (Republic, 6. 527 c), but about the intelligible truth that is true
of all squares, all rectangles, etc. (6. 510 b).109 This level is thought (dianoia), but not truly
knowledge (epist_m_) because the postulates are not referred to a higher principle which gives them
validity, but are just accepted as true.110 To find the underlying truth of a postulate, one uses
philosophical dialectic (elenchos),111 a process of cross-examination which seeks the first principles
that ground all postulates. Dialectic is not argument that supports a thesis, but rather, a process of
inquiry that uncovers assumptions, thereby helping the inquirer to separate truth from the falsehood
that is part of conventional opinion.112 When the true first principles are found, these are the Ideas
or the Forms. Only this knowledge of first principles qualifies as epist_m_, the certain knowledge
which gives understanding (no_sis). Because Plato believed that the world is intelligible, he held
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that there “must be a good in relation to which and for the sake of which whatever is good finds its
justification” (or reason for being). The final good requires no justification because it is the source of
justification for everything else. Thus, the Good is the _ρχή, the first principle of truth and the first
principle of the human mind.113 The knower, the nous, and the known, the Good, are kin.
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Plato’s ideas are not the standard of truth for Origen and Evagrius, but a lens through which
to understand the truth. Like Plato, they search for the “first principles.” Like Plato, they understand
the visible world, or God’s visible creation, as an image of God’s intelligible creation of the virtues
and angelic powers. However, Scripture, as the revealed word of God, is for them the starting-point
of knowledge. In affirming that despite the Fall, human beings can respond to God’s grace and be
restored to the intellectual purity necessary to contemplate God and participate in God’s life, Origen
grounds his affirmation in the scriptural account of the creation of man and woman in the image of
God (Gen 1. 26-27): “Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our
likeness’ . . . So God created humankind in his image; in the image of God he created them; male
and female he created them” (NRSV). This passage already takes Origen beyond Plato, who would
have said that created reality reveals only the intelligible level just above it; for humanity, that would
have been merely the angelic level. Building on his definition of Christ as the “exact image” of God,
Origen associates the image of God in humankind with Christ, in whom all people are created.114
Thus, through Christ, human beings have an analogous affinity with God in both intellect and will:
“We, therefore, having been made according to the image, have the Son, the original, as the truth of
the noble qualities that are within us. And what we are to the Son, such is the Son to the Father,
who is the truth” (Princ. 1. 2. 6).
The Fall has, however, muddled the truth of this correspondence. Sin subjects the intellect to
demonic suggestions and weakens the will. Thus, instead of following God’s will, we blindly follow
“many wills,” those of both the flesh and the [evil] thoughts which tempt us.115 Scripture is a difficult
road to the knowledge of God because sin impairs our ability to read it. Nor is our weakened
condition the only reason for the difficulty of Scripture. Some passages of Scripture are intrinsically
114

See “Genesis: Homily 1," 13 in Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, trans. Ronald E. Heine, FC 71
(Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1981) and my discussion below.
115

The Commentaries of Origen and Jerome on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians, ed. Ronald E. Heine (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002) 123-124, col. 1.

62

obscure, containing depths of meaning which even an attentive and persistent reader may not be
able to discern:
Divine wisdom has arranged for there to be certain stumbling blocks or interruptions of the
narrative meaning, by inserting in its midst certain impossibilities and contradictions, so that the
very interruption of the narrative might oppose the reader, as it were, with certain obstacles
thrown in the way (Princ. 4. 2. 9).116

According to Origen, God intends that we be frustrated when Scripture does not make sense, when
“wisdom denies a way and access to the common understanding.” Not that divine wisdom truly
destines us for ultimate frustration; but the difficulties we find in Scripture are a sign that we are
called to “the beginning of another way,” that by reading even more attentively and purifying our
minds with care (Princ. 4. 2. 7), we may take the narrow path to “the immense breadth of divine
knowledge” (Princ. 4. 2. 9). While God invites us and provides grace for the journey, we must
respond to God by taking the narrow path of ongoing study and moral practice in order to reach that
immense breadth of contemplation.
For Origen, then, the main question is how to interpret scriptural texts which present differing
“windows” to the mystery of God so that one can safely “mount up” from the historical accounts in
Scripture to the mystery of God as Trinity. Without going into full detail here, I offer three points
which will guide my study: First, neither Scripture nor the most profound of theological discussions
can remove the mystery from the being of God. For human beings, the goal is reverent
contemplation, participation in divine life, not the possessive grasp of academic knowledge. Second,
in order to know God as mystery, one must prepare, through both study and the living of a Christian
life. Third, Christ, as Son of God and Word, is the only means by which we know the Father,
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whether in Scripture or in life. Therefore, we make progress only in and through Christ, in whose
image all are created and to whose image all are to be restored.
At stake is our salvation, for misinterpretation of Scripture results in false teachings. The
false teachers that Origen targets are Marcion and the Gnostics, Basilides, Valentinus, and
Valentinus’s disciple, Heracleon. Although Marcion and the Gnostics differ in several respects, they
agree in their presumed freedom to alter Scripture, Marcion having cut out the Old Testament and
much of the New, while the Gnostics had assumed the Scriptures into their eclectic, free-floating
mythological systems. In Origen’s view, both groups were equally guilty of misinterpreting Scripture
and changing it to reflect “new and improved” beliefs that deviated from the apostolic Rule of Faith.
Thus, it was his aim to show that their epistemologies were as false as their versions of the doctrine
of God. For Origen, contemplation of a false version of God does not help anyone draw closer to the
true God. Marcion and the Gnostics propose dead-end roads; and their adherents are in real
danger.117
Fundamentally, Evagrius shares Origen’s conviction that the destiny of all created beings is
to contemplate the mystery of God and to participate in it. He also develops Origen’s idea of the need
for preparation through study and inner purification. For him too, freely chosen moral practice is the
key to contemplation. Only by facing the challenges of Christian service and scores of inner and outer
temptations, can we emerge from knowledge that is partial and sinful into the vision of the mystery of
God. In the ascetic tradition of the Egyptian desert, Evagrius presumes that no one can progress
without the help of others who have traveled the same path. Indeed, both by writing and by giving
spiritual direction, Evagrius spent much of his monastic life assisting others to travel that true road
toward knowledge of God. However, his vision differs from Origen’s in certain respects. Where
Origen corrected Marcion and the Gnostics, Evagrius was formed by the second generation of the
117

In his tenth Conference, Cassian provides the example of Serapion, whose anthropomorphic concept of God has
resulted in the contemplation of a false version of God. See Conf. 10. 3. 1 - 4. 1. As Serapion’s example demonstrates and
modern spiritual directors know, movement from illusion to increased understanding of God can be extremely painful.

64

Arian Controversy. His teachers, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, were engaged in refuting Aetius and
Eunomius, who based their ontological subordination of the Son and the Holy Spirit on a particular
epistemology: the theory that there is a univocal relation between human theological language and
the essence of God. That is, Aetius and Eunomius contended that theological words provide full
knowledge of God’s being. Basil and Gregory Nazianzen (and Gregory of Nyssa as well) needed to
refute this theory of knowledge as well as the subordinationism to which it led. Evagrius, who, as we
have seen, admired Basil and served as Gregory’s assistant at the First Council of Constantinople,
reflects the entire controversy.
Therefore, in distinguishing between human knowledge of God and God in se, Evagrius is
able to define the Trinity more systematically than Origen, who taught by exploring questions that he
did not always answer definitively. At the same time as he uses theological language more precisely,
however, Evagrius is also more sharply aware of the limitations of all human theological language
than Origen needed to be. In this chapter, I will discuss Origen’s doctrine of God against the
backdrop of his Marcionite and Gnostic opponents. Against them, he develops a view of the Trinity
which is both ontological and moral. Against them, he also insists on God’s mystery as an important
ingredient of God’s revelation. I will then trace Evagrius’s development of Origen’s Trinitarian thought
as he worked it out through the contemporary challenge of the Arian Controversy.

B. One in Divinity and Participation:
Origen’s Answer to Marcion and the Gnostics
Since Basilides, Valentinus, Heracleon, and Marcion all flourished in the mid-second century,
they were long-since deceased by the time Origen was writing. Gnostic and Marcionite churches
lasted through the fourth and even into the fifth century in some areas, however;118 and Origen’s
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patron and friend, Ambrose, was a converted Valentinian.119 Hence, even though Tertullian had
already trounced Marcion, and both Irenaeus and Clement had exposed the errors of the Gnostics,120
Origen needed to continue the combat, if only for the sake of Christians of his own time who might
stray. For Origen, the most dangerous tenets are these three:
·

the plurality of deities which results from Gnostic reliance on emanated hypostases;

·

the dualism of both Marcion and the Gnostics, as they posit both a “good” God and a “bad”
God, thereby severing the Old Testament from the New and the Creator from the Father of
Jesus Christ; and

·

Gnostic fatalism.

Origen’s response to these challenges was twofold: an ongoing and updated reflection on how
Scripture reveals the nature of God to us and a doctrine of the Trinity that holds in balance the
distinction of God’s hypostaseis while strongly affirming their unity.
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Origen’s main contribution to Trinitarian doctrine is universally agreed to be the Father’s
eternal generation of the co-eternal Son. In taking the begetting of the Son out of time, so to speak,
Origen could have forestalled one of the errors of Arianism: a time or a primordial “when” the Son
was not. Origen makes another valuable contribution, however, which was to influence the
Cappadocian Fathers and Evagrius. In essence, Origen explains the relations of the Three to the
One by forging a combination of ontological union with moral union. While presupposing the
ontological union of the three hypostaseis of the Trinity, albeit in subordinated order — all three are
God, but within the Godhead, the Father is highest — Origen is not content with ontological
language because of the possibility of understanding “essence” (ousia) as some sort of refined
material “stuff,”121 as the Stoics understood “spirit,” for example.122 He prefers the language of
participation and shared will. Anticipating Thomas Aquinas, who conceived of God as pure act,
Origen suggests that we think of God as power, love, and glory: as creating, sharing divine life,
teaching, intervening, and shaping the return of the whole creation to its original contemplative unity.
Indeed, created beings are endowed with freedom of will, the created and finite form of God’s
freedom to create. With the common goal of assisting creatures to move toward holiness, the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are active in our lives. As a corollary to this stress on choice and act, the image
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of God in human beings consists not only of intellect, but also of will, the freedom to move. We are
created to make choices; and God responds to the choices we make. Thus, Origen’s rejection of
fatalism is absolute.
In formulating this doctrine of God, Origen had to meet a twofold challenge: to derive it from
the best exegesis of Scripture he could manage while simultaneously refuting the exegesis of his
opponents. Note that opposed as they were, Origen, Marcion, and the various Gnostic thinkers
shared a common intellectual and spiritual heritage. First, they were all educated in the major
philosophies of Late Antiquity: Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and Middle Platonism. Second, they shared
a knowledge of the Jewish and Christian scriptures. Marcion, Basilides, and Valentinus all saw
themselves as Christians; it was only later, as a result of the Apologists’ polemical writings, that
Gnostics separated from the Christian churches and formed their own communities,123 as did the
Marcionites.124 Where they disagreed was on the question of how to interpret Scripture. Marcion
favored a literal approach (as Origen’s bishop, Demetrius of Alexandria may also have done, though
he was not a Marcionite);125 while the Gnostics’ approaches to Scripture were eclectic and their
systems an idiosyncratic amalgam of Scripture, Middle Platonism, and mythology. Origen read
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Scripture allegorically and typologically in order to show its essential unity. Moreover, as Khaled
Anatolios has shown, for Origen, the essential unity of Scripture is the proclamation of the coming of
Christ in the Incarnation.126 As Word and Wisdom, “Christ is not only the author of the Scriptures but
also the interpreter of them . . . . The Incarnation . . . is thus the decisive interpretation” of God’s
interactions with humanity in all of salvation history.127
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Thus, although each group could make use of the same building blocks in their search for
Christian truth, they used them in ways that are radically different. The Gnostics, who worked out
several theological systems, appear to have put everything on the same level of truth: Jesus, the
Platonic Demiurge, the paired Aeons in the Ogdoad, the Creator God of the Old Testament—any
element of their mythical systems can be taken from any other system. Marcion, in contrast, will
have nothing to do with mythology; he sticks to Scripture with a fundamentalistic tenacity, demanding
from it a literal consistency. In an effort to explain the existence of evil, he begins with Luke 6. 43:
“No good tree bears bad fruit, nor again does a bad tree bear good fruit.” He concludes logically that
good and evil do not have a common origin. Yet in Isaiah 45. 7, God claims to be the creator of both
good and evil. If his claim is true, the Creator must be evil, the bad tree. Therefore, the Creator, the
God of the Old Testament, is not the God of the New Testament; he is a deity who is just but not
good.128 From this point, Marcion reasons that the Old Testament should be rejected. Eventually, he
rejects much of the New Testament as well, allowing only Paul’s letters and part of Luke’s Gospel.
Against his opponents, Origen argues that their false conclusions about God result from their
misinterpretations of Scripture.

Reading the Old Testament literally and finding much of it

inconsistent with the New, Marcion has resolved the conflict by positing two gods, one good, the
other inferior, just but not good. As for the Gnostics, their inability to cope with figurative language led
them to posit separate emanations for each attribute of God. Sharing the assumption that matter is
evil, both groups failed to come to terms with the Incarnation, as well as with the affirmation of
Genesis that God created heaven and earth directly.129 But for Origen, Christians do not have the
right to subordinate Scripture to another system (as the Gnostics did) or to reject the parts of
Scripture that are difficult or even, on appearance, ridiculous. If we are to discern the meaning of
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difficult passages, allegorical and typological approaches to Scripture are an interpretive necessity.
Origen does not mean that the literal narrative should always be ignored. In fact, “the passages that
can be established according to the narrative meaning are far more numerous than those that contain
only the spiritual meaning”; and many passages contain both levels of meaning (Princ. 4. 3. 4).
How are these distinguished? In general, Origen follows Paul in distinguishing an inner, or
spiritual meaning from the outer, or fleshly meaning:
Therefore, since we have been taught by Paul that there is one Israel according to the flesh and
another according to the Spirit, when the Savior says, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the
house of Israel” (Mt 15. 24), we do not understand him as do they who have an earthly wisdom . .
. Rather, we understand that there is a nation of souls named Israel. Even the meaning of the
name itself suggests this, since Israel is translated “the mind seeing God” (Princ. 4. 3. 8).

This spiritual sense of “Israel” derives from the literal chosen people of Israel who, Paul asserts, had
the first opportunity to receive Jesus as savior and Messiah but turned it down (Rom 9. 6-8). Without
the literal sense of “Israel,” a spiritual sense of “Israel” would have no meaning.
In Origen’s hands, then, allegory and typology are not mechanical substitutions for what is
written in the text of Scripture but rather extensions of the literal meaning which reveal the underlying
unity of Scripture, the whole of which reveals Christ from different perspectives. Marcion’s mistake
was not to value the literal meaning of the text but to deny the spiritual sense of it. Therefore, when
he encountered apparently conflicting statements about God, his only recourse was to reject the
major part of Scripture.
Although the weakness of the allegorical and typological methods is a tendency toward a
collapse of the distinctions of history and genre,130 its strength is its provision of various figurative
glimpses of the redeeming work of Christ. In his homilies on Joshua, for example, Origen begins with
the fact that in Hebrew, Jesus and Joshua are variants of the same name. Therefore, Joshua, who
leads the battle against the peoples of Canaan, is a type of Jesus of Nazareth, who leads his Church
130

For a critique of the view that allegory and typology always ignore historical context as well as a survey of the
scholarly debates about the use of allegory and typology in the patristic era, see Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading Renunciation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 70-103.

71

in the battle against the powers of darkness. Joshua said, “Every place you have set the soles of your
feet will be yours” (Jos 1. 3). Jesus promises to “crush Satan under our feet” (Rom 16. 20).131 For
anyone who works with him, Jesus will defeat the powers of darkness within each person (Hom. on
Jos. 1. 6). From Origen’s viewpoint, Marcion failed to perceive the typology, probably because he
was one of those people who “bring too little zeal to the training of their minds” (Princ. 4. 2. 2). He
therefore saw only a warlike God with his warlike leader and missed the message of God’s love
which is present to us at any time or place.
For Origen, even the most difficult scriptural passages provide gateways to contemplation and
divine wisdom (Princ. 4. 2. 3):
And what must we say about the prophecies, which we all know are filled with riddles and dark
sayings? Or if we come to the gospels, the accurate interpretation even of these, since it is the
mind of Christ, demands that grace that was given to him who said, “We have the mind of Christ”
. . . As for the apostolic episodes, [who of those who understand the texts] would think them to be
plain and easily understood, when even in them there are thousands of passages that provide, as
if through a window, a narrow opening leading to multitudes of the deepest thoughts [Butterfield’s
translation of the Greek; Rufinus’s translation has the narrow opening through which pours “the
brightness of an immense light”132].
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Thus, Origen insists that whatever the apparent obscurity in a given passage, the whole of the Old
Testament speaks of Christ and the Church. Throughout Scripture, God’s message is the same: love
of God’s people. There is no “just- but- cruel” God set against a good God, but only a variety of
perspectives on God’s ways of working with fallen human beings. It therefore makes sense that
Origen understands the Song of Songs, for example, as an explication of the “love with which the
blessed soul burns and is on fire in regard to the Word of God” as well as the song which the soul
sings “through the Spirit, by which the Church is . . . united with its heavenly bridegroom Christ.”133
Even Old Testament passages which bespeak an unjust God are not what they appear to
be. Understanding the soul as both pre-existent and immortal (thanks to his Platonic heritage),
Origen reasons that death is no barrier to God’s work in us. The most famous of Origen’s examples is
the archetypal enemy of Moses, Pharaoh, whose heart was hardened by God (Ex 7. 3) in order to
reveal to the Egyptians that the Israelites’ God is Lord (Ex 7. 5). Although for Christian readers,
Pharaoh was a stock type of the devil, Origen sees him as a person, a human being who has so
consistently denied the will of God that God can work with him only by hardening his heart still further
so that he will “hit bottom,” by suffering defeat and by drowning in the sea. He drowns, but “[God’s] . .
. care for him does not stop at this point. For when he was drowned, he was not destroyed” (Princ. 3.
1. 14). Even after Pharaoh’s death, in other words, God will continue to work with him in whatever
way is most appropriate. Origen is not bothered by the fact that Scripture does not offer Pharaoh
further opportunity for conversion in so many words because he conceives of Scripture as inviting the
reader to discover further revelation, or knowledge of God’s providence and mercy that has not been
set down in words. Why did God not inspire the writers of Scripture to write down every aspect of the
truth? The reason is that the process would be too easy, as Origen indicates in Princ. 4. 3.11:
All these truths . . . are concealed, hidden, and buried in the narratives of holy Scripture because
”the kingdom of heaven is like a treasure hidden in a field, which a man found and covered up;
then in his joy he goes and sells all that he has and buys that field” (Mt 13. 44). . . . The meaning
133
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according to the letter is the “field” . . . while the deeper and more profound spiritual meaning is
the “treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2. 3).134
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As Plato maintained that a student ought to progress from sensible knowledge through the study of
dialectic to intelligible knowledge in a gradually ordered way, so Origen holds that Christian learners
need to begin with the literal levels and moral teachings of Scripture, progressing in an ordered way
to the mystery of the uncreated Word and the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (Princ. 4. 4. 10).
Note that for Origen, the understanding of divine mystery requires not only study of Scripture, but
also intense moral preparation; without living in a way that is similar to Christ’s way, we cannot
understand the Trinity, the nature of which is “loving Affection.”135
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In moving from reflection on how we know God to the development of his doctrine of God,
Origen did not want any trace of Gnostic emanations, dualism, or fatalism. In avoiding these errors,
Origen accepts the Father’s superiority to the Son and the Holy Spirit as an axiom correlative to the
Father’s role as Source, or μόvη _ρχή.136 Hence, he does not escape a subordinationism within the
Trinity that was later considered heterodox; however, Origen argues against the ontological
subordinationism which the Arians later pressed for. In Metaphysics (v. 11. 019a1-14), Aristotle had
defined “priority of being,” or priority according to nature and being (κατ_ φύσιv κα_ o_σίαv), as a kind of
ontological independence137 which can be diagrammed thus: “A is prior in being to B if A can exist
without B but B cannot exist without A.”138 Conceiving of the Father as Source, as Origen does, it
would be easy to conclude that the Son cannot exist without the Father, since he draws divinity and
being from the Father, but that the Father, as Source, could exist without the Son. However, for
Origen, the relation is mutual. The Father generates, or begets, the Son eternally; there is no time
when the Father was not the Father of the Son. The two are coeternal and interrelated; “God was
always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was indeed born of him, but is yet without any
beginning” not only in time, but also in any other conceivable way that could be discerned by “bare
intellect and reason” (Princ. 1. 2. 2). Therefore, the Father could not and does not exist alone, without
the Son. Hence, Origen’s subordinationism is not the ontological subordinationism of the Arians,
which consigned the Son (and the Holy Spirit) to being creatures. Rather, it consisted of an
“economic subordinationism” within the Godhead.139 In On First Principles, 1. 3. 5, he says
(translation from Greek text):
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The God and Father, who holds the universe together, is superior to every being that exists, for
he imparts to each one from his own existence that which each one is; the Son, being less than
the Father, is superior to rational creatures alone (for he is second to the Father); the Holy Spirit
is still less, and dwells within the saints alone.140

Here, concerned with the Father’s role as Source, Origen finds a hierarchy within the Trinity. Yet he
also reaches toward a Trinity that is truly a divine community, a communion of wills that is able to
include creatures in divine life. In On First Principles 1. 3. 8, he gives testimony to the unity of the
Three which is based on their common purpose in (will toward) the economy. This approach to the
Trinity also grounds a pedagogical understanding of the Fall, sin, and grace in which humanity is
never separated from the love of God.
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The Gnostics of Origen’s day, in contrast, had established churches for the spiritually elite.
There are earthly hierarchies in Gnosticism which reflect the heavenly hierarchy of being and
knowledge. To begin with, as Couliano points out, “Gnostic myth works with hypostases;” and
hypostases arise from “the deification/personification of abstract concepts, the elaboration of divine
parts or powers into active entities.”141 For example, Valentinian Gnosticism postulated the Father:
Pater Agennetos (unbegotten), the Ineffable, and the Abyss, or Depth, who is paired with Silence.
Silence, a female entity, coexists with the Father and knows the Abyss only as “incomprehensible.”142
The Father also emanates the Son, who is Knowledge. 143 The Father Abyss and Silence emanate
thirty Aeons (hypostates of God’s attributes and institutions), who are also paired, to make up the
Pleroma, or fullness.
Note that the Aeons are not equal; those last created are farthest away from the Father and
therefore the most ignorant. Thus difference in time becomes a metaphor for varying degrees of
knowledge; yet, the Father can be known only as unknowable. Sophia, the last of the Aeons, not
knowing that the Father is ineffable, breaks the law of the Pleroma by falling into a passion for the
Father. An Aeon named Limit saves her by teaching her the Father’s ineffability; and the Father
follows up by instructing the Son to make known to all the Aeons his Ineffability.144 Her passion is
then separated from her and thrown out of the Pleroma. This separated passion becomes the lower
Sophia, who gives birth first to Christ, then to the Demiurge, who is the God of the Old Testament.
The Demiurge in turn, acting under the direction of the lower Sophia, who imitates the Father so far
as possible, creates the Rulers and Archons of this world. He is ignorant, knowing neither his own
141
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origin nor the existence of the Pleroma:
Since he did not know the one who operated through him [Sophia], he supposed that he created
by his own power, being industrious by nature. . . . And a particular proof of his involuntary action
is the fact that he blessed the Sabbath and was exceedingly fond of rest from his labors.145
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Procter, 19.

79

He is “Sophia’s abortion, stupid, and mad,”146 most opposed to the Father in ignorance.
Unfortunately, it is the Demiurge’s image and likeness in which we are made (Gen. 1. 26).147 Human
beings are not the creatures of the Immaterial Father at all.
There are many variants of the Gnostic account of creation, and they are difficult to keep
straight. In all of them God the Father is utterly transcendent, having no part in the creation of the
world because he cannot get involved with matter. In all of them too, we find three levels of human
creation: physical being, ruled by a created demiurge who is close to consisting completely of
matter, psychical being, in which people have souls but lack the spiritual seed which would make
spiritual life easy, and spiritual being, given in seed form.148 Those with spiritual being will easily
ascend from ignorance to knowledge of higher truth. Matter, associated with the passions and with
ignorance, is close to being an evil principle, that of disorder.
146
147
148

Couliano, 95.
Procter, 20.

Here, the Gnostics advert to the Stoic concept of logos spermatikos, the “seed” of reason which comes to the child
through its father’s sperm. “As in the universe the logos permeates all things, so in the sperm, the logos permeates all [people]”
and is the foundation of human relations. See Kerry A. Shirts, “Λόγoς: The Significance of Jesus Christ” at
http://www2.ida.net/graphics/shirtail/logojand.htm., 4.

80

At this point, agreement among Gnostic creation-myths ends. In one version, the Archons of
the Demiurge create Adam physically and psychically, while unbeknownst to the Demiurge, the lower
Sophia inserts spiritual seed into some of the people to be born.149 In another version, before bearing
the Demiurge, the lower Sophia gives birth to Christ. When Christ flees Sophia and is welcomed into
the Pleroma, he in turn gives birth to the Savior as well as to a host of male angels.150 In this version,
it is the male angels who, at the lower Sophia’s behest, give the seed of spiritual life to some of the
human beings at their creation, while she herself gives the seeds of psychic life to others . The
Demiurge creates only material people, who can live, but cannot come to spiritual life.151 When
Christ enters the world to give human beings the knowledge which is the way to salvation (saving
gnosis), he communicates only with a subset of humanity: the people who have spiritual seeds within,
although those who have psychic seeds can hear him with much effort and come to salvation. The
material people cannot be saved, but will burn up with matter at the end of time.152
Christ himself, of course, cannot mix with matter. He has a docetic body, visible but psychic
(rather than material), to use while on earth.153 He did not need a human body and soul because his
role was not to take on the burden of humanity but to be seen, to reveal knowledge— yet this
revelation is only for those who are spiritually constituted. The Gospel of Philip, for example, presents
Jesus as a docetic trickster:
Jesus tricked everyone, for he did not appear as he was, but he appeared so that he could be
seen. . . . He appeared to the great as great, he [appeared] to the small as small, . . . to the
angels as an angel and to humans as a human. For this reason his word was hidden from
everyone.154
149
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For Gnostics and Marcionites, matter, seen as opposed to spirit, comes close to being identified with
evil, as it is for Plotinus, who states the case more clearly:
There must . . . be some Undetermination-Absolute, some Absolute Formlessness . . . What will
this be? That Kind (Matter) whose place is below all the patterns, forms, shapes, measurements,
and limits, that which has no trace of good by any title of its own . . . a mere image as regards
Absolute-Being, but the Authentic Essence of Evil— insofar as Evil can have Authentic Being.
The bodily Kind, in that it partakes of Matter, is an evil thing (Enneads, 1. 8. 3).155

However, Plotinus attacks the Gnostics from his own viewpoint, finding their systems lacking in
coherence; and despite his above statement about the body, he asserts that “to despise this sphere
and the Gods within it, or anything else that is lovely, is not the way to goodness . . . How can they
[the Gnostics] deny that the Lord of Providence is here?” (Enneads, 1. 9. 16).
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Although Origen sometimes uses the word, “emanation,” he dissociates the Christian doctrine
of God from the Gnostic pleroma. While agreeing with the Gnostics that God the Father is immaterial
and ineffable— he begins Book 1 of On First Principles by showing that God is not a body156— the
Son and the Holy Spirit are more than hypostases of the Father’s attributes, and there is no
descending chain of emanated hypostases from them.157 This dissociation occurs early in On First
Principles. Instead of hypostasizing the aspects of the Son and thinking of them as separate
emanations, Origen reduces the number of types of heavenly being. He says that Christ “is called”
both Wisdom and Firstborn, then explains: “The Firstborn is not, however, by nature a different being
from Wisdom (nec tamen alius est primogenitus per naturam quam sapientia),158 but is one and the
same (Princ., 1. 2. 1).159 Christ, the only begotten Son of the Father, is called Wisdom because he is
the Father’s Wisdom. Only in Christ, then, does Wisdom exist, inasmuch as Christ is God’s Wisdom
(1. 2. 2); but neither Wisdom nor any other of the Son’s attributes has hypostatic existence
156
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independent of the Son. Similarly, although the Holy Spirit is the source of both inspiration and grace
(Princ. 1, 3, 8), Origen does not hypostasize either of these attributes. In his Commentary on
Romans, where Origen characterizes the Holy Spirit as Teacher,160 teaching is a ministry of the Holy
Spirit, not an Aeon by the name of Teacher (5. 2. 22).161 Origen’s “pleroma” does not have separate
Aeons; it is instead the Trinity and the Trinity only. All fullness is in God.
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The Gnostics were not the only groups to make use of emanations, however. Neo-Platonism,
just emerging under Ammonias Saccas, did the same. In the system of Plotinus, for example, the
One emanates the Intellectual Principle, and the Intellectual Principle emanates the Soul.162
Therefore, both to distinguish Christianity from Gnostic systems and the Trinity from Neo-Platonic
Primal Hypostases, Origen must show that the Son and the Holy Spirit themselves are neither
increasingly distant emanations of the Father nor mere personifications of the Father’s attributes, but
that the Three are truly distinct and truly one God. Related to this issue is the nature of the Father,
split in two by both the Gnostics and the Marcionites. Origen, therefore, also needed to reject dualism
by showing that the Father, though immaterial and ineffable, is not divorced from the world, that
rather, he is author of both the creation and the redemption.
By positing eternal generation of the Son, Origen rejects Gnostic emanationism. He does also
allow gradations of being within the Trinity; but it is significant that these gradations of being are
within the Trinity. The Son and the Spirit are not creatures.163 Origen’s interpretation of Joshua 1. 1217 is evidence of this point. Why are the twelve tribes divided into two-and-a-half tribes plus nineand-a-half rather than into a division of three and nine? For Origen, this situation signifies the state of
belief of the people in the two-and-a-half tribes: they believed the Lord’s dispensations but lacked
knowledge of the Incarnation. Therefore, “these tribes are neither two, lest the fathers be outside the
faith and salvation of the Trinity, nor three entire and perfect, lest the mystery of the Trinity seem
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already fulfilled among them” (Hom. on Josh. 3. 2). Bruce and White note that we need not ascribe
this passage to Rufinus, for Procopius confirms the Greek version of this passage in his Catena in
Joshua 87. 1. 997A.164
Origen, then, defines the Son as eternally begotten by the Father, explaining that the Father
has never been without his Wisdom or Word (Princ. 1. 2. 2). By identifying the Son as the Father’s
wisdom, Origen not only establishes the Son’s identity as Wisdom and Word; he also establishes the
Son’s coeternity and shared divinity. Although his description of the Son as “God’s wisdom
hypostatically existing” (Princ. 1. 2. 2) could recall Gnostic hypostases, clearly the Son is co-eternal.
There was no time at which the Son was emanated, nor did the Son have some kind of logical
beginning. Instead:
God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was born indeed of him and draws his
being from him, but is yet without any beginning, not only of that kind which can be distinguished
by periods of time, but even of that kind which the mind alone is wont to contemplate in itself and
to perceive . . . with the bare intellect and reason” (1. 2. 2).

Using the same argument, Origen says that “the Holy Spirit would never have been included in the
unity of the Trinity, that is, along with God the unchangeable Father and with his Son, unless he
had always been the Holy Spirit” (Princ. 1. 3. 4).Thus, despite his stated uncertainty as to whether
the Holy Spirit is another begotten Son or not (Princ. Prol. 4), Origen does uphold the co-eternity
and common divinity of all three hypostaseis.
Gradations of divinity enter in when Origen tries to define the distinct identity of the three
hypostaseis. In On First Principles Origen struggles to emphasize their unity and yet define their
distinctions. The Father is the ultimate source for him, therefore “good without qualification,” while
the Son “perhaps . . . while being good is yet not good purely and simply,” that is, he is the image
164
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of the goodness, drawing the Father’s goodness into himself, eternally born from the Father’s
goodness as the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father’s goodness (Princ. 1. 2. 13).
Similarly, in relation to the creation, the Father “who holds the universe together,” is superior to the
Son, who is second to the Father; and both the Father and the Son are superior to the Holy Spirit
(Princ. 1. 3. 5). Yet all three are God; and Origen more convincingly demonstrates their distinct
identities in their common divinity when he develops their shared ministry to the world in On First
Principles, 1. 3. 8. The Father “bestows on all the gift of existence,” and this gift is revealed in its
glory when Christ, the Son, Word, and Wisdom, gives to all the gift of righteousness, which
enables us to advance in holiness; and the Spirit, working with us as we go forward, sanctifies us.
Origen’s explorations of the Trinity in Books 1 and 2 of On First Principles implicitly reject
Gnostic elitism, a tenet which he will also explicitly reject in Book 3. Recall that the Gnostics held
that at the creation, spiritual seeds were given to few, while most received psychic or material
seeds. “Psychic souls” can receive saving knowledge only with difficulty, and the “material souls”
cannot be saved at all. This ontological subdivision of humanity amounts to a fatalism which in
Origen’s view is utterly opposed to Christian truth and must be rejected out of hand. He insists, in
Book 3 of On First Principles (1. 8), that there are no “lost natures which cannot receive salvation”
or “saved natures which are incapable of being lost.” No one gets the security of being among the
saved by nature or inherits the despair of being among the lost. If we make bad choices, the
process toward evil and ignorance inevitably begins; but it is gradual, and we can for awhile
reverse it by good choices (Princ. 3. 4. 1). What we cannot do is forget the importance of choosing
well. If Origen sacrifices security for freedom, he gains inclusiveness, however; for salvation is
open to all. Each person is therefore responsible for accepting it or else choosing to turn away. For
Origen, positing saved and lost natures is tantamount to attacking the justice of God and to
denying the image of God in humanity, which consists both of intellect and of the freedom to make
choices.
Origen’s conviction that salvation is open to everyone is also grounded in his view of the
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Trinity and their work in the economy. As he defines the Trinity, the three hypostaseis are
coeternal and share in divinity, but in the graded order of Father as Source, Son as only-begotten
Wisdom and Word, and Spirit as Sanctifier, drawing divinity from the Son. Despite his
subordination of Son and Spirit, soon to be out of date, Origen views the Trinity as a union of
charity which is both a model for the human community and its destiny. There are no “lost natures”
or “saved natures” because God’s charity extends to all creatures who want to receive it, even the
demons. Yet, in On First Principles (3. 1. 23-24), Origen faces the issue which might lead to a
belief in lost or saved natures or even to doubt about divine justice: why do some people progress
from worse to better while others consistently go from bad to worse? As he sees it, Scripture gives
two different answers. In Romans 9. 20 - 21, God is the potter. God therefore has the right to make
both vessels of honor and vessels of dishonor; and we have nothing to say about God’s choices.
However, 2 Timothy 2. 21 says the opposite: if we purge ourselves, we shall be vessels of honor,
fit for the master’s use.
Origen’s solution is to take them together. God does not create “vessels of dishonor”; but
God allows those who consistently choose evil to experience the pain of degenerating into vessels
of dishonor. Irenaeus said that we must learn the value of the good through experiencing evil.
Origen goes further to say that the experience of evil is part of the process of healing. In order to
receive God’s grace, we have to realize that we need it: “In regard to the immortality of the soul
and the eternal world it will be to [sinners’] advantage that they should not be brought quickly to
salvation but should be brought more slowly after having experienced many ills” (Princ. 3. 1. 13).
Origen’s God is a patient instructor of souls. Origen’s God would therefore have taken in stride
Augustine’s enjoyment of stealing the pears and his wanting chastity, but “not yet.” These sinful
inner movements would have been part of Augustine’s pedagogical process. Origen’s God would
have been relieved by Augustine’s repentance, however, and overjoyed by the self-knowledge and
the longing for God that Augustine expresses in the Confessions.
Origen suggests that unless we desire to pay attention to God, we cannot know God,

88

whatever God might do. Apart from the knowledge of God, no one can make progress; however,
the knowledge of God alone will not help us make progress unless we continue to exert effort.
Thus we become vessels of honor not because we have been created as such but because “God
finds a ground of difference in our will, as it inclines to the better or to the worse” (Princ. 3. 1. 24).
The Trinity enters in by virtue of the fact that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit all take part in
bringing us into a life of grace through their special operations:
There is . . . a special activity of God the Father, beyond that which he exercised on all things in
giving them natural life. There is also a special ministry of the Lord Jesus Christ towards those on
whom he confers the natural gift of reason, by means of which well-being is bestowed upon them
in addition to mere existence. There is yet another grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed upon such
as are worthy, a grace ministered indeed through Christ, but put into operation by the Father in
proportion to the merits of those who become capable of receiving it (Princ. 1. 3. 7).

Origen envisions a harmony of wills between the hypostaseis of the Trinity which reaches out to
include the will of the person struggling to live a Christian life here on earth, that is, the will of the
one who works to “become capable of receiving” God’s grace and keep on trying.
For Origen, the Trinity is our model for building a human community which is based both on
the love within the Trinity and on the common heritage of all people as created intellects that have
fallen. Within the Trinity, the community consists of distinct hypostaseis, each of whom has
special operations; and their unity consists both in divine essence which is charity and in the
divine will which is charity. In his Commentary on the Song of Songs, he begins with 1 John 4. 7-8:
“Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God and everyone who loves is born of God and
knows God. Whoever does not love God does not know God; for God is love” (NRSV). Attention to
the words that Scripture uses for “love”: amor/erast_s, dilectio, and caritas/agap_ , reveals that
they are to some extent interchangeable. Although amor/ erast_s (lover) generally mean human
love, all three terms can be used for love of virtue or love of God, as in 2 Kings 13. 1-2, where the
term for Amnon’s sinful passion for his sister is agap_ (LXX; dilectio in Rufinus’s Latin); or in
Wisdom 8. 2, where Solomon is said to be a passionate lover (erast_s; amator in Latin) of
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Wisdom.165 Origen gives pride of place to agap_ (caritas) because in 1 John this term defines the
nature of God: God is Charity. This means that the Father is Charity, and the Son is also Charity;
for “the Father and the Son are one and the same in every respect” (unum est et in nullo differt;
Prol. 2. 26).166 However, in the light of the Great Commandment, to love (agapa_) God with all
one’s heart, soul, [mind] and strength (Luke 10. 27), it is all right to talk of having passionate love
(amor) for God or of God’s having passionate love for us (Prol. 2. 36).
The charity of God looks in two directions: toward both God and our neighbors, whom we
are to love as we love ourselves and “with whom [we are] in kinship as being similarly created in
incorruption (utpote similiter creatum in incorruptione; 2. 32).” Because we all shared in the original
intellectual creation and the fall alike, everyone is our neighbor, as is made clear in the parable of
the Good Samaritan. Ontological neighbors by nature of our creation and fall, we become
neighbors in love when we benefit someone else when we can. We also become more like God.
In short, says Origen, Christ, the Son:
requires in us something like himself (sui simile aliquid requirit in nobis); so that through this
charity which is in Christ Jesus, we may be allied to God who is Charity, as it were in a sort of
blood relationship through this name of charity; even as he, who was already united to him, said:
Who shall separate us from the charity of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord?” (Rom 8. 35; 39;
Songs, Prol. 2. 29).

Therefore, it is one and the same love by which the soul seeks the Word of God as that by which
the Scriptures sing the marriage of the Church to Christ (Prol. 2, 46). No people are excluded
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except by their own choice because it is the will of God the Trinity to invite all to the life of charity.
Even Origen’s Trinitarian analogies, some of which are awkwardly subordinationist from
post-fourth-century standards, serve his intention to show that the entire Trinity wills that we
participate in divine life. In explaining Trinitarian relations in On First Principles, Origen makes
particular use of three analogies: light and its brightness, prototype and copy, and source and
the being participating in the source. I shall begin with Origen’s comparison of the Father’s relation
to the Son to light and its brightness in On First Principles 1. 2. 8. This analogy follows what
seems to be a rather unsuccessful comparison of the Father to an immense statue too big to be
seen and the Son to the same statue but in smaller, visible form. One is “an exact image” of the
other, differing only in scale. Thus the relative size of the statues is analogous to the different
degree of Godhead between the Father and the Son. Aside from its insistent subordinationism, the
idea of two statues suggests ditheism because two statues are separate physically even if the
“ratio” of form to matter is the same; but such is far from Origen’s intention. His shift from the two
statues to the light and its brightness parallels a shift from intra-Trinitarian relations to the mystery
of the Incarnation:
It is by some such likeness as this that the Son, in emptying himself of his equality with the Father
and showing us a way by which we may know him, becomes an ‘express image’ of God’s
substance, so that through this fact of his becoming to us the brightness, we who were not able to
look at the glory of pure light while it remained in the greatness of his godhead, may find a way of
beholding the divine light through looking at the brightness (1. 2. 8).

Because light is experientially inseparable from its brightness, yet is distinct, as when we
see the sun’s brightness without looking straight at it, this analogy succeeds in conveying the coeternity and shared Godhead of Father and Son while indicating that it is only through the Son that
we know the Father. Here Origen alludes to Wisdom 7. 25: “For [Wisdom] is a breath of the power
of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty. For she is a reflection of eternal light, a
spotless mirror of the working of God, and an image of [God’s] goodness” (NRSV). Since God (the
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Father) is light everlasting, it follows that the Son is eternal, that “the Son’s existence springs from
the Father himself, yet not in time, nor from any other beginning except, as we have said, from God
himself” (Princ. 1. 2. 11).167 This is christology from above. Staying with his analogy of light,
Origen applies it to his first analogy of the two statues, thereby turning both to a meditation on the
mystery of the Incarnation and showing that theology is really christology from below. In all its
awkwardness, the image of the two statues applies to the awkwardness of being human and the
resulting need to see divine truth through a clumsy medium or a narrow opening. Origen explains
that he used the two statues:
to show that the Son of God, though brought within the very narrow compass of a human
body, yet gave indications, in the likeness of his power and works to those of God the Father,
of the immense greatness that was in him; witness the words which he said to his disciples,
“He that has seen me has seen the Father also” (Princ. 1. 2. 8).

The image of light and its brightness suggests that any image of God that is taken from the
material world can serve only as a narrow window through which to glimpse God’s greatness; for
the Son in himself is the invisible image of the invisible Father (1. 2. 6). It is Jesus who, like the
second statue, is the visible image of the invisible Father. Human nature by itself is inadequate to
reveal fully all the mystery of God’s action on our behalf. Human nature is like the small statue and
like the awkward analogy itself. Yet it is human nature in which Christ actually does reveal that
God is Father. Henceforth, to be human is to possess the nature in which Christ reveals the
Father. Against the elitist groups of Gnostics with their docetic Incarnation, Origen proclaims that
the Father reveals himself both indirectly, through the prophets, and directly in the life and
preaching of Jesus that has been handed down by the apostles. This is Christ’s function, to make
167
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the Father known— not just to an elite group, but to anyone who desires to turn to God.
In Book 2 of his Commentary on John, Origen’s concept of the co-eternity of the Father and
the Son becomes a participatory union of divine wills that is a prototype for the destiny of the
human community. Origen begins by setting out a pastoral problem: that many people “who wish to
be pious” have a great deal of difficulty even conceiving of the Father and the Son, let alone of
Father, Son, and Spirit, as one God:
Either they deny that the particularity (_διότητα)168 of the Son is other than that of the Father,
while confessing as God the one they call, at least in name, “Son”; or they deny the divinity of
the Son, making his particularity and essence as an individual (τ_v _διότητα κα_ τ_v o_σίαv) to be
different from the Father (Comm. on John 2. 16).169

The first error would be modalism: that is, reducing the Son to a mode or appearance of the
Father; the second error anticipates Arianism: reducing or denying the Son’s divinity by defining
the Son as different from the Father in essence. Neither choice is acceptable to Origen, who wants
to teach both the hypostatic distinction between the Father and the Son and their co-eternity and
common divinity. Avoiding the concept of a common essence (ousia) in God for fear of a
materialistic connotation, Origen uses the metaphor of participation in order to express unity in the
Godhead. His argument, on the face of it a bit strange, will make more sense if we remember
Plato’s depiction of the progress of knowledge as progress up a divided line: from images to right
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belief to thought to understanding. Each level of knowledge serves as an image that reveals the
existence of the level above it; thus, the visible world provides an image of the intelligible world of
the Forms.
For Origen, the Father is source of all divinity as well as source of everything in creation.
Therefore, in the Commentary on John, the Father is not simply “God,” but “the” God,”as in John
17. 3, for example: “And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God (τ_v μόvov
_ληθιv_v θεόv) and Jesus Christ whom you have sent” (NRSV). According to Origen, whenever John

means “the uncreated cause of the universe,” he uses theos with the definite article. Taking this
point as his departure, he finds the paradigm for the relation between the Father and the Son in
John 1. 1: “_Εv _ρχ_ _v _ λόγoς, κα_ _ λόγoς _v πρ_ς τ_v θεόv, κα_ θε_ς _v _ λόγoς,170 “In the beginning was
the Word, and the Word was with God (πρ_ς τ_v θεόv), and the Word was God (θεός). The Son is
Word, God, true image of the Father, “firstborn of every creature” (Col 1. 15), but not “the” God.
Because Origen eschews ontological language, his discussion allows a loophole for the later
interpretation of Arius that the Son is less God than the Father, even created. What would restrain
us from Arius’s interpretation is Origen’s own awareness of the problem, stated in 2. 16 (quoted
above) that to deny the divinity of the Son or make his individual essence different from the Father
is one of “the false and impious beliefs.” The Son, then, is God, and not only God, but also “the”
Word, _ λόγoς. So the Son has a dignity parallel to that of the Father, signified by the scriptural use
of the definite article; both Father and Son are “the’s.” As the Son is the archetypal image of the
Father, so lesser gods are “images of the image,” and human beings are created “according to the
image” (Comm. on John, 2. 20).
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It may come as a surprise to those brought up on the Second Commandment, but for
Origen, there are other gods, beings who share in the Father’s divinity. Origen gets them from Ps
49.1 (LXX): “The God of gods (Θε_ς θε_v) has spoken and called the earth from the rising of the sun
to its setting.” Who are these “gods”? Origen posits that they are heavenly beings, like the sun, the
moon, and the stars, created intellects who participate in divinity.171 However, they participate in
divinity only through the Word, who is “the archeypal image of the many images” (Comm. on John,
2. 18). The Word/Son fully draws divinity into himself and shares divinity with the other gods: “It
was by his [the Son’s] ministry that they became gods, for he drew from God that they might be
deified, sharing ungrudgingly also with them according to his goodness” (2. 17). The “other gods”
are not the same as “false gods” because they truly participate in the Father’s divinity through the
Son. But they are not part of the Trinity either.
Although the phrase from Colossians, “first-born of all creation,” was pushed by Arian
theologians to define the Son as an ontological creature, hence God by courtesy only, Origen
does not seem to me to be pushing the phrase in that direction, but rather to be trying to express
the distinct individuality of the Son, generated or begotten by the Father, a full member of the
Trinity, but not a mode of the Father. Because the Son is not “Source,” Origen sees him as
dependent on the Father, yet also as participating fully in the Father, indeed, as drawing divinity
into himself and sharing divinity with the lesser gods. As long as these continue to participate in the
Son’s divinity and partake of the Word, they are not false gods (Comm. on John, 2. 19, 23). They
can be accepted as serving the limited pedagogical purpose of instructing and receiving the
worship of those who still need a visible focus for their spiritual lives.
This conception of the other gods makes it clear that for Origen, the economy of salvation
is like a school of sanctification. The most advanced can receive the full mystery of the Incarnation,
which is to know God as Father. Advanced Christians know the Father by participating fully in the
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Word who is “with God” (Comm. on John, 2. 28). They contemplate the Trinity. Others, less
advanced, “take their stand” on God the Son, the anointed one, in his humanity: “Jesus Christ and
him crucified” (1 Corinthians 2. 2). These participate fully in the humanity of Jesus and accept the
resurrection but do not relate to the uncreated Word and the Trinity (2. 29). They are not wrong in
centering their worship on Jesus in his humanity; but they lack the contemplation of the mystery of
the Trinity.
Still others, not yet Christians, worship “the visible gods,” such as the sun, the moon, and
the stars. These heavenly bodies are not the modern swirls of flaming gasses. They are lightly
embodied angelic intelligences, in short, “the gods” of Ps 49. who participate in the divinity of the
Son who in turn shared divinity with them. People who worship heavenly bodies at least worship
beings that participate in the Son’s divinity; so they are not totally divorced from truth (Comm. on
John, 2. 25-27). In fact, God the Father assigns holy intelligences to serve as objects of worship for
those not yet ready for Christian teachings “so that those who are not able to rise to the spiritual
nature, being moved concerning deity by gods perceived by the senses, might stand contentedly in
these and not fall to idols and demons” (2. 26). Finally, on the last step of the scale, are those who
“give the name of gods to the works of [people’s] hands, gold and silver” (2. 27) because things
can be worshipped only as idols.172 Moving up the scale from the complete illusion of idolatry to
worship of heavenly lights to contemplation of the sacred humanity of Jesus to contemplation of
the Father and the Trinity resembles the progress up Plato’s divided line. Each step of truth
(except perhaps idol-worship) can serve as an image or a reflection of the next step up. Idol172
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worship, or the worship of false gods, is not, for Origen, part of the “divided line.” It is not an image
of truth at all, except in the sense of a perversion. Idols are rather falsehood to be turned away
from.
Origen does a parallel “divided line” for the Son who is Word of God. At the top of the line is
the uncreated Word, Son of God. Second is the Word made flesh, Jesus Christ in his human
nature. Third are words which participate partially in the Word; and the people who follow them are
“those who follow the popular and prevailing schools in philosophy among the Greeks” (2. 30).
Fourth, at the bottom of the scale, are those who follow words that are completely corrupt, words
which deny providence and “approve some other goal than the good” (2. 31). They are the only
people who are outside the school of sanctification. All words that have value must participate in
the Word in some way; yet God the Son and Word transcends all created words. Only those who
follow words that are completely corrupt or for God substitute things or powers that are opposed to
God are outside the school of sanctification — and that, perhaps, only temporarily.173 Everyone
who responds to the drawing of divinity and listens to the drawing of truth will be given the way of
relating to God that s/he needs.
Although there is no parallel “line” of participation and knowledge for the Spirit in the
Commentary on John, Moser has brought out a comparable treatment of the Spirit in Origen’s
Commentary on Romans. The Holy Spirit, both “Spirit of God” and “Spirit of Christ,” is the ultimate
sanctifier and teacher of human beings. But other ministering spirits, sharing in the holiness of the
Holy Spirit, work with human “students” until they have grown sufficiently for the Holy Spirit to work
with them directly.174 Even the evil spirits participate in teaching. Evil in their own intention and will,
they yet do God’s will by bringing the punishment that is necessary in order for the suffering sinner
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to turn away from sin. Then the spirit of remorse leads the sinner further away from sin. Key to this
system is the human spirit, the human conscience. The human spirit is “the individual person’s
potential for participation in God’s Spirit . . . the potential for intimacy with God’s own Spirit.”
Although a person must make good choices in order to activate this potential, intrinsically the
human spirit within is good.175 Therefore, just as we have the Father and the Son who is Word, we
also have the Holy Spirit, in whom all other spirits who are holy participate.
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In all this, Origen evolves a divine community with its common source being God the Father
and its shared mission being the salvation of human beings. In relation to God, the Son draws
divinity into himself by “unceasing contemplation”: “By being ‘with the God’ he [the Word] always
continues to be ‘God.’ But he would not have this if he were not with God, and he would not remain
God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father” (2. 18; italics
mine). Thus the Son’s whole will is contemplation; contemplation is a chosen union with the
Father; yet the Son’s will to contemplate the Father does not cancel out his sharing in the Father’s
divinity through eternal generation. Eternal generation implies eternal being. Origen therefore holds
together the Son’s eternal nature as God with his will to contemplate the Father unceasingly.176
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In relation to us, the Word becomes flesh to enable us to participate with him in
contemplation of the Father. Herein lies a complication in Origen’s doctrine of the Incarnation
which Evagrius later inherits: the nature of the created soul of Jesus. With Platonic
correspondence, the soul of Jesus mirrors the Uncreated Word, the Son, and unceasingly
contemplates and clings to God. But the soul of Jesus, like all human souls, has a pre-existent
state as a created intellect. Of all the created intellects, Jesus was the only one who did not fall
away from God. For this reason, he “being the soul of the wisdom and word of God . . . and
receiving him wholly . . . was made with him in a pre-eminent degree one spirit”: and it is this
created intellect, made one with God, who enters humanity to be born of Mary (Princ. 2. 6. 3). In
On First Principles, this view of Christ is only one aspect of Origen’s exploration of the nature of
the Son. People could overlook it. For Evagrius, the same view becomes central to his vision of the
eschatological restoration. It could not be ignored because of the christological controversies which
followed in the wake of the resolution of the Arian Controversy. To some, that teaching would have
a tang of Apollinaris’s teaching that Christ descended as a “heavenly man.”177
The risk of emphasizing will and participation as principles of unity within the Trinity is that
with the notion of “will” goes the possibility of change. Origen seems aware of this possibility when
he remarks that the Son would not have divinity if he should cease contemplating the Father. It
seems to me, however, that this possibility is forestalled by Origen’s strong emphasis on the
eternal generation of the Son. The Son, unlike any creature and certainly unlike Gnostic Aeons,
transcends time, even though those who try to write about eternity cannot really fathom what
transcendence of time could mean. We might even get the unfortunate idea that the Son is “stuck
with” his divinity because of his eternity; but such an idea would be time-bound, not penetrating the
nature of eternity at all. The closest scriptural approach to eternity might be Rev 1. 8: “‘I am the
Alpha and the Omega,’ says the Lord God, who is and was and is to come, the Almighty.” Origen
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prevents his stress on freedom and voluntary participation from introducing change into the Trinity
by positing that both the Father’s generation and the Son’s participation are eternal acts. Indeed,
the Father’s generation and the Son’s participation are one eternal act, an act that points outward,
embracing the economy and embracing all time; for the common eternal will of the members of the
Trinity is to create, sustain, redeem, and sanctify all the members of the created world.178

178

See Origen’s discussion of the “activities” of the Trinity in On First Principles, 1. 3. 7-8.

101

In one more analogy concerned with light, in his Commentary on John, Origen suggests the
limitations of human thought and language. Distinguishing “the light in which there is no darkness
at all” (1 John 1. 5) from “the light which shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it” (John 1.
5) as the light of the Father and the Son respectively, he distinguishes two senses of “darkness.”
The Father’s light, absolute, is darkness from a human perspective because the Father’s light
transcends light, just as the Father also transcends wisdom because he is the Father of wisdom (2.
150-152).179 To us, the Father’s light is darkness, resisting human efforts to understand it: “‘He
made his hiding place’ in this darkness (Ps 17. 12) when he ordained that the things which are
infinite about himself be unknown” (Comm. on John, 2. 171). Although there are many “doors” to
contemplation in Scripture, not all of them are open to us, or if open, they lead to mystery. This
apophatic emphasis on the inscrutability of God the Father will become important for the
Cappadocians, Evagrius, and Pseudo-Dionysius in their development of Trinitarian doctrine.
In contrast (Comm. on John, 2. 163 ff.), one cannot say of the Son that there is no
darkness in him because “Christ . . . took our darknesses upon himself that by his power he might
destroy our death and completely destroy the darkness in our soul, that what Isaias said might be
fulfilled: ‘The people which sat in darkness have seen a great light’” (Is 9. 1; Mt 4. 16). “Darkness”
now means the deprivation of God’s light that is the result of sin. Christ restores our ability to see
the “great light” at the price of taking on himself the darkness of sin— this exchange will be another
important piece of Basil’s and Gregory Nazianzen’s arguments against the subordinationism of
Eunomius and thence, part of Evagrius’s understanding of the Incarnation. Once again, Christ
provides the narrow window or hole through which mysteries that are beyond us may be . . . well,
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almost seen.
The Holy Spirit is more difficult for Origen, in part because he thinks that John 1. 3, “All
things were made through him,” has to mean that the Holy Spirit was created by the Son; yet in
other passages, the Spirit seems to rank above the Son, for example, Matthew 12. 32: “Whoever
speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit
will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the world to come” (NRSV). For Origen, the question of
the Holy Spirit is still open. But Origen asserts (in Greek, not in Rufinus’s translation) that “We . . .
are persuaded that there are three hypostaseis (τρε_ς _πoστάσεις), the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit, and we believe that only the Father is unbegotten (_γέvvητov)” (2. 75).180 Finally, although still
groping for the Holy Spirit’s exact place in the Trinity, Origen reasserts the cooperative activity
(unity of wills) on behalf of human beings in the economy:
Or perhaps it is also possible to say that the creation (but also the human race), in order to be
set free from the slavery of corruption, was in need of an incarnate, blessed, and divine power
which would also restore the things on earth to order. This activity fell . . . to the Holy Spirit.
Since the Spirit cannot bear it, he sends forth the Savior because he alone is able to bear such
a great conflict. And although it is the Father, as leader, who sends the Son, the Holy Spirit joins
in sending him in advance, promising to descend to the Son of God at the right time and to
cooperate in the salvation of men (Comm. on John, 2. 83).

Thus, Origen is very clear on the moral union of the Trinity; and as we have seen, he develops the
role of the Holy Spirit in the economy in the Commentary on Romans. In this passage, the Holy
Spirit lacks ontological clarity, though Origen includes the Spirit in the Trinity. The third homily on
Joshua has a stronger statement (section 2):
I think that probably not even in the coming of Jesus or in his Incarnation do we learn what is
perfect and complete. . . . We still have need of another who uncovers and reveals everything to
us. . . . You see that . . . even Jesus says to his disciples, ‘You are not yet able to hear unless
the Paraclete comes, the Spirit of truth,’ because through him and in him is fulfilled the
perfection of the Trinity.

Although the ontological unity of the Trinity is not fully defined, varying from passage to passage,
180
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all three hypostaseis are consistently God. Thus the unity of the Trinity is on its way to being
constituted both ontologically and morally.181
In sum, Origen’s doctrine of God assumes a gradation of rank within the Trinity because he
sees the Father as Source. The three hypostaseis are therefore distinct; yet all of them are the
One God (in distinction from “the gods,” or lesser divine beings). Where they are ranked as the
Three, they are One in unity of will. This is an eternal unity of will, though in explaining it, Origen
says that the Son would not be God if he stopped contemplating the Father. The possibility of the
Son’s sinning is prevented by the doctrine of eternal generation. Within the Trinity, the Son is “the
invisible image of the invisible Father”; and in the world, the Son is the “visible image” of the
invisible Father. With the help of the Holy Spirit, his role is twofold: to make the Father known and
to empower creatures to “move,” to find the way back to God. Thus for Origen, the Trinity’s relation
to us guarantees a destiny which is both contemplative and active. Prayer does not exist apart
from care for our neighbors; and in all this, the role of the human will is as crucial as the intellect.

B. “One by Nature, Not by Number”: Evagrius’s Answer to Eunomius
In his Letter on the Faith, Evagrius writes his own doctrine of the Trinity; and parts of it have
no resemblance to any thought of Origen’s. For example:
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Number relates to quantity; and quantity is conjoined with bodily nature. We believe our Lord to
be Creator of bodies. Wherefore every number indicates those things which have received a
material and circumscribed nature. Monad and Unity on the other hand signify the nature which is
simple and incomprehensible. Whoever therefore confesses either the Son or the Holy Spirit to
be number or creature introduces unawares a material and circumscribed nature (2).182

Origen had conceived of the Father as source and the Son and the Spirit as second and third, both
deriving their divinity from the Father in a moral union. Yet Origen did not deny the ontological
unity of the three hypostaseis. He merely preferred to focus on the language of will and
participation, with the result that the image of God in humanity includes both intellect and will. But
in this passage from Letter on the Faith, Evagrius will have nothing to do with any ordering of first,
second, and third within the Trinity. Evagrius refers to Aristotle’s categories of quantity and
number only to exclude both from discussions of the Trinity. Created nature consists of compounds
of qualities in a variety of quantities; it can be defined, or “circumscribed.” Simple uncreated
essence has no compounds, no quality or quantity, and therefore cannot be circumscribed through
definition. This simple essence, for Evagrius, is God. The act of definition sets the limits of what a
thing is, thereby allowing us to understand it. Since God is simple, undefinable essence, God is
incomprehensible to the human mind.
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We see in this passage a new insistence on the oneness, the unity of the Trinity. Although
Evagrius does uphold the moral unity of the hypostaseis and even develops its significance, he
also takes a firm stand on their ontological unity. Moreover, in Evagrius’s doctrine of God,
subordinationism within the Trinity is all-but-gone; only an echo of it remains. Although the Father
is logically prior, being Father to the Son and Principle to the Holy Spirit (KG 6.4),183 this logical
priority does not appear to entail an ontological subordination. All three hypostaseis share one
uncreated divine essence in what he calls the Unity (Henad); the absolute oneness of God he
terms the Monad. Thus, Evagrius’s doctrine of God is in line with the fourth-century Nicene position
as ratified by the First Council of Constantinople.
Yet, Evagrius’s doctrine of God still owes a great deal to Origen. Evagrius retains and
develops Origen’s understanding of the imago dei as intellect and will. The philosophical
foundation of Evagrius’s interpretation of the imago dei is, as for Origen, Plato’s epistemological
journey, symbolized by the divided line (Republic, 6). Thus, for Evagrius, the human nous is “in the
image” of God, naturally configured to know God. Because of the Fall, human beings cannot
contemplate the Trinity or know God’s love directly. The world is therefore sacramental, a ladder of
love and knowledge for those who, to varying degrees, are ignorant because of the Fall. The
world cannot be seen properly, however, without Scripture, which Evagrius follows Origen in
seeing as the beginning of true knowledge (gnosis). For Evagrius too, the doctrine of the Trinitarian
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nature of God reveals the destiny of the human community: loving unity with the loving divine
community of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in all, Evagrius follows five of
Origen’s tenets:
1.

Origen’s stress on the voluntary unity (as well as the essential unity) of the Trinity as a
model for the redeemed human creation. Evagrius develops his own understanding of both
types of unity.

2.

Origen’s view that as Trinity, God is transcendent mystery, only partially accessible to the
human mind.

3.

Origen’s analysis of the human mind as “fallen,” enclosed in a body and subject to all kinds
of inner and outer distraction. Although creation indirectly speaks of God and Scripture is
God’s revelation, both provide only “doors,” “windows,” or “gateways” to the fullness of divine
life. In order to contemplate or even catch a glimpse of the being of God, we must “mount
up,” purifying ourselves of all distractions and concerns that are unworthy of God.

4.

Origen’s confidence in the final return of all created minds to God in an intensely
contemplative union in which bodies will no longer be needed and in which, somehow, all
created intellects will participate in the Unity.184 Evagrius grounds this confidence in the
image of God in human beings (Gen 1. 26).

5.

Origen’s two-stage model of creation borrowed from Plato’s Timaeus, to which he added a
corresponding two-stage eschaton.
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As we shall see, the doors and windows to the higher contemplation seem narrower than
they are in Origen’s works, the dangers of self-deception greater, and God more highly
transcendent. Clearly, Evagrius’s Origenism is filtered through other lenses than Origen. I will
focus on the influence of two of Evagrius’s teachers and mentors: Basil of Caesarea, who, in the
process of refuting the Aristotelian Neo-Arians and the Pneumatomachians, contributed a
systematic approach to understanding the transcendence of God, and Gregory Nazianzen, who
focused on the paradox of human contemplation of a God beyond human knowledge, finding the
model for this paradox not in either Plato or Aristotle, or in any of their followers, but in Scripture.
As a result of his own effort to refute the Neo-Arians, Gregory also took the whole question of
human contemplation (knowledge) of God in a more apophatic direction than Origen’s.185 By
tracing Basil’s and Gregory’s answers to the questions raised by the Arian Controversy, I will
attempt to shed light both on Evagrius’s doctrine of God and on his view of how we come to know
God. For Evagrius, God transcends human knowledge. Yet, God reveals divine life to us through
Scripture and through the creation. “The creation” consists both in visible nature and in the
capacity we have for self-knowledge.
With regard to his doctrine of God, it is not surprising that Evagrius would insist on
ontological language at the same time as he conceives of the Trinity as a participatory unity; for
theological concerns had shifted during the century-and-a-half between Origen and Evagrius and
were still shifting. Origen’s challenge was to distinguish the Christian understanding of God from
the teachings of the Gnostic and Marcionite churches. Against Marcion, who rejected the validity of
185

It seems odd to me that Evagrius evidently was not in contact with Gregory of Nyssa, who in the Life of Moses
explored the paradox of seeing God in darkness and knowing God in ignorance. See Guillaumont, Un philosophe, 31-32.

108

Scripture at will, Origen developed allegorical and typological approaches to Scripture that allowed
him to find truth in all of it. His answer was the Father’s eternal generation of the Son, the eternal
procession of the Spirit, and an insistence that the entire Trinity is responsible for both stages of
the creation. In regard to the creation, he used Plato’s myth from the Timaeus because he saw the
relation between the Good and the demiurge as a pedagogically useful, but defective parallel to
the relation between the Father and the Son. Origen also needed to combat all forms of fatalism.
Finally, against the elitist anthropology of the Gnostics, he argued that salvation is open to all
people. In all of these endeavors, Origen derived his conclusions from Scripture (read both literally
and allegorically).
The main challenge to the faith in Evagrius’s time came from Aetius and Eunomius, who
taught a radical ontological subordination of the Son to the Father. In the process they denied
divinity both to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. They argue that since the Father is Unbegotten
(_γγέvvητoς) and the Son is Begotten (γέvvητoς), then the Father and the Son have different natures.
Therefore, since the Father is God, the Son (and the Spirit) must be creatures. In distinction from
the Homoian Arians, who wanted to say that the Son is “like the Father” but avoid committing
themselves on the subject of the Son’s ousia,186 Aetius and Eunomius, usually termed Neo-
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Arians,187 stressed the difference in essence (ousia) between the Father and the Son along with
the created status of the Son and of the Holy Spirit as well.188
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philosophical terms and logic as well as its strong emphasis on the created ousia of the Son; Homoian Arianism avoided ousia
language as well as Greek philosophy and and held to the literal scriptures. It was known in both east and west. See Hanson, 557.
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Ancyra added “in all things” to “like the Father.” It seems that this creed was too vague to satisfy anyone. Nicene Faith I, 90-91.
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Behind their position is a theory of language which is connected with the epistemological
question of how and to what extent human language about God (theologia) reveals the essence
(ousia) of God. According to M. C. Steenberg, the issue of human knowledge of God was implicit
in the Arian Controversy from the beginning, when Arius insisted that Alexander of Alexandria and
others were presenting ideas of God that were inconsistent with what is known of Jesus’s nature in
Scripture.189 Even in the writings of Origen this epistemological question is implicit, inasmuch as
Origen’s answer to Marcion involved showing that Scripture must often be read allegorically or
typologically. As we have seen, for Origen, the words of Scripture instruct beginners; but they also
provide many “doors,” or “windows” for higher, unexpressed truths about the nature of the Trinity
and God’s operations. Although those who are morally prepared can “read” these mysteries, they
are not communicable by the literal words of revelation.
But Aetius and Eunomius effectively forced an explicit consideration of the power of human
language to reveal the essence, or ”whatness” of God; for they taught that the term “unbegotten,”
before this time considered an attribute of the Father, is God’s very essence; while the term
“begotten” is the very essence of the Son. Basically, this is a question of the function of theological
language. As Behr has put it, “Do our words refer to God as [God] is, or not? And if not, how can
we even claim to know God?”190 Aetius and Eunomius said that “unbegotten” expresses the exact
essence of God. If “begotten” expresses the exact essence of the Son, then the Son does not
share God’s essence; therefore, the two are of unlike (anhomoian) essence, and the Son is not
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Behr, Nicene Faith 2, 282.
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God.

Evagrius’s teachers, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory Nazianzen, spearheaded the effort to
refute Eunomius (though he promoted a similar theology, Aetius was not as much in the forefront,
perhaps because he died in 366). In response to Eunomius’s Liber Apologeticus (359), Basil wrote
Against Eunomius (364).191 Beginning in 379, Gregory Nazianzen wrote five theological orations
against Eunomius: Orations 27 to 31.192 In the 380s, Gregory of Nyssa wrote his version of
Against Eunomius in response to Eunomius’s second Apology.

In all this dispute, the

Cappadocians take issue with Eunomius (and implicitly with Aetius also) both for their doctrine of
God and for the false epistemology on which they base their doctrine of the Son’s subordination to
the Father. Evagrius, therefore, could not simply follow in Origen’s footsteps as he worked out his
own position. He needed to explore for himself the issues which Aetius and Eunomius had raised.
For this task, he was aided by conversations with Gregory and at least the writings of Basil. In the
process of assisting Gregory with various works and in helping him to draft his presentation to the
Ecumenical Council in 381, Evagrius wrote his Letter on the Faith, the letter until recently ascribed
to Basil.193 Later, in his monastic life at Kellia, Evagrius remained concerned with the issue of
human knowledge of God as Trinity, especially as it relates to prayer. His answer to the challenge
of Aetius and Eunomius is complex and paradoxical: our words do not speak of God univocally
191

Steenberg says that while Basil wrote the first two books, most modern scholars believe that a later author wrote
Books 3 and 4. See p. 8, n. 2.
192

These began as lectures given at Constantinople around the time of the Ecumenical Council. John McGuckin The
Westminster Handbook of Patristic Theology (Louisville: John Knox Press, 2004) 151.
193
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because the essence of God is beyond human knowledge. Yet, through Christ and the Holy Spirit,
through moral preparation, human beings can attain to a knowledge of God that transcends human
senses, words, concepts, and speech. This “knowledge” is based on likeness to God, on sufficient
growth in charity.194 In the Skemmata, Evagrius says that the mind comes to “see” the
“formlessness” which is the “place of God” within itself (20); for, purified of selfish passion and
stripped of all concepts, “the mind is the temple of the Holy Trinity” (34).195 Evagrius comes close
to saying that in this dimension of contemplation, one receives the grace to know God essentially,
even while remaining here on earth. As Evagrius puts it in the Letter to Melania: “Every human
mind has understanding because the Word and the Spirit make everything known to it, as it is itself
their true image and their likeness is communicated to it” (4. 140-143) .
Evagrius insists, on the one hand, that even to speak of knowing God is problematic — not
only because human language is finite, though it is, but also because revelations of God are so
easily counterfeited by demons or even fabricated by wishful thinking. Because of the Fall, our
thoughts are not only finite (while God is infinite), but also deceptive. Thoughts about God are no
exception to this rule.
On the other hand, Evagrius maintains the conviction that through a process of quieting the
passions, absorbing the Scriptures, and seeking God’s help, one can progress through purification
of thoughts and passions to contemplation, first to the contemplation of created physical nature,
then to the contemplation of intelligible being, and finally, to contemplative union with the Trinity.
This confidence, as well as this three-stage contemplative journey (termed praktik_, theoria
physik_, and theoria theologik_), he inherits, to a large extent, from Origen. One can also see that
his analysis of the journey is an application of Plato’s divided line of knowledge and being.
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In contrast to Evagrius, with his many-layered, paradoxical approach to the knowledge
of God, Aetius and Eunomius have basically one focus: the subordination of the Son and Spirit to
the Father, whose essence is alone Unbegotten. Although we do not have all of their writings—
many were destroyed after their defeat in the conflict— in the fragments we have, they proceed
straightforwardly, building their arguments on Aristotle’s categories and Scripture, not
seeing the host of possibilities and complexities that Evagrius saw.196 One reason for this
difference is their educational background. In comparison to Evagrius, educated by Basil and
Gregory Nazianzen in grammar and rhetoric, the classical philosophies, Scripture, and the Church
Fathers,197 Aetius and Eunomius grew up in humble backgrounds and came to education only later
in life.198 Aetius, born around 280, worked as a goldsmith to support himself and his mother after
his father died in the 290s. When he gained the means to study, he studied with disciples of the
martyr Lucian of Antioch, who had taught Arius. Thus, he is linked to the first generation of Arians.
With these teachers, he studied logic, the Pauline epistles, and the prophets.199 Eunomius, born
between 310 and 320, was the son of a farmer who taught him to read. Learning shorthand,
Eunomius worked as a secretary and a pedagogue until his parents died and he was free to study
rhetoric in Constantinople. After moving to Antioch, he was sent to Alexandria in order to become
both secretary and student of Aetius. Thus, the two were closely related; and through Aetius and
his teachers, they could trace their heritage back to Lucian, the teacher of Arius himself. They were
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Both Aetius and Eunomius studied Scripture from an Arian viewpoint according to which passages such as
Colossians 1. 15 and Proverbs 8. 22 were read literally and taken as proof-texts for the Son’s ontological subordination to the
Father.
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therefore a new breed of “old school” Arians who wanted to demonstrate the irrefutable logic of
Arianism, in distinction from the Homoians, who objected to ousia language because Scripture
does not use it.
The premise on which Aetius and Eunomius built their theology of the “Trinity” is that we
know God’s essence (ousia) from the words that are used of God in Scripture and apostolic
tradition. Epiphanius quotes Aetius as saying: “With such entire clarity do I know God and so fully
do I know him and am acquainted with him, that I do not know myself better than I know God.”200
Language reveals divine essence, and there is no gap between human knowing and the reality of
God. If human language does not reveal the essence of God, Aetius reasons, then theology is
merely a fantasy.201 In his Syntagmation (written about 360202; the name means little “ordering,” or
treatise), Aetius argues that if the word “unbegotten” (_γέvvητoς) is merely a human description of
God and does not actually reveal God’s essence, then “the utterance of humans is of more worth
than the substance of the Almghty, adorning God . . . with an incomparable preeminence.”203
Here, Aetius touches upon a basic issue of religious faith. He anticipates the modern
question of whether humans project God out of psychological need, then endow the projection with
qualities such as Almightyness. If words about God do not actually reflect God, he argues, then
we are creating God with our words; and a door opens for skepticism about God’s existence, let
alone God’s nature. For Aetius, either form of doubt would mean despair because “the hope of
Christians” would be founded on spoken words alone rather than on “natures which are what their
names signify.” Applying Aristotle’s principle of the priority of being: A is prior to B if A can exist
without B, but not B without A (Categories 12. 14a.30), Aetius argues that if “the unbegotten” is not
200
201
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revelatory of God’s essence, then “unbegotten” signifies nothing. But if “unbegotten” signifies
nothing, then “far more does ‘the offspring’ (γέvvημα: the term for the Son) mean nothing;204 and the
result is precisely “nothing”: a complete divide between the human mind and the nature of God.
Eunomius agrees. In the following passage, Vaggione finds an echo of Ex. 3. 14 which
reinforces Eunomius’s claim that anyone who disagrees with him is refusing not merely to allow his
interpretation of “unbegotten,” but also to let God be, in fact, what he is:
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When we say “Unbegotten,” then, we do not imagine that we ought to honour God only in name,
in conformity with human invention (o_κ _vόματι μόvov κατ’ _πίvoιαv _vθρωπίvηv); rather, in conformity
with reality (κατ’ _λήθειαv), we ought to repay to [God] the debt which above all others is most due
God: the acknowledgment that [God] is what [God] is (τ_v τo_ ε_vαι _ _στιv _μoλoγίαv).205

“And God spoke to Moses, saying, I am THE BEING (__Ώv”; LXX).206 If THE BEING of God is
Unbegotten (o_σία _γγέvητoς), then Unbegotten is THE BEING of God. At the same time, the Son’s
being is clearly Begotten; therefore, Eunomius says, they are of different natures; and anyone can
know this from the words. Should anyone be in doubt, Eunomius provides two arguments. First,
Eunomius alludes to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1004a15-16: “in privation there is also an underlying
nature of which the privation is asserted;”207 that is, the underlying nature is prior to the assertion of
deprivation. Assuming that even his adversaries agree that God the Father is unbegotten (they
would at least say that “unbegotten” is one of the Father’s attributes), he asks how God is
unbegotten. In answer, he argues that

God cannot be unbegotten through deprivation of

begottenness because “if privatives are privatives with respect to the inherent properties of
something, then they are secondary to their positives”; and God cannot be secondary to anything.
205
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Second, “Unbegotten” cannot be applied to a part of God, for God is simple and uncompounded.
“Parts” pertain to quantity and division (Metaphysics, 1032b11-14). Therefore, “‘the Unbegotten’
must be simple, unbegotten essence”(Apol. 8).
In Apol. 8, Eunomius also contrasts “in truth” (κατ’ _λήθειαv) with “in thought” (κατ’ _πίvoιαv).
Basil relates the word “epinoia” to “ennoia”; and both derive from “voέω,”which, according to the
Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, has a range of meanings related to thought: “to perceive
(with the eyes),” “to think,” and “to contrive.” Both words are also related to “vo_ς,” which has the
primary meaning of “mind” and the secondary meanings of “that which distinguishes human
nature” and “the human capacity for knowing God.”208 For “epinoia,” the basic meaning is “thinking
on (i.e., reflecting),” or “thought.” But just as voέω can signify “contrive,” epinoia can signify
“invention.” Eunomius takes the second sense: for him, epinoia means “invention” or “empty
conception,” a thought not leading to truth.209 An opponent who cannot agree that the essence of
God is Unbegotten and conversely, that Unbegotten is the essence of God, is arguing by human
conceptions and inventions, not κατ’ _λήθειαv. For Eunomius, “the ousia of the Father is . . .
knowable [as unbegotten] through the precision of terminology applied to it.”
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Eunomius acknowledged only the Father as God, it is the ousia of God that is knowable as
unbegotten.
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In order to address Eunomius’s subordinationism, the Cappadocians had first to address
his erroneous epistemology, both his belief that we can know God essentially through theological
language and his denial that we can truly know God only through reflection on revelation, that is,
God’s operations (energeiai) in the world. For the Cappadocians, knowledge of God is not a choice
between terminology which reveals God’s essence and invented human conceptions which reveal
nothing. There is a third (and correct) way which relies on a better understanding of what epinoiai
really consist of. In Book One of Against Eunomius, Basil applies Plato’s divided line of knowledge
by distinguishing between God’s essence and God’s energies, or activities in the world.211 He
reaches a new conclusion, however. God’s essence is utterly transcendent, beyond our knowledge
and unintelligible to us.212 In essence, then, God is beyond the divided line of knowledge. We
know only God’s energies, which are revealed by God’s works and in written revelation (Scripture).
The energies of God are the manifestations of God’s power, observable activities which reveal to
us God’s attributes. They tell us how God is (τ_ π_ς), not what God is (τ_ _v).213 For example, says
Basil, through creatures we know the Creator and from all God’s works we know God’s goodness
and wisdom (1, 14).214
This knowledge of “how God is” is not, for Basil, an empty human construct. It is true
knowledge of God, the whole revelation of God, and God’s real presence among us. The essence
of God, however, is another matter. Only the Father knows the Son; no one knows the Father
except the Son; and it is only the Holy Spirit who can probe the depths of God (Matt 11. 27 and 1
211
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Cor 2. 10-11; Against Eunomius, 1. 14). Thus, human beings cannot know God’s essence.
Through God’s energies, though, all people can truly know God.
With these limits set, Basil addresses the question of human epinoiai, the mental
conceptions which Eunomius regards as mendacious. He argues that in theology, we begin from
perceptions of the works of God, either from our own observation or from Scripture. These
perceptions of God’s activity in the world, both sensory and mental perceptions, are ennoiai.
From these perceptions or observations, we form concepts of God such as “good,” “unbegotten,”
“simple,” “immortal,” and so forth; and these concepts are, strictly speaking, epinoiai. In the
process of knowing, the human mind moves reflectively from perception (ennoia) to concept
(epinoia).215 Basil explains:
We say that the God of all things is “indestructible” and “ingenerate,” calling him by these names
according to different points of view (κατ_ διαφόρoυς _πι_oλάς) . For when we look to the past ages,
we find [observe] the life of God extending beyond every beginning and [therefore] say
[reflectively] that God is “ingenerate” (Against Eunomius, 1. 7. 525c).216

The epinoiai do not reach to God’s essence, which is unintelligible to us; but they provide true
knowledge of God insofar as God can be known by created human beings. In fact, the process of
progressing mentally from sensory or intellectual perceptions of God’s works (ennoiai) to
conceptualizations of God’s attributes (epinoiai) is integral to our way of engaging in theology.
Therefore, the epinoiai are not “empty concepts” or mere inventions, as Eunomius believes. They
do provide true knowledge of God’s uncreated energies (energeiai) according to human perception
215
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and scriptural revelation. But they cannot signify, describe, reveal, or in any way “be” God’s
essence.
Instead of correcting Eunomius’s understanding of the domain and the language of
theology, as Basil does, Gregory Nazianzen shifts the philosophical basis of the discussion from
Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics, which are Eunomius’s area of strength, to his own forte,
the Platonic correspondence between the world of the Ideas (or Forms) and the created world of
becoming. After his opening ad hominem attack on the character of Eunomius and his followers
in Oration 27,217 Gregory deploys Plato to attack Eunomius’s position head-on in Oration 28:
It is difficult to conceive God, but to define [God] in words is an impossibility, as one of the Greek
teachers of Divinity taught [Plato: Timeaeus, 28 E] . . . but in my opinion it is impossible to
express [God], and yet more impossible to conceive [God] (28. 4).

For Gregory, as for Plato, mind and reason constitute the image of God in humanity. Despite this
likeness, however, humanity, the image, cannot penetrate the essence of the archetype. Human
beings are indeed created to seek God; for included in Gregory’s concept of human reason is a
“hard-wired” desire for God that has been implanted by God in the first place: “Thus reason that
proceeds from God, that is implanted in all from the beginning and is the first law in us . . . leads us
up to God through visible things” (Or. 28. 16). In addition to the echo of Plato, there is also a trace
of Origen’s pedagogical model of the creation in this passage. Switching over to Scripture, Gregory
invokes Paul (1 Cor 13. 12): we see only dimly, as in a mirror; or in Gregory’s words, “in our
present life all that comes to us is but a little effluence, and as it were a small effulgence from a
great Light” (28. 17). Although our minds even now have the desire to ascend to God, their
Archetype (28. 17), they do not have the ability to do so, in part because our “little effluences” of
light are too small, being created, and in part because we are easily tricked by the Evil One into
worshiping the wrong objects ( cf. Rom 1. 23; Or. 28. 15). Moreover, the power of sense, which
217
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holds us back from perceiving intelligible reality, is simply too strong:
As it is impossible for the eye to draw near to visible objects apart from the intervening air and
light . . . so it is quite impracticable for those who are in the body to be conversant with objects of
pure thought apart altogether from bodily objects. For something in our own environment is ever
creeping in, even when the mind has most fully detached itself from the visible . . . and is
attempting to apply itself to those invisible things which are akin to itself (28.12).

It is possible to see in this paragraph a nutshell-version of Evagrius’s thought on prayer,
which is for him a futile struggle to run (δραμε_v) while being tied up if one cannot detach from
impassioned thought (vόημα) which carries the mind “hither and thither” (On Prayer, 72). However,
for Gregory, human nature is stubbornly embodied; we are unable to divest ourselves of our
senses “by which we are borne hither and thither” and which are always with us (28. 21). In the
final third of Oration 28, Gregory figuratively “mounts up” through a contemplation of created
nature to “pass the first veil” and step beyond the realm of sense to “look into the Holy Place, the
Intellectual and Celestial creation”(28. 31), only to discover that “even the secondary natures
surpass the power of our intellect; much more then the First and . . . only Nature” (28. 31). Both
Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the ascent of Moses in The Life of Moses and Evagrius’s journey of
the mind through the second and first natural contemplations to God derive (at least in part) from
Gregory Nazianzen’s account of the mind’s ascent to God in Oration 28.218 And yet, for Gregory
Nazianzen, it is an ascent that fails; for the mind cannot completely divest itself of sense. Nor,
Gregory finds, can human beings comprehend the breadth and the depth of God.
Indeed, according to Gregory in Oration 29, Eunomius has already implicitly admitted that
he does not know the essence of God; for instead of declaring what it is, Eunomius has merely
rejected what it is not (29. 11): “For your word signifies that [God] is not begotten; it does not
present to you what is the real nature or condition of that which has no generation.”
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In refutation of Eunomius, Gregory concludes that we can, as Paul said, “know in part and
prophesy in part”only. Scripture nourishes our desire for God and tells us that God is Trinity, but in
this life at least, the essence of God is beyond our words and beyond our knowing. As we will see
in Chapter 2, Evagrius absorbed Gregory’s views, finding in Oration 28 an outline of the soul’s
progress. But he needed to qualify Gregory’s conclusions in order to make room for his own
teaching of the contemplative passage to God.
Evagrius develops his epistemology mainly from Basil’s discussion of ennoiai and epinoiai,
with which he fundamentally agrees. Though different, Evagrius’s terminology is cognate. Also
related to “voέω” is Evagrius’s primary word for “thought”: “no_ma” (vόημα), which has a similar
range of meanings to epinoia: perception, thought, understanding, and purpose, or design. As
Columba Stewart has shown, Evagrius has a “highly visual epistemology” which incorporates
several levels of perception and distinguishes two kinds of “thought”: logismoi, thoughts which
originate from without, usually instigated by demons, and no_mata, which are concepts or
“depictions.”219 Originating, as most logismoi do, from demons, who aim to obstruct knowledge of
God, logismoi are usually negative; they have a trajectory toward evil, either in the form of action or
mental preoccupation, and they prevent human beings from perceiving truly. For example, in
Skemmata, 24, Evagrius says:
“Demonic thoughts (Ο_ δαιμovιώδεις λoγισμoί) blind the soul’s left eye (τ_v ε_ώvυμov _φθαλμόv τ_ς
ψυχ_ς _κτυφλo_σι ) which is involved in the contemplation of things that have
come into being (τ_v _πιβάλλovτα τ_ θεωρί_ τ_v γεγovότωv).”220

If demonic thoughts preoccupy the mind, it is impossible to see what really exists; one is blinded,
hence deluded. In contrast, no_mata “are simply the way the mind functions”; they are the interior
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conceptualizations that thinking requires:
All thinking and acting requires interior conceptualization, even of one’s own thinking and acting.
If I hand someone a glass, my mind “imagines” myself doing it as I physically hand over the glass.
The mind, being without a body, must act via such representations. The no_mata carry the “form”
(μoρφή) of objects or ideas, enabling the mind to function (Stewart 187).

No_mata arise from three sources: sensory stimulation, especially sight and hearing, the memory,
or even from demonic suggestion (Stewart 188), as the demons suggest “mental representations”
to the mind that are likely to arouse passion.221 Evagrius thinks of these depictions as making an
impression on the mind, or “imprinting” the mind, especially if they arise from sight. No_mata are
often charged with passion, as with a seeing or hearing or memory that arouses strong feeling; but
Evagrius also conceives of “bare depictions” (ψιλ_ voήματα) or the depictions which imprint lightly
because they are not charged by passion (Stewart 188). In all these cognitive possibilities, we
have the responsibility to use them wisely (Stewart 187); in a Stoic sense, their use is “up to us.” I
will return to human responsibility for no_mata in Chapter 2; for now it will suffice to note that the
no_mata, like Basil’s ennoiai and epinoiai, allow us to function in this world and to speak of God.
In formulating his epistemology, Evagrius implicitly agrees with Basil that we move from
observation to concept; the two are discrete acts because we can think only one thought at a time
(Stewart 188-189). Evagrius may have chosen a term which could apply to either ennoia:
“observation” or epinoia:” concept” because his purpose is to demonstrate the necessity of the
mind’s transcending all thought in the ascent to God. Also, as Stewart observes, for Evagrius,
no_mata succeed one another in our minds with amazing speed (189). Thus, the mind can move
so rapidly from observation to concept that one would be aware neither of the movement nor of the
distinction. Would our ability to think only one thought at a time mean that we could not think a
compound, like “a red cup” or “a running dog” as one no_ma? Perhaps for Evagrius, the no_mata
221

See Thoughts, 2, cited by Stewart, “Imageless Prayer,” 188, n. 65. Evagrius gives the example of the depiction of
the face of someone who has angered us, which signals the approach of the thought or demon of resentment. Terminology
overlaps a bit here, since demonic suggestions are generally considered logismoi; overlapping also occurs with the nous, which
Evagrius sometimes sees as the highest part of the soul, other times as mind which is above the soul.

125

involved would really be “cup: red” or “dog: running,” two depictions in each case but in such rapid
sequence as to be experienced as one. I am not certain of his account of complex perceptions.
Like Basil’s ennoiai and epinoiai, the no_mata of Evagrius provide the basis for rational as
well as theological thought. But they do not take us to essential knowledge of God. Unlike Basil,
Evagrius asserts that the nous can reach a state that transcends concepts (noemata) and
contemplates God by “essential knowledge” (_ o_σιώδης γv_σις; Skemmata, 20). Though admitting
the impossibility of such a state, since “the knowledge of Being is un-revelatory and has no parallel
to knowledge of being” (Skem. 20), Evagrius maintains his conviction that such a state exists and
can be reached in this life. However, he would agree with Basil that human conceptions and
depictions do not reach to God’s essence. The no_mata arising from Scripture and the works of
God would provide what we need in order to reflect discursively on God’s Providence, his designs
and works in the economy. For Evagrius, as for Basil, however, “essential science,” or knowledge
of God’s essence, transcends human thought.
Having dealt with the issue of how we know God, the Cappadocians and Evagrius then
needed to address the Neo-Arians’ subordinationism. In what did this consist? Hanson
distinguishes Neo-Arian subordinationism, which is based on the Father’s ingenerate essence,
from Homoian subordinationism, which is based on the subordination of Jesus in Scripture and on
the incomparable glory of the Father.222 Both types of Arianism preserve the monarchy of the
Father, as LaCugna points out, but at the price of relegating the Son and the Spirit to a finite,
intermediary domain.223 To say that the Son was of the same or of similar essence to the Father
was for Arians tantamount to saying that there are two Gods, either two Fathers or two Sons. In
addition to the Arians there were the “Pneumatomachians,” who accepted the divinity of the Son
but denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit for fear of worshiping three Gods. Because Basil and
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Gregory opposed both groups and aimed to give their own positive views of the Trinity, they
sometimes focus on the relationship between the Father and the Son, while at other times, they
focus on the divinity and the identity of the Holy Spirit. My discussion, like theirs, will vary in its
focus. But their purpose in refuting Eunomius and the Pneumatomachians is unwavering: to
establish the unity of three distinct hypostaseis in the Trinity — a unity free of ontological
subordinationism and even of the Pre-Nicene subordinationism which conceives of the Son and
the Spirit as deriving from the Father, hence less God than the Father, even though equally
uncreated. The latter system we have seen in Origen.
Eunomius attacks the integrity of the Trinity with single-minded logic, arguing that as
unbegotten essence, God cannot share this essence with an offspring without undergoing
separation or division—and division would destroy God’s incorruption.224 Vaggione notes that
“division” and “separation” are being used in two senses. Eunomius invokes a philosophical
tradition in which “the same words represent both logical operations and ontological realities: if we
are said to know the divine essence by the logical operation of distinguishing or separating it from
something else, [in other words, as in distinguishing the Father from the Son as hypostaseis
sharing divine essence] then

the essence itself is considered to have been divided or

separated.”225 Moreover, asserts Eunomius, the Unbegotten cannot be related in any way to the
Begotten, nor can there be a comparison between the two; for since “a comparison cannot be
made between things with nothing in common. If [one compares them], the fundamental principle
of the essence will be made common. But if that happens, the name will be made common as well”
(Apol. 9). In other words, one would wind up either with two Unbegottens or two Begottens; and
this conclusion would be nonsense:
If, then, God is the only true and only wise God because only [God] is unbegotten, the Son, being
224
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only-begotten because he is the Unbegotten’s only offspring, could not in fact be anything ‘only’ at
all if his nature were made to share a common property with some other by means of a ‘similarity’
(Apol. 22).

Instead of either of these alternatives, Eunomius concludes that the Son has a different essence
from that of the Father and that he was begotten at some time by the will of the Father: “We assert,
therefore, that [the Son’s] essence was begotten— not having been in existence prior to its own
coming to be — and that it exists, begotten before all things by the will of its God and Father”(Apol.
12). Thus Eunomius rejects Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation of the Son.
In order to argue that the Father generated the Son at a particular time, Eunomius
distinguishes sharply between God’s essence and God’s will. What God is cannot have an end;
but what God wills is an action which can have beginning and end. In particular, God’s essence is
Unbegotten, and God cannot share this essence with any being. God’s will, however, pertains to
God’s action, which was to beget the Son. The essence of God has no beginning and no ending. If
God’s begetting of the Son had no beginning and no ending, then either God’s action would be
unproductive (i.e., he would not succeed in begetting the Son but would eternally keep on trying) or
being eternal as the Father is, the Son would also be unbegotten (Apol. 23). For Eunomius,
begetting cannot (by definition) be eternal.

To be begotten is therefore to begin in time.

Accordingly, God’s will (βoύλησις) is an action (energeia), and “this action is not essence” (Apol.
24).
His distinction of essence from energeia allows Eunomius to prove the Son’s essential
difference from the Father in two ways, or by “two roads”: one either begins with essence, by
comparing “generate” and “ingenerate,” and sees from the difference of the terms that the
essences must be different; or one starts from God’s activity in the world and is led up to God’s
essence as ingenerate and the Son’s essence as generate (Liber Apologeticus, 19). He does not
want to rely on mere energeia for knowledge of God, however, because he thinks it possible to go
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straight to essence through theological terms.226 Therefore, Eunomius concludes, the Son is not
similar to the Father essentially but is similar only with respect to God’s will, which is contingent.
Once assigned to the begetting (i.e., creating) of the Son, or once the begetting of the Son
is assigned to them, God’s will and action are split off from God’s essence and subordinated to it.
Again, using Scripture this time, Eunomius argues that as the “image of the invisible God” and “the
first-born of all creation” (Col 1. 15-16), in whom all things were created, the Son does not share
the Father’s essence but reflects the Father’s will: “The word ‘image,’ then, would refer the
similarity back, not to the essence of God, but to the action unbegottenly stored up in his
foreknowledge prior to the existence of the first-born and of the things created ‘in him’” (Liber
Apologeticus, 24).
Action is not essence. Eunomius’s analysis consigns God’s will to an ontological limbo,
outside God’s essence, even though its action exists within God’s foreknowledge. Whereas for
Origen, the willing participation of the Three in divine charity constitutes the One God’s essence
(Comm. on John 2. 18), Eunomius sharply separates God’s will from God’s essence and
subordinates it, not specifying its ontological status, yet giving it an intermediate place between
God’s Unbegotten essence and the created order, which begins with the Son:
For we confess . . . that what the Son is everlastingly is what he is rightly called: Offspring,
obedient Son, most perfect Minister of the whole creation and will of the Father . . . . In all these
things the pre-eminence and sole supremacy of God is preserved, for the Holy Spirit is clearly
subject to Christ, as are all things, while the Son himself is subject to his ‘God and Father’ in
accordance with the teaching of the blessed Paul(1 Cor 15. 28; Apol. 26).

Eunomius’s subordination of God’s will can be seen more clearly by contrast with the theology of a
later student of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, who in the Summa Theologiae answers the question
226
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of whether there is a will in God:
There must be a will in God because [God] has a mind. And as [God’s] understanding is [God’s]
being, so also is [God’s] willing. . . . The will is an appetitive part in our case. Despite the fact that
it is named from wanting, ‘appetite’ or desire is active not only when seeking what is not yet
possessed but also when delighting in what is. It is in the last sense that we attribute will in God,
for[God’s] will always holds the good which is its objective, since . . . this is not distinct from the
very nature of [God’s] being (1a. 19, 1).227

Whereas for Aquinas, God’s intellect and God’s will are both essential, that is, “not distinct from the
very nature of God’s being,” Eunomius posits an ambiguous, yet subordinate relation between
God’s essence and God’s will.
Evagrius does not have the benefit of Aquinas’s distinction between willing what one does
not have and delighting in what is which would allow him to assign God’s will (with God’s mind)
directly to God’s being. Rather, in his Letter on the Faith, he returns to Origen’s emphasis on the
moral unity of the hypostaseis. Defining three types of creation: coming from non-being into being,
turning from worse to better (conversion), and the resurrection of the dead, Evagrius says, using
the term “sunergon” that the three hypostaseis of the Trinity cooperate in creation: “_v ταύταις
ε_ρήσεις συvεργ_v Πατρ_ κα_ Υ__ τ_ _Άγιov Πvεύμα,”or, “in these (creations) you will find the Holy Spirit

cooperating with the Father and the Son” (11). Yet, earlier in this letter, Evagrius clearly states that
both Son and Spirit are “of one essence and substance with the Father” (9-10). As we will see,
Evagrius’s Origenism has been balanced by his knowledge of both Basil and Gregory Nazianzen,
as well as by the project of refuting Eunomius. As a result, Evagrius argues for the ontological unity
of the Trinity in a more precise way than Origen was willing to do, even as he upholds the unity of
the Trinity as a moral one.
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For Eunomius, however, the unity of the Trinity does not exist, nor even the Trinity itself.
The outcome of his logic is a strict ontological hierarchy of one God and two created beings. By the
principle of subnumeration (_παρίθμησις), there is an order of First, Second, and Third. According to
Aristotle, to “subnumerate” is to count beings unequal to a first being. If the beings are equal, one
is to “connumerate” (συvαριθμε_σθαι) them.228 The essence of God is Unbegotten, and the
Unbegotten comes first. The Unbegotten and the Only-Begotten are two different essences and
cannot be compared (Apol. 24). The term “Father,” therefore, pertains not to the essence of God,
but only to the action of God in begetting the Son (Apol. 24). The Son comes second. Created by
the will of God alone, not “out of nothing,” like other creatures, the Son is to be honored above the
rest of creation (Apol. 15). But the Son is still a creature, (πoίημα; Apol. 20). The Holy Spirit is
created by the will of the Father, yet not directly, because “through [the Son] all things were made
(John 1. 3). The Holy Spirit, “brought into existence at the command of the Father by the action of
the Son,” comes third. The Spirit is to be “honored in third place as the first and greatest work of
all, the only such ‘thing made’ of the Only-begotten, lacking indeed godhead and the power of
creation, but filled with the power of sanctification and instruction” (Apol. 25). According to “A
Eunomian Confession of Faith” appended to the manuscripts of the Apology, “The Unbegotten is
first, incomparable, and God; the Son is second, created by the will and power of the Father and
maker of all other creatures; and the Spirit is third, the first and best creature made by the Son at
the command of the Father, but inferior to both Father and Son.”229 Superficially, this order
resembles Origen’s, with the Son being second and the Spirit third; however, for Origen, the Son
and the Spirit are constituted by their voluntary sharing of divine essence. The Son and the Spirit
are within the Godhead, not outside it.
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For Gregory and Basil, Eunomian subordinationism arises from misunderstanding both of
terminology and of the unique nature of the being of God, who transcends logical categories. As
they see it, Eunomius writes τεχvoλoγία, a logic-chopping argument, rather than θεoλoγία, true speech
about God.230 In Oration 29, Gregory Nazianzen puns on the two senses of _γέv(v)ητoς in order to
show that these Arian sticklers for precise language have confused being begotten with being
created :
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In what sense do you assert that the Unbegotten and the Begotten (τ_ _γέvvητov κα_ τ_ γέvvητov)
are not the same [of the same essence]? If you mean that the Uncreated and the created (τ_ μ_
_κτισμέvov κα_ τ_ _κτισμέvov) are not the same, I agree with you; for certainly the Unoriginate and
the created are not of the same nature. But if you say that he that begat and that which is
begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate (29. 10).231

LaCugna notes that Pre-Nicene theologians, trying to preserve monotheism, had “used the word
agenn_tos ( unbegotten) to express God’s ineffability and transcendence, when the word agen_tos
(uncreated) would have done just as well.”232 Better, in fact. For Gregory, the terms “begotten” and
“unbegotten” have nothing to do with the essence of either Father or Son; they are attributes which
pertain to God’s hypostaseis. Therefore, to say that the Father is unbegotten while the Son is
begotten does not preclude arguing that the two are of the same essence, as Eunomius had
assumed. In contrast, agen_tos and m_ ektismenon are not homonyms, but synonyms, as are
their opposites. Whichever set of words is used, Gregory means that what is uncreated is not the
same as what is created; and being created (or not) does pertain to the Son’s essence. Eunomius
should speak more accurately, for to say that the Son is begotten differs from saying that the Son
is created. The second does not follow from the first. The way is now open for showing that the
Son is “begotten, not created.”
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For Gregory, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all uncreated hypostaseis of the Trinity. In
essence they differ from any created being. LaCugna’s summary of the Trinitarian definition of I
Constantinople may be useful here: “The Father is agen_tos and agenn_tos, uncreated and
unbegotten; the Son is agen_tos and genn_tos, uncreated and begotten; the Holy Spirit is
agen_tos, uncreated, and, strictly speaking, agenn_tos, unbegotten.”233 If only it can be agreed
that all three hypostaseis are uncreated, the way is open to seeing them as coeternal and even
coequal within the essence of Trinity. However, Gregory characteristically shies away from precise
definitions of God’s essence. Reading Ex 33. 23 allegorically, as a spiritual quest for vision,
Gregory follows Basil’s insistence that human reason cannot reach God’s essence but allows only
the analogical knowledge available to us in revelation.
I was running to lay hold on God, and thus I went up into the Mount [Sinai] and drew away the
curtain of the cloud and . . . away from matter and material things and as far as I could I withdrew
within myself . . . [and saw] not the First and unmingled Nature known to itself— to the Trinity . . .
but only that Nature which at last even reaches to us (Oration 28. 3).

How is the Son begotten? “The begetting of God must be honored by silence” (Oration 29. 8). We
can “sketch” God’s attributes (Oration 30. 17); but in the question of Who God Is, we are like
Moses on the mountain, who received God’s name simply as “I Am” (Ex. 3. 14). God’s being is
absolute, and we cannot grasp it (Oration 30. 18). Evagrius shows the influence of Gregory’s
refusal to define God’s essence when he says of Christ, “there is one whose nature, person, and
name God only knows. And he, as he stands in his nature is the only one among all the beings
whose place and name are unknown. His nature . . . is naked mind and he himself is able to say
what his nature is” (Letter to Melania 6. 198).
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For Basil too, the essence of God is utterly transcendent. It follows from his argument that
God’s essence cannot be known, as Unbegotten or by any other term, that human definitions and
categories also fall short of revealing the truth about God; and Scripture provides the most certain
guide. In On the Holy Spirit, Basil never explicitly defines the Holy Spirit as God; why not?
According to Gregory Nazianzen, Basil was trying to be tactful, to avoid offending those who were
not ready to take that step. But surely Behr is right in suggesting that Basil wanted to adhere to
Scripture, which does not directly state that the Spirit is God.234 This interpretation would be
consistent with his conviction that unless philosophical terms and categories coincide with the
message of Scripture, they are technologia instead of theologia. Thus, Basil confronts both
Eunomius and the Pneumatomachians, who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit, with their misuse
of Aristotle’s categories to argue the subordination of the Son and/or Spirit.235 Eunomius, for
example, orders his “Trinity”of Unbegotten, Begotten, and Spirit/Counselor as first, second, and
third according to “subnumeration”(Apol. 25), Aristotle’s term for the counting of unequal entities.
But to “sub-numerate” is to “sub-ordinate.” Hence, Basil insists that both counting and ordering are
inappropriate to the Trinity; nor are the hypostaseis divided “parts” of God to be numbered and
ordered:
It is by no means easy to understand what our opponents mean by the term subnumeration. . . .
Do they define subordination as the division of the whole into lesser parts? I am unable to believe
that they have gone so utterly mad, treating the God of all like a thing only to be perceived by the
human mind, having no real personal existence. They chop [God] up into subordinate pieces and
call this process subnumeration (Spirit, 41)!236

In the first place, says Basil, numbers have nothing to do with either superiority or inferiority of
nature (φύσις). To use the orders of numbers to express inferiority in nature would be like claiming
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that tin is subordinate to gold on the basis of weight. Numbers determine quantities, but they have
nothing to do with the nature of a thing (Spirit, 43).
In the second place, numbers are an aspect of quantity; and quantity means “that which is
divisible.” Therefore, quantity, whether intelligible or material, applies only to the created world.
The source is Aristotle again: Metaphysics, Δ. 13 (1029a. 7-14):
‘Quantity’ means that which is divisible into constituents, either of which or each of which is by
nature one and a this. . . . It is called ‘a plurality’ if it is divisible potentially into parts which are not
continuous, but ‘a magnitude’ if it is divisible potentially into continuous parts. . . . Of these, a
limited plurality is called ‘a number.’

If the hypostaseis of the Trinity were members of a finite class within the created world, they could
be counted, weighed, measured, and divided; but Basil denies that Aristotle’s categories apply in
any way to the hypostaseis of God, each of whom is unique. Moreover, Basil’s opponents have
replaced the issue of salvation with “a stupid arithmetic”:
We are saved by faith; numbers have been invented as symbols of quantity. . . yet these men
honor arithmetic more than the divine nature, lest they give the Paraclete more honor than [the
Paraclete] is due! . . . We declare each Person [hypostasis] to be unique, and if we must use
numbers, we will not let a stupid arithmetic lead us astray to the idea of many gods (Spirit, 44).

Although the uniqueness of each of the hypostaseis could be construed to mean that there are
three Gods, Basil guards against this interpretation by insisting on “the unity of the Monarchy” that
is present in all three hypostaseis. As he puts it, the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son;
what the Father is, the Son is also; and through the Son, the Spirit is joined to the Father. Thinking
of the unity of the Monarchy properly requires that the meanings of both “One” and “Three” stretch
almost beyond conception:
If we count, we do not add, increasing from one to many. We do not say, “one, two, three,” or
“first, second, and third” . . . As unique Persons, [Father and Son] are one and one; as sharing a
common nature, both are one. How does one and one not equal two Gods? . . . Since the divine
nature is not composed of parts, union of the persons (_ _vωσις τ_ς θεότητoς) is accomplished by
partaking of the whole (_στιv _v τ_ κoιvωvί_) (Spirit, 45).

We do not count the three hypostaseis of the Trinity by numbers, as we could count three
objects, nor can we rank them in any order because their uniqueness makes them “one and one
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[and one].”237 In their common nature, they are not three sharing one essence. Instead, they are
one koinonia, or communion, partaking of the one Monarchy, which is the Father.238 There is an
echo of Origen’s participatory language here. For Basil, the Father’s monarchy does not
subordinate the Son and the Spirit, however, because the Father cannot be thought apart from the
Son and the Spirit; in fact, Father, Son, and Spirit must always be thought together: “We learn that
just as the Father is made visible in the Son, so also the Son is recognized in the Spirit. . . The
Holy Spirit cannot be divided from the Father and the Son in worship” (Spirit, 64). In the same
section, Basil goes on to say that outside the Spirit, we cannot worship at all.
The only ordering that takes place is the ordering of grace, an ordering that does not
pertain to the relations of the hypostaseis, but to the way in which God works with human beings.
When the Spirit is said to be “in” someone, this expression does not imply any reduction in the
Spirit’s rank; for the Spirit is always with the Father and the Son in co-eternity:
When we consider the Spirit’s rank, we think of [the Spirit] as present with the Father and the
Son, but when we consider the working of [the Spirit’s] grace on its recipients, we say that the
Spirit is in us. If we say, “Glory to the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit,” we are not
describing the Spirit’s rank, but confessing our own weakness, since we show that we are not
capable of glorifying God on our own; only in the Spirit is this made possible (Spirit, 63).

For Basil, the Spirit is always “with” the Father and the Son. It is in relation to us that the Spirit
enters and leaves, in response to our wavering receptivity. No one (other than Christ) is united to
the Spirit indissolubly. For us, the grace of the Spirit comes and goes (Spirit, 63). Therefore, Basil
says, it is more fitting to say that the Spirit is “in” human beings rather than “with” them because no
human being is eternally indivisible from the Holy Spirit. Even those in whom the Spirit dwells
continually are not indissolubly united with the Spirit. “In us” is a metaphorical term which Basil
uses in connection with the scriptural metaphor of the “place” of contemplation in the Spirit:
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Although paradoxical, it is nevertheless true that Scripture frequently speaks of the Spirit in terms
of place — a place in which people are made holy. . . In reference to the Spirit, God says,
“Behold, there is a place by me: you shall stand upon the rock”(Ex 33. 21; LXX). This “place” is
contemplation in the Spirit, and when Moses entered this “place,” God revealed [Godself] to him.
Only in this special “place” can true worship be offered (Spirit, 62) .

The paradoxical idea of the Spirit’s being “located” in a place does not mean that the Spirit is a
lesser member of the Trinity who can be contained by physical places. Rather, the metaphor of
place is Scripture’s way of describing God’s assumption of our humanity as we engage in the act
of worship, which is essentially an act of contemplation. True worship cannot, in fact, happen
unless, as we are open to it, the Spirit embraces us and gives us our “place” in God.239
For Basil, working with another spatial metaphor, worship itself is a “way of divine
knowledge”that ascends from the Spirit (in which we pray) through the Son to the Father. Basil
explains that the Spirit reveals the Son, as Scripture says in 1 Corinthians 12. 3: “No one can say
‘Jesus is Lord’ except in the Holy Spirit.” The Son, in turn, reveals the Father; “No one knows the
Father except the Son” (Mt 11. 27). Thus, we ascend to the Father on the road of
knowledge/worship:
The way [of] divine knowledge (_δ_ς τ_ς θεoγvωσίας) ascends from one Spirit through the one Son
to the one Father. Likewise, natural goodness, inherent holiness, and royal dignity reaches from
the Father through the Only-Begotten to the Spirit (Spirit, 47).

God’s grace, on the other hand, descends to us as goodness, holiness, and royal dignity from the
Father, through the Son, and in the Spirit. Like Origen, Basil emphasizes the cooperation of the
entire Trinity in the work of salvation. On this point, Gregory Nazianzen concurs:
The Father was the true light which lightens everyone coming into the world, the Son was the true
light which lightens everyone coming into the world, the other comforter was the true light which
lightens everyone coming into the world: Was and Was and Was, but Was One Thing, Light thrice
repeated; but One Light and One God (Oration 31. 3).

As Father, Son, and Spirit are one God, the light of God coming into the world (John 1. 9) is (and
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was and will be) one God. Gregory, however, is more willing than Basil to use the word “three”:
To us there is one God, for the Godhead is one . . . though we believe in three persons
[hypostaseis]. For one is not more and another less God; nor is one before and another after; nor
are they divided in will or parted in power . . . and there is one mingling of light, as it were of
three suns joined to each other (Oration 31. 14).

Again, these “three suns” are three, but they form one light, as God is one, both in essence and in
operation. Later, Gregory of Nyssa also develops Basil’s formula of oneness of essence and
operation, using it to prove that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God and not three
Gods:
Every operation which extends from God to the creation and is named according to our variable
conceptions of it has its origin from the Father and proceeds through the Son and is perfected in
the Holy Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not divided with regard to
the number of those who fulfil it because the action of each concerning anything is not
separate and peculiar, but whatever comes to pass . . . comes to pass by the action of the Three,
yet what does come to pass is not three things (On Not Three Gods, 334).

Not only are the three hypostaseis one essentially, but even with regard to the distinct operations
of each hypostasis in the economy of salvation, one plus one plus one does not equal three. In
Trinitarian math, one plus one plus one equals one. “The power is not divided, nor the glory
separated” (Basil, Spirit, 45).
As can be seen in his Letter of the Faith, Evagrius follows Basil and Gregory Nazianzen in
formulating his doctrine of the Trinity, continuing Basil’s discussion in On the Holy Spirit of how
God, as Trinity, is one. On the question of how we know God, Evagrius agrees with Basil with
Gregory Nazianzen that the divine essence of God transcends human knowledge— or, at any rate,
God’s essence transcends discursive human knowledge, conceived and transmitted in language.
However, Evagrius’s practice of prayer took him to a wordless, formless state of “pure prayer”
which comes infinitely close to essential knowledge of God. Exploring this realm takes him past
Gregory Nazianzen’s clear denial that human beings can attain to essential knowledge of God in
Oration 28. Although Evagrius agrees with Gregory that knowledge of God surpasses the capacity
of the human intellect, he cannot be as certain as Gregory that we can never know God
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essentially. Yet, Evagrius is far from being a follower of Eunomius, who believed that the correct
terminology reveals the essential nature of God. In fact, Evagrius is capable of stretching the
meanings of theological terms to the point at which their insufficiency to convey an understanding
of God becomes obvious: for example, his discussion of God’s oneness in Letter on the Faith, to
be explored shortly. Thus, both argument and method are grounded in Basil’s and Gregory’s
convictions that God cannot be essentially known through theological language.
More specifically, Evagrius grounds his theory of the knowledge of God in Basil’s
arguments against the Neo-Arians and the Pneumatomachians, as well as on Basil’s insight into
the nature of the three hypostaseis as one God. Evagrius draws attention to the paradox implicit in
Trinitarian language in such a way as to underline the Cappadocian argument that God is
essentially unknowable. However, Evagrius puts more stress than Basil on the moral and
participatory unity

of the Trinity.

For his understanding of the moral cooperation of the

hypostaseis of the Trinity in the economy, Evagrius returns to Origen. It is Evagrius’s theological
grounding in Basil and Origen that will be the concern of the remainder of this chapter. I will begin
with Evagrius’s Letter on the Faith, his explication of the Trinity that owes the most to Basil.
Immediately noticeable in this letter is a pronounced stress on God’s oneness with an
argument that stretches the meaning of normal theological language. For Evagrius, God is both
“Monad and Henad (_ μov_ς κα_ _vάς),” or “Unity and Unicity.” These words have a long history of
being difficult to conceive. Guillaumont traces the conjunction of these terms for oneness to Plato’s
discussion of the Forms in Philebus, 15. a-b, then to Origen, Princ. I. 1. 6.240 Butterfield’s note on
the latter passage traces the terminology back to the later Pythagoreans, who distinguished the
Monad (Unity) from “the bare One,” an absolute not related to anything. He then supplies Clement
of Alexandria’s explanation of Monas in Stromata V. 71. 2: one can imagine the Monad by
thinking of a body, then mentally removing its depth, breadth, length, and position (n. 1, p. 10).
240
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What is left, supposedly, is the primal Unity. Origen connects both Monas and Henas to God’s
simple intellectual being::
God. . . must not be thought to be any kind of body, nor to exist in a body, but to be a simple
intellectual existence . . . Unity, or if I may say so, Oneness throughout, and the mind and fount
from which originates all intellectual existence or mind.

Guillaumont points out that in the Letter on the Faith, Evagrius uses both terms (Monas and
Henas) for intensification; his objective is to defend the unity that exists within the Trinity.241 In
addition, Evagrius’s agenda is to reinforce Basil’s argument by showing the inconceivable unity of
God, that is, the difficulty with which our conceptions stretch to be able to conceive of God at all.
Implicit in Letter on the Faith is Evagrius’s later explication of the no_mata, our human depictions
and conceptions that are part of our created mental reality, but do not serve us in the
contemplation of God.
Accordingly, Evagrius begins his discourse on the Trinity by continuing Basil’s discussion of
how God is one “against those who cast it in our teeth that we are Tritheists”(2).242 Adverting to
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Basil had discussed the inappropriateness of “subnumerating” the
hypostaseis of God, or even of counting them, for two reasons: first, number is a category
belonging to quantity; and quantity is irrelevant to the nature of a thing; second, quantity and
number can be predicated only of divisible things, that is, things in the created world. Early in
Letter on the Faith, Evagrius denies the charge of tritheism on the grounds that “we confess one
God not in number, but in nature” (2). “One in number,” he says, pertains to the counting of
composite things. For example, one human being would be one in number; but as all humans
consist of both body and soul, one human being would not be one in nature. Developing Basil’s
distinctions, Evagrius contrasts the way in which the world is one, as a composite whole that is
composed of fire, water, air, and earth, with the way in which God is one: as being that is simple,
241
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not composite, and concludes,”God is therefore not one in number” (2); that is, God is not a whole
formed of constituent parts. He continues:
Again, [human nature] is called one in number. We frequently speak of one man, but [human
nature] . . . composed of body and soul, is not simple. Similarly we say one angel in number, but
not one by nature nor yet simple, for we conceive the hypostasis of the angel as essence with
sanctification. If, therefore, everything which is one in number is not one in nature, and that which
is one and simple in nature is not one in number . . . how can number be charged against us
when we utterly exclude it from that blessed and spiritual nature (2)?

Because “one” is a term which in ordinary speech designates number, when we use it of God, we
think we know what we are talking about. Evagrius would say, however, that we need to remember
that “one” is actually not a number in relation to God. But is it possible to think “one” and not think
of number or at least of quantity or at the very least of wholeness? Yes, but probably not
consistently; for we can do it only to the extent that we can let go of the meanings the word
normally has. These are no_mata, the depictions and conceptions of our minds, which need to be
transcended even to begin to fathom the mystery of God.
Evagrius uses a similar argument to exclude the category of quality from the essence of
God. Referring to the Homoian Arians, who taught that the Son is like the Father and to the NeoArians, who were believed to teach that the Son is unlike the Father, Evagrius says that both terms
are “equally impossible,” for “like” and “unlike” “are predicated in relation to quality, and the divine
is free from quality” (Letter, 3). This distinction too goes back to Aristotle, who in the Metaphysics,
defines “quality” as “the differentia of the substance” and the “differentia of motions,” even the
motions of moving affections, such as virtues and vices:
Virtues and vices . . . indicate differentia of motion and activity, according to which things in motion
act or are acted upon well or badly. . . “Good” and “bad” signify a quality most of all in things having
a soul, and of these, most of all in those which have choice (Book Δ. 14: 1020b.14-25).

Although Evagrius bases his analysis of the human spiritual journey on this very discussion, he
rejects “quality” in the Trinity. Involving, as it does, both difference and movement, “quality” applies
to created being. God, being One Simply, does not admit difference and transcends movement.
The only possibility left is to “confess identity of nature” and to accept the consubstantiality of the
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Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (3). To assert consubstantiality avoids importing quality into
discussions of God.
Would Evagrius say that we cannot predicate attributes, such as “good” and “wise” of God?
In the Letter to the Faith, he has no argument against the scriptural passages that ascribe wisdom
and goodness to God, Rom 16. 27 and Luke 18. 19 respectively (3). However, it seems that
Evagrius would warn us not to mistake the attributes of God for definitions of God’s nature (ousia).
There is danger, for Evagrius, in “circumscribing” God with definitions that are based on human
categories, such as quantity and quality. To be “circumscribed” (περιγραπτός) in nature means to be
limited and created. Creatures can be defined by qualities as well as by quantities, but God is not
comprehensible (Letter, 2). Here Evagrius recalls Origen’s distinction between God, who is
essential goodness, and creatures. As Origen said (Principles, 2. 9. 2), created beings have their
goodness accidentally rather than essentially, with the result that this goodness can be lost; and, in
fact, it was lost in the Fall, when the created intellects “wandered away.” For Evagrius, to be
circumscribed also means to be vulnerable to sin: “Every holy thing . . . of which the nature is
circumscribed and of which the holiness is acquired is not insusceptible of evil. But the Son and
the Holy Spirit are the source of sanctification” (Letter, 3). Therefore, the Son and the Spirit and
indeed the Father as well are not to be defined. If they could be defined, they would be creatures;
and salvation would not be assured.
Conversely, if we think that our human definitions really capture the nature of God, we will
be deceived. However, words do have symbolic value for Evagrius. Like Origen, he finds the words
of Scripture to be doors to the mysteries of God. For example, in Letter on the Faith, he takes
issue with the Arians who interepret Jesus’s saying in John 6. 57: “I live because of the Father, to
mean the Son’s subordination to the Father. Evagrius says no, “I live because of the Father” refers
to Jesus’s life in the flesh and in this time. Here, Evagrius makes use of the Nicene tradition of
“partitive exegesis”: the distinction between what Scripture says of Christ as divine and what it
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says of Christ as human, assuming that divine and human, Christ is the same personal subject.243
But having marked the distinction, he sees past it. For Evagrius, as for Origen, the human life of
Jesus is never merely human. Because of Jesus’s union with the Son, God’s Word, Jesus’s life in
the flesh is a “door” to further mystery and meaning. Evagrius therefore takes “flesh” in two senses,
as referring both to the human life of Jesus and to his resurrection-body. Thus, Evagrius relates
Jesus’s words, “I live because of the Father,” to what he says just before, in John 6. 56 “Whoever
eats my flesh and drinks my blood remains in me, and I in him.” For him, John 6. 56-57
recapitulates the economy of salvation (Letter on the Faith, 4):
He did not say, “I have lived because of the Father,” but “I live because of the Father,” clearly
indicating the present time; and the Christ, having the word of God in himself, is able to call the
life which he leads “life,” and that this is his meaning we shall learn from what follows. “He that
eats me,” he says, “he also shall live because of me,” for we eat his flesh and drink his blood,
being made through his Incarnation and his visible life partakers of his Word and his Wisdom.

If we participate in the economy of salvation, we both eat Christ’s flesh and drink his blood
sacramentally244 and we “eat and drink” the Word and Wisdom that is the Son by the three-fold
path that Christ sets out for us:
For all his mystic sojourn among us he called “flesh and blood,” and [he] set forth the teaching
consisting of practical science, of physics, and of theology, whereby our soul is nourished and is
meanwhile trained for the contemplation of actual realities (Letter on the Faith, 4).

For Evagrius, eating and drinking are metaphors for knowing and doing. He sets out here
243
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three stages of Christian life: “the praktik_,” the practice of purifying our passions; “physik_,”
the contemplation of God’s Providence and the principles (logoi) of material and intelligible created
reality; and “theology,” the contemplation of the Holy Trinity.245 In these stages, we enter more
and more deeply into the Body of Christ and we gradually learn to contemplate the triune God who
is beyond us to define. Reception of the flesh and the blood of Christ in the Eucharist symbolizes
the whole journey; and the journey symbolizes partaking of Christ’s body and blood. In Ad
Monachos, Evagrius states this with naked clarity:246
Flesh of Christ: virtues of praktik_;
he who eats it, passionless shall he be.
Blood of Christ: contemplation of created things;
he who drinks it becomes wise.
Breast of the Lord: knowledge of God;
he who rests against it, a theologian shall he be (118 - 120).247

Thus, broadly considered, theology is not a matter of defining God’s nature by the use of
categories and definitions (though one has to engage in that to combat heresy), but a
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contemplative partaking of God’s love through Christ. This partaking comprises the whole of
Christian life and ends in “theology” strictly considered, which is a loving and intelligent union with
God. Made possible through the Incarnation, this union is full participation in the life of the
Trinity.248

248
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Before exploring Evagrius’s view of that contemplative journey, it is necessary to consider
his conception of God’s Unity and Unicity in relation to his Christology. Being “essential intellect,”
God is also essential contemplation: the archetype of the human intellect. In God, for Evagrius,
knowledge is being. As Guillaumont has said, “Dieu, Unité ou Trinité, est défini comme ‘science
essentielle,’ γv_σις o_σιώδης; en cela se distingue le vrai Dieu du ‘dieu étranger’ . . . La science est
l’essence de Dieu.”249 “God, Unity or Trinity, is defined as ‘essential knowledge’; on this point one
may distinguish the true God from the false (strange) God.” Knowledge is the essence of God.
Essential knowledge is, then, the Unity within the Trinity; essential knowledge also characterizes
the relations of Father and Son: “Le Père seul connaît le Christ et le Fils seul le Père, celui-ci en
tant qu’unique dans l’unité et celui-là en tant qu’unité et unicité” (KG 3. 1)”: “The Father alone
knows Christ, and Christ alone knows the Father, the latter insofar as he is unique in the unity, the
former insofar as he is the unity and the unicity.” The Father is Monad, absolute one, but the Trinity
is Henad. As for Basil, Father and Son are “one and one,” not two. Each is a unique hypostasis,
but one in being and operations. Evagrius refers here to Matthew 11. 27: “No one knows the Son
except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son.” Because the Father generates
the Son, the Father is the generator of “essential knowledge” also; and the Son is essential
knowledge of the Father within the Trinity.250
This identification of being and knowledge may derive from Origen’s development of
Scripture’s stress (Prov. 8. 22 and John 1. 1) on the Son as the Father’s Wisdom and Word,
always with the Father. The role of the Spirit in relation to essential knowledge is harder to
determine because Scripture does not state it so exactly. But Evagrius gives a suggestion of it in
Letter on the Faith, 11, where, having delineated three creations: creation out of non-being,
conversion from sin, and resurrection from the dead, he brings out the cooperation of all three
249
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hypostaseis. In speaking of the creation of the world,251 he cites Psalm 32. 6 (LXX), as Basil does
in On the Holy Spirit: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made and all the host of them by
the breath (pneuma) of his mouth.” In commenting on this passage, Basil also emphasizes the
cooperation between the Word and the Spirit:
The Word is not merely air set in motion by the organs of speech, nor is the Spirit of his mouth an
exhalation of the lungs, but the Word is [the one] who was with God in the beginning, and was
God and the Spirit of God’s mouth is the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father. Perceive
these three: the Lord who commands, the Word who creates, and the Spirit who strengthens
(Spirit, 38).

Also quoting the verse, Evagrius connects Psalm 32. 6 with the baptismal formula, in which the
Holy Spirit participates with the Father and the Son in making each person a new creation. In the
third creation, the resurrection of the dead, Evagrius gives the Spirit the role of renewing the face
of the earth. Finally, Evagrius nails down his argument that all three hypostaseis cooperate in the
ongoing work of creation by citing Ephesians 6. 17: “And take the helmet of salvation and the
sword of the Spirit which is the word of God”:
God is called θεός either because he placed all things or because he beholds all things (παρ_ τ_
τεθεικέvαι _ θε_σθαι τ_ πάvτα). If he is called θεός because he “placed” or “beholds” all things, and
the Spirit knows all the things of God as the spirit in us knows our things, then the Holy Spirit is
God. Again, if the sword of the Spirit is the word of God, then the Holy Spirit is God, inasmuch as
the sword belongs to him of whom it is also called the Word (Letter, 11).

Thus, for Evagrius, it appears that the Holy Spirit knows the Father through the Son and can even
translation of S2]. See Un philosophe, 341.
251

in this letter.

Evagrius does not use Origen’s model of the two-stage creation, the second stage of which was caused by the Fall,
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wield the Word who is essential knowledge as a sword. Although human language separates and
compares, Evagrius agrees with the Cappadocians that in the Trinity there is no separation or
subordination according to essential knowledge.
It is Evagrius’s christology that was problematic enough to get his works condemned in
553. Here, he follows Origen, who in On First Principles, borrowed from Plato the account of
creation in the Timaeus. For both Origen and Evagrius, the original creation was intellectual: God’s
choice to create intellects who would be with him as his Word and Spirit are with him, but in an
analogous way, as creatures. Because they are creatures and not God, Origen stipulates several
times that they do not have goodness essentially (e.g., Princ. I. 5. 3), but must make it their own by
practicing it. However, the primordial created intellects chose to wander away (intellectually) from
God. God then provided for them in the “second creation,” bodies and worlds appropriate to their
spiritual distance, with the result that some became angels, others human beings, and still others,
demons. Origen, defending the freedom of the human will against Gnostic fatalism, insists that all
created intellects started out in a state of goodness. Moreover, they had (and have) freedom of
choice to be with God or not. Each created intellect lives in the world and is given the helpers he,
she, or it needs in order to return to God. Every world and body has a pedagogical (not merely
punitive) purpose.
For souls are, so to speak, innumerable, and . . . equally so are their movements, their purposes,
their inclinations, and their impulses, of which there is only one perfect superintendent, who has
full knowledge both of the times and the appropriate aids and the paths and the ways, namely the
God and Father of the universe (Princ. 3. 1. 14; Greek version).

Only one created intellect did not fall; and that was the intellect which clung to God, namely
Christ. It is this Christ, in union with the Word, who is the Son of God, who comes to save
humanity. In On First Principles, this vision of Christ, the ever- faithful created intellect, lives
peacefully with the usual version of the uncreated Son of God assuming human nature in the
Incarnation, as stated in Princ. I. 2. 1: “First we must know this, that in Christ there is one nature,
his deity, because he is the only-begotten Son of the Father, and another human nature, which in
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very recent times he took upon him to fulfil the divine purpose.“ But the two versions are not in
harmony. Because created intellects became angels, humans, and demons as a result of the Fall,
the notion of Christ as a pre-existent created intellect gives rise to the question of whether Jesus is
truly human as well as truly God. Also, as we have seen, the Arian Controversy called for
ontological language, rather than moral language, to answer the Arian claim that both Son and
Spirit are creatures and adequately define the Trinity. The Cappadocians emphasized ontological
language without discarding the importance of the will. The three hypostaseis “cooperate” in
salvation because their will and their work “is” One.
Although Evagrius fundamentally agrees with them, he also agrees with Origen that the
created Christ began not as a human baby,252 but as a pre-existent intellect who clove to the Word
so thoroughly that he did not wander away, but became united with the Word by an inseparable
moral union. Thus, Christ is connatural with the Trinity only by moral union:
Le Christ n’est pas connaturel de la Trinité. En effet, il n’est pas aussi science essentielle; mais
seul il a en lui toujours la science essentielle inséparablement. Mais le Christ, je veux dire celui
qui est venu avec le Verbe Dieu et en esprit est le Seigneur, est inséparable de son corps et par
l’union il est connaturel de son Père, parce qu’il est aussi science essentielle (KG, 6. 14).253

What Evagrius is getting at, I think, is that as created intellect, Christ is not “part” of the Trinity
as a fourth hypostasis; he therefore is not “essential knowledge.” Nor is Christ’s union with the
Word strictly ontological. Nevertheless, having chosen to be inseparable from the Word, the
created soul of Christ is united to the Word in a permanent moral union. He therefore has
“essential knowledge” of the Trinity within him in a uniquely voluntary, quasi-ontological manner.
Similarly, in the Incarnation, he is united voluntarily both to the human body of Jesus and to the
252
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Word/Son. The union is not given a clear ontological expression.
Moreover, Evagrius seems to be aware of the ambiguity; for in the Letter to Melania, he
does use the language of being to express Christ’s union with God and humanity. The context is
his rejection of the notion that there are two Christs, a human Christ and a divine, intellectual
Christ. There is only one being, Christ, who is God and “man”:
Our Lord has appeared as a man in our time, in our world, and in our measure. But in his own
time, in his world, and in his kingdom, this man does not only appear to be God, but he truly is.
And as in this world there were not two beings, God and man, but one, God for Himself and man
for us; thus in his world too, there are not two beings, God and man, but one God who for himself
is God and God who is man because God has become man (LM, 12. 473-479).

In making the case against “two beings,” Evagrius suggests the possibility that the union between
Christ and the Word is ontological as well as moral: “in his own time, in his world, and in his
kingdom, this man does not only appear to be God, but he truly is.” Evagrius reaches for a balance
between the need for ontological language to account for the Incarnation and the need to keep
Origen’s focus on the importance of the will, the free choice of Christ to cleave to the Word in
obedience as well as the free choice of God to become incarnate.
The Christological controversies of the fifth century are foreshadowed here. In the
Kephalaia Gnostika, Evagrius denies again that there are two Christs: “Celui qui dit deux Christs
ou deux Fils est semblable à celui qui dit la sagesse et le sage deux sages ou deux sagesses” (6.
16). In English, we read: “The one who says [that there are] two Christs or two Sons is like one
who says [that] wisdom and the sage [are] two sages or two wisdoms.” Hence, through the union,
there is only one Christ, one Son. Does this statement ring true? — that is the question.254
Whereas Basil and Gregory Nazianzen drop Origen’s cosmology but keep his stress on
God’s unchanging will to love, shared by each of the hypostaseis, Evagrius keeps Origen’s
cosmology because it accords with the spiritual pedagogy that he worked out in monastic life. Yet,
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he also makes an attempt to harmonize Origen’s system with that of his Cappadocian mentors.
The result is a hybrid with Platonic elements that are problematic, even to some extent, for
Evagrius, as the above passages witness. However, Evagrius does establish a moral and quasiontological union between God and human beings in Christ that provides the basis for his theology
of prayer. Despite his retention of Origen’s creation-myth and his resulting failure to define the
Incarnation in clear ontological language, nevertheless, in the Letter to Melania, Evagrius
continues his discussion of the Incarnation by clarifying God’s purpose:
That which is natural to [us] is that [we were] created in the image of God. What is supernatural is
that we may come to be in [God’s] likeness according to the word, “I have come that they may
have life and that they may have it in abundance” (John 10. 10; LM, 12. 484-487).

Thus, in the twelfth section of the Letter to Melania, Evagrius gives his own version of Athanasius’s
formula: God became human that human beings can become God.255 This is the underlying tenet
that keeps Evagrius — barely — on the Christian side of the divide between Gnostic myth and
Christianity. To his theology of prayer and to Origen’s, we now turn.
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III. Chapter 2
The Movement from Image to Likeness: A Theology of Prayer
A. The Heritage of Clement of Alexandria
In the process of reaching a definition of the Trinity at the First Council of Constantinople in
381, the Cappadocians and Evagrius had made great progress in defining the nature of God and in
dealing with the question of how God is known. Following Origen’s idea of the higher mysteries
hidden in the words of Scripture, they taught that the human mind cannot know God directly through
the words and the theological concepts that address the nature of God. God can be known only
through revelation; and revelation provides true knowledge of God’s will and energies, but not
knowledge of God according to essence. The latter transcends the human mind.
In any consideration of prayer, however, the parallel question of self-knowledge arises. How
and how well can we know ourselves? “Γv_θι σεαυτόv,” Socrates is supposed to have said; know
yourself, but how?256 For Origen and Evagrius, self-knowledge begins with Genesis 1. 26: creation
in the image and likeness of God. Plato and the Stoics provided analyses of the human person
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This advice was engraved over the entrance to the Delphic Oracle; it has been ascribed to Socrates and to various
members of the Seven Sages of the Ancient World. Who actually first said it is uncertain. What is certain is that self-knowledge
was a necessity to anyone trying to interpret the often-ambiguous words of the “god.”
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which Origen and Evagrius in different ways use as their interpretive lens for Genesis 1. 26. For
Plato, human beings have a natural orientation to goodness and truth because the human nous is
modeled on the Good and has the capacity to know the Good. By endeavoring to know truth, the
mind activates its inherent share in immortality, which itself derives from the mind’s kinship to the
eternal Good. Plato’s stress on the relationship between knowing and being provided Origen and
Evagrius with the framework for interpreting humanity’s relationship with God as essentially
contemplative. Plato also provided models for moral and spiritual education, as well as the schema
of the tripartite soul that proved so important for Evagrius.
In Stoic thought, human beings are “rational beings,” oriented to Reason (Logos) by nature.
As Marcus Aurelius put it, “τ_ λoγικ_ ζ__ _ α_τ_ πρ_ξις κατ_ φύσιv _στ_ κα_ κατ_ λόγov”: To the rational
creature, the same act is [both] according to Nature and according to Reason.257 However,
“Reason” is not an Ideal Form, eternal and transcendent, but a natural principle that pervades the
world and encompasses change. What is natural is reasonable; what is reasonable is natural. Our
minds have a spark (or sperm) of Reason (logos); they correspond to Nature. Therefore, faced with
endless changes in our circumstances, we have the capacity to make decisions that harmonize with
the flow of Nature. These are, ipso facto, the most reasonable decisions.
Stoics thought of Reason as working out in a necessary chain of causality; whatever
happens is according to providence and has to happen. Providence is the order that lies behind the
apparent chaos of change. We cannot change what must be. Because we are part of the order of
the world, we must accept the way things work out. Yet, we have a limited sphere of power, the
freedom to choose whether to accept what happens, thereby harmonizing ourselves with Nature, or
to resist. Harmony (hence happiness) is “up to us” (τ_ _φ’ _μ_v). Because human beings have a spark
of reason (logos), they are able to consider circumstances rationally, then decide on the choice
which most harmonizes with Providence, that is, the choice that is most reasonable. This choice will
257

To Himself, 7. 11. Loeb edition, ed. and trans. C. R. Haines (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1979.
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be the best even if it does not seem personally satisfying. In order to harmonize themselves with
Providence, however, human beings have to master their self-centered passions and reach the state
of clarity known as apatheia.
Because Providence does not transcend, but rather pervades the world, the focus of
Stoicism is on this world. What are we doing with this choice, here and now? Moreover, in Stoic
thought, we cannot understand the workings of Providence and contemplate them by use of a ladder
of knowledge; in harmonizing with Reason, our own reason must learn to trust that all is for the best
without insisting on figuring everything out. It will all be forgotten anyway, and everything will have
forgotten us, says Marcus Aurelius (To Himself, 7. 21). Stoicism’s stress on trust went well with the
pedagogical system of Origen and Evagrius in which we are asked to use all the circumstances of
our lives on earth to learn the ways of God.
Yet, as Origen and Evagrius both understood, general overviews of the human person can
be misleading in particular situations. Misunderstandings of Scripture and philosophy result in
Marcion’s scriptural deletions or lead to endless heresies: Gnosticism, Arianism, Anthropomorphism.
From these follow damaging or fatal illusions about one’s own identity and spiritual state — recall
Cassian’s example of the monk used to praying to a physical “God” in Conference 10. Accordingly,
Origen and Evagrius both stipulate that studies should proceed in a pedagogical order, so that
students can be prepared gradually for the more difficult teachings, as well as for the “higher” forms
of prayer.258 For them, prayer is not an undertaking that can be abstracted from the difficult task of
258

Origen and Evagrius both made use of Hellenistic educational models, some of which will be discussed below. See
Origen’s Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, 3. Proverbs comes first for its moral teachings, then Ecclesiastes,
which teaches the transience of corporeal nature, and third, Song of Songs, which teaches the love of God by use of metaphors
of physical love. In Lawson’s edition, this discussion is on pp. 43-46. Evagrius associates Proverbs with moral improvement
(praktik_), Ecclesiastes with natural contemplation, and the Song of Songs with “theology,” or the contemplation of God. See In
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self-knowledge; nor is “self-knowledge” merely a matter of individual self-understanding, important
as that is. In fact, neither prayer nor individual self-knowledge can be divorced from a basic
understanding of what it means to be a human being created “in the image and likeness of God.”

Prov. 22. 20 and Jeremy Driscoll’s discussion, Steps to Spiritual Perfection (Mahwah: Newman Press, 2005) 14-16.
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For Origen and Evagrius, Genesis 1. 26 is the ontological basis of the very possibility of
relationship between God and human creatures. Thus, creation “in the image and likeness of God”
grounds their theology of prayer. The question for them was how to interpret this scripture; for
Genesis leaves its meaning open. In the early Christian centuries, some thought that Genesis 1. 26
referred to a physical correspondence between human beings and God, while others located the
image of God in the heart or the mind. Origen and Evagrius followed the latter trajectory originating
with Philo of Alexandria, the Jewish exegete of the early first century, and proceeding with Clement
of Alexandria, Origen’s mentor and tutor. With Philo and Clement, they identify the image and
likeness of God as the human nous, the human mind and spirit.259 As we shall see, this was not a
mere matter of theological theorizing. For Origen and Evagrius, a basic understanding of one’s own
creation in God’s image was a necessity for anyone who wanted to learn to pray. To this end of
understanding, St. Paul and the pagan philosophies contributed their anthropological constructs.
As an entry-way into the intricate relations between prayer, self-understanding, and
anthropology, it will be helpful to return to the “root definition” of prayer given by Clement of
Alexandria and quoted at the beginning of this thesis:
Prayer is, then, to speak more boldly, converse with God. Though whispering . . . and not opening
the lips, we speak in silence, yet we cry inwardly. For God hears continually all the inward
converse. So also we raise the head and lift the hands to heaven and set the feet in motion at the
closing utterance of the prayer, following the eagerness of the spirit (τ_ πρoθυμί_ τo_ πvε_ματoς)
directed toward the intellectual essence (voητ_v o_σίαv); and endeavoring to abstract the body
from the earth along with the discourse, raising the soul (ψυχή) aloft, winged with longing for better
things, we compel it to advance to the region of holiness, magnanimously despising
(καταμεγαλoφρovo_vτες) the chain of the flesh (Strom. 7. 7. 39. 6-40. 1).
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Gabriel Bunge discusses the correspondence between nous and pneuma in Évagre le Pontique: Traité Pratique ou
le Moine, trans. Paul Peternell (Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1996) 28.
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Significantly, Clement’s adaptation of Plato’s intellectual goal for the human person— the joining of
the human spirit to God’s intellectual essence — does not involve a Gnostic rejection of the body.
While on the one hand, the flesh is a chain which keeps us tethered to earthly matters, on the other
hand, the body participates effectively in the endeavor of the mind to rise to God. Bodily gestures,
indeed, both express and reveal the “eagerness of the spirit directed toward the intellectual
essence.” In On Prayer, Origen allegorizes bodily gestures thus: “This is how [a person] should
come to prayer, stretching out his soul . . . instead of his hands, straining his mind (nous) to God
instead of his eyes, raising his governing reason [h_gemonikon] from the ground and standing it
before the Lord instead of standing (31. 2).” Evagrius condenses the whole passage into one
sentence: “Prayer is conversation of the mind with God” (De Orat. 3); but he actually shares
Clement’s interest in the body’s literal ability to express the state of the soul, as when, for example,
in a very different application from Clement’s, he explains that the demons, unable to read our minds
directly (as God does), must rely on our bodily gestures in order to plan their attacks (Thoughts,
37).260
Thus, one way or another, this passage was a major source for both Origen and Evagrius.261
In it, Clement blends both Stoic and Platonic anthropologies with that St. Paul, as expressed in 1
Thessalonians 5. 23: “May the God of peace . . . sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit and soul
and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.”262 First, Clement
develops Paul’s anthropology by showing that all three aspects of humanity, body, soul, and spirit,
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I will be following Robert E. Sinkewicz’s translation in Evagrius Ponticus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
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While Evagrius certainly could have read this passage in Clement’s Stromateis, he could also have taken Origen’s
version of it in On Prayer or even have done both. That he states it without context( De Oratione,3) makes his access to it
difficult to determine, but Clement’s stress on abstracting the body and raising the soul in prayer does correspond with
Evagrius’s idea that in the first stage of the apocatastasis, body and soul will be raised to nous (Letter to Melania,5. 158-161);
I think, therefore, that he read both Clement’s and Origen’s versions directly.
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See the discussion of Origen’s Pauline anthropology in Stewart, “Eight Generic Logismoi,” 19-20.
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share in the act of prayer. Yet, in the “magnanimous despising of the chain of the flesh,”263 we also
see Clement’s Christian version of the “Stoic Sage,” to borrow Peter Brown’s term for the person
who has conquered the passions and become “free to collaborate joyfully . . . with the hidden action
of the Supreme Mind:”264

263

This phrase translates Clement’s terminology: τo_ δεσμo_ καταμεγαλoφρovo_vτες τo_ σαρκικo_: being high-souled,
despising the bond of the flesh.
264

See Brown, 128. Brown notes that the Stoic views and Platonic metaphysics reflected in Clement’s works “were
part and parcel of the intellectual koiné of the age.
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Every situation was to be perceived for exactly what it was— not as an occasion to experience
fear, frustration, or inappropriate hope, but as an opportunity for joyful service. . . . What stood in
the way of such a state of lucid and alert availability were what are misleadingly called, in modern
summaries of Stoicism, “the passions.” . . . The “passions” colored perceptions of the outside
world with nonexistent sources of fear, anxiety, and hope; or else they bathed it in a false glow of
pleasure and potential satisfaction.265

Therefore, Clement urged the goal of apatheia, freedom from the passions; and this state, as Brown
explains, means “a state of final serenity of purpose,” of no longer being held back “ by the fears and
uncertainties engendered by the passions.” Good actions then can be done in response to “right
knowledge”and in a spirit of generosity.266
Finally, in connection with Clement’s description of conversation with God, we should recall
Plato’s figurative anthropology in Phaedrus: the charioteer (nous) who drives two winged horses,
one horse “a lover of honor with modesty and self-control,” the other horse “companion to wild
boasts and indecency,” hard to control unless given its head toward earthly desires (253d-e).
Because Plato defines the two horses only loosely, his framework proved useful for theologians as
different as Clement and Evagrius. Clement uses Plato’s framework in order to highlight the intensity
with which the whole person must reach out toward God. For him, the “flight” of the soul is a
metaphor for a change in focus, from the visible world of mundane affairs to the invisible, but
intelligible reality of the God who is truly present to us. In transcending the mundane, we do not lose
ourselves but find “conversation with God.” Like a charioteer, then, the mind (nous) is meant to rule
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Brown, 129.
Brown, 131.
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the lower parts of the soul so that the whole soul can “ascend” from the physical world, with its
uncertainty, to the world of intelligible forms, of which this world provides only images and shadows.
Of course, the body cannot literally be abstracted from the earth; but Clement sanctions its physical
expression of the longing for God in the human soul and spirit. Like Clement, Origen and Evagrius
also stress the yearning of the spirit to ascend to God; however, as we shall see, they develop all
three of Clement’s anthropologies in order to explore the dynamics of psychological conflict and
spiritual warfare.
For Plato, the human nous is actually kin to the intelligibility of the “upper” world and is
therefore capable of perceiving it, provided that the nous is not overcome by the “bad horse,” the
strong desire for bodily satisfaction and the laziness that leads one to settle for conventional
opinions rather than struggle for truth. In Book 9 of the Republic, Plato names the three parts of the
soul as the logistikon (nous), the thumos, or “spirited part,” and the epithum_tikon (desire).267 For
Plato, desire is by far the most dangerous; for earthly desires are insatiable. Plato compares desire
to a many-headed beast (Republic, 9. 588 b - 589 a). The thumos can boil with wrongful anger; but it
has the function of protecting the logistikon from following mindless desires. It is therefore like a lion,
noble, but needing to be tamed. Only the reason can be symbolized by a human being, however; for
only the reason can recognize justice (and hence, the Good).
Although Clement suggests that in prayer, the spirit must strain intellectually toward God’s
essential intellect, he gives equal emphasis to the will’s longing, as expressed by the inward cry of
the heart. What God hears is the inward conversation that results from the eagerness of the spirit to
receive divine knowledge. Note that the relationship between intellect and will is reciprocal. The
intellect needs that eagerness, the drive toward God, which Plato expresses through the figure of
the good horse. The “drive toward God” also needs the understanding of the intellect to provide the
right direction for its energies. Accordingly, Clement grounds his definition of prayer in the two-fold
267

See the Republic 9. 571 d - 572 b and 9. 588 c - 589 b. Evagrius uses the terminology of Book 9, changing
“logistikon” to nous, perhaps because the latter term is closer to the biblical sense of “heart,” or center of the person.
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correspondence he finds between the human person and God, a correspondence both of mind and
will:
But if voice and expression are given us for the sake of understanding, how can God not hear the
soul itself and the mind, since assuredly, soul hears soul and mind, mind (ψυχ_ ψυχ_ς κα_ vo_ς
vo_ς _παίει)? Whence God does not wait for loquacious tongues as interpreters . . . [but] our
thought (_vvoια), which even before the creation he knew would come into our mind, speaks to
God. Prayer, then, may be uttered without the voice by concentrating the whole spiritual nature
within [on intelligible discourse (ε_ς φωv_v τ_v voητήv)] in undistracted turning towards God (Strom.
7. 7. 43. 3 - 5).

“Spirit, “ or pneuma, is the highest part of the soul for Paul; Plato characteristically thinks in
terms of “mind,” or “logistikon”, or “nous.”268 Clement makes use of both pneuma and nous. By
concentration of the spirit and undistracted (_περίσπαστov) turning toward God, we actually speak with
God, not in spoken words, but from mind to mind, soul to soul, immediately and intelligibly. Clement
may be alluding to Romans 8. 5b-9b: “Those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the
things of the Spirit. . . . you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you.” The theological
foundation for this connection between the prayer of the inner mind and the spirit’s spontaneous
turning toward God is two-fold: the kinship between the human and divine mind based on Genesis 1.
26, and the will of God, God’s own choice. For Clement, God is good not by necessity, but by free
choice; and God has given human beings the freedom and the responsibility to choose to be saved:
For neither is God involuntarily good, as the fire is warming; but in [God] the imparting of good
things is voluntary, even if [God anticipates the request]. Nor shall [the one who] is saved be
saved [unwilling: _κωv], for s/he is not inanimate; but s/he will above all, voluntarily and of free
choice, speed to salvation. . . . Wherefore God does not do good by necessity but from . . .
[deliberate choice: κατ_ πρoαίρεσιv] benefits those [of them] who . . . turn [toward God](Strom. 7.
268

Plato names the three parts of the soul in the Republic. In Book 9, for example, he recommends that before going to
sleep, one rouse one’s rational part (logistikon) with good arguments and speculations, quiet one’s anger (thymos), and give
one’s desiring part (epithumetikon) just enough food to let it sleep quietly (571 d-572 a). Here, Plato sees the desiring part as
especially dangerous because it has a lawless dimension (572 b). Even more clearly than in the Phaedrus, Plato’s terms in the
Republic suggest Evagrius’s schema.
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7. 42. 4 - 6).

Clement finds the reason for God’s choosing to help us in divine condescension, or
compassion “for our weakness,” in the same way as a shepherd serves the sheep or a king his
subjects. In return, we serve God most of all simply by turning toward God wherever we happen to
be: “Each place . . . and time in which we entertain the idea (epinoia) of God is, in reality, sacred”
(Strom. 7. 7. 43. 1). However, as God does not need our “loquacious tongues as interpreters,” the
words we use in the process of entertaining the idea of God are less important than the turning of
attention to God without distraction (Strom. 7. 7. 43. 5). In his work against the Gnostics, then,
Origen develops Clement’s stress on divine and human freedom even as he develops Clement’s
conception of the contemplative goal: the sharing in God’s wisdom and knowledge.
Clement’s Platonic emphasis on the likeness between the praying mind and God depends,
as Bernard McGinn points out, not only on “a seeing, but [also on] an awareness of identity with the
present Ultimate Principle.” Thus:
The contact between the Absolute Principle and the philosopher . . . is possible only because the
philosopher’s soul— or, to speak more precisely, the higher dimension of the soul that Plato often
calls nous— is itself of divine origin, as Timaeus 90[a-c] insists. . . . Hence, the soul is both divine
269
in origin and capable of being divinized.

Clement probably also proceeds from Genesis 1. 26: creation in the image and likeness of God.
Yet, humanity fell away from this image with the disobedience of Adam and Eve.270 As a result, there
is also division between humanity and God; and the divine Logos is met by the human alogon, the
irrationality now present in each person.271 Because sin means intellectual and moral division from
God, Clement conjectures that it is dangerous for the wicked, those who are ignorant of what is
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Clement does not have Tertullian’s understanding that sinfulness is passed on by a father’s sperm; nor does he have
any doctrine of original sin. Yet, he sees all humanity as united in sin, so that Adam and Eve become symbolic of the human
race. See Duffy, 49-51.
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really good, to pray. If they receive what they ask, it may not really be good, or if it is really good,
they will not know how to use it (Strom. 7. 7. 44. 1 - 2). Therefore, each one must prepare for prayer
by “obtaining command of all influences which war against the mind” (Strom. 7. 7. 44. 7). In order to
be ready to turn to God, then, we have moral homework to do; for the more closely we can know
and follow God’s will, the more fully we will be able to receive knowledge of God, receiving this
knowledge “from the mystic choir of the truth itself” (Strom. 7. 7. 45. 1).
Thus, Clement suggests two stages of prayer:

moral purification and contemplation, or

reception of the knowledge of God. These are not linear stages of life; that is, Clement does not say
that a person must attain to a final purity before he or she can pray. Instead, Clement presents
them as two movements of the act of prayer, both necessary every time we pray because we need
to turn to God without distraction and “concentrate the whole spiritual nature within on intellectual
discourse” with God.
In their reflections on prayer, Origen and Evagrius bring out different aspects of Clement’s
anthropologies. In On First Principles, Origen uses Plato’s anthropology in the Timaeus as his
source for the primordial creation in Book 2. In the Timaeus, the human intellect is the “most
sovereign part of our soul [and] god’s gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit” (90a).272 For Origen,
the gift of creation is the intellect, the “image of God” (Princ. 3. 1. 13).273 However, his conception of
the intellects themselves is closer to the z_a logika274 of Marcus Aurelius in To Himself, 7. 11; for
Origen’s intellects are rational creatures whose “reason” includes freedom of will, or “the power of
free and voluntary movement” (Princ. 2. 9. 2), given in order that the intellects might freely choose
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The other two parts are appetite, recognizable in Evagrius’s concept of epithumia, and ambition, which does not
square exactly with Evagrius’s thumos.
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In the Timaeus, the soul is tripartite, but Plato does not use the figure of the charioteer and the horses, which might
have been awkward in a discussion of primordial intellects.
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Origen uses exactly this Stoic terminology in On First Principles, 3. 1. 3.
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whether to remain with God or not.275

275

In On First Principles, 3. 6. 3, Origen relates the eschaton to the original misuse of human freedom in Genesis 2.
17: “nor will one who is always in the good and to whom God is all things (1 Cor 15. 28) desire any longer to eat of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil.” If the intellect is the image of God according to Genesis 1. 26, the power of free choice is the
gift of Genesis 2.
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This originally Stoic understanding of freedom, Origen unites to Plato’s conception of inner
conflict within the tripartite soul between the nous, seeking intelligible knowledge, and the lower
parts of the soul, seeking earthly goals instead.276 For Plato, the conflict need not even be moral; it
can be generated by the mere fact that the lower parts trust sense-impressions and the educated
nous knows better (Republic, 10. 602e-603a). For Origen, inner conflict is generally moral and
spiritual as well as epistemological; therefore, he prefers Paul’s schema of body, soul, and spirit.277
Yet, Origen shares Plato’s utter conviction that human beings are knowers by nature. In the
Phaedrus, Plato figuratively presents knowledge as food for the mind and indeed, for the whole soul.
He conceives of many souls pursuing knowledge, only to settle for the easier goal of conventional
opinion. Yet the many took off after knowledge; why? “The reason there is so much eagerness to
see the plain where truth stands is that this pasture has the grass that is the right food for the best
part of the soul, and it is the nature of the wings that lift up the soul to be nourished by it” (248b-c).
Origen and Evagrius absorbed this metaphor.
In Book 3 of On First Principles, Origen shifts to a Stoic anthropology, which emphasizes
reason (logos) and the decision of the will (h_gemonikon) in order to lay bare the dynamics of moral
choice and the possibilities for training the will. Origen supplements this Stoic framework with
Paul’s bipartite division of flesh and spirit (Gal 5. 17), plus his tripartite division of body, soul, and
spirit from 1 Thessalonians 5. 23 (Princ. 3. 2. 4). In his Commentary on Romans, Origen develops
Paul’s tripartite model more fully, linking it to a tripartite process of spiritual growth. But even in the
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See, for example, Phaedrus, 248a-b.

Origen found no biblical correspondence with Plato’s anthropology. He therefore preferred Paul’s model. See
Stewart, “Eight Generic Logismon,”19- 20,.
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Commentary on Romans, Origen alludes to the Stoic model in order to deal with the issue of choice
itself. Thus, Origen’s use of all of his anthropological sources is flexible, varying with his pedagogical
purpose. In his discourse On Prayer, he adverts to all three.
In contrast, as at least two scholars have shown, Evagrius narrows his focus, selecting
almost exclusively Plato’s tripartite soul from Book 9 of the Republic. The result is Evagrius’s own
tripartite anthropology of nous (intellect or spirit), thumos (the irascible part of the soul) , and
epithumia (the concupiscible part of the soul).278 In his Letter to Melania, Evagrius joins Plato’s
anthropology to Paul’s anthropology of body, soul, and spirit, arriving at body, soul, and nous, a
hybrid

which fits both his conception of the unity of the created intellects with God in the

apocatastasis. However, as Gabriel Bunge has pointed out, since nous and pneuma are close in
meaning, Evagrius’s vision of the final unity as knowledge for the intellect should be understood as
spiritual relationship, as in John 17. 3: “And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true
God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent”( NRSV).279 Never, as far as I know, does Evagrius
conceive of contemplation as a distant, uninvolved stance of intellectual consideration. As it does for
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The anthropological differences between Origen and Evagrius have been explored at length by Michael
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Origen, contemplation of God requires participation in God’s love; and this participation can take
place only through Christ’s love and desire to teach us. We have to become loving in order to see
the God who is love. That is why Evagrius says in Praktikos, 84 that the end of the praktik_ is charity
(agap_).
Evagrius’s adaptation of Plato’s anthropology is thus a constant, though we find an
important echo of Clement’s Stoic Sage in Evagrius’s concept of apatheia. With this exception,
however, Evagrius develops Plato’s threefold schema in the Republic (4. 439 d-440 c) and Book 9
(571 b - 572 b). This he relates to two other schemas which Origen had suggested: the eight
“generic” thoughts280 and the three stages of spiritual progress, praktik_, theoria physik_, which
includes the visible and invisible creations,281 and theoria theologik_ (or theologia).282 Most relevant to
this study is the schema of the three stages of spiritual progress, for which Evagrius’s immediate
source is Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs. Origen distinguishes the stages of Ethics,
Physics, and Enoptics. He decodes these terms to mean “moral, natural, and inspective.” By
“moral,” he means the learning of virtuous habits; by “natural,” he means study of the nature of
created things (undertaken so that we do not go against nature), and by “inspective,” he means the
study “by which we go beyond things seen and contemplate somewhat of things divine and
heavenly, beholding them with the mind alone” (Commentary on the Song of Songs, Prologue).283
Origen himself did not invent these three stages, but modified a schema from later Stoicism,
which distinguished a moral (ethikos) stage, a “natural” (physikos) stage, and a “logical” (logikos)
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stage of development.284 Evagrius would also have known the model derived from Plato and
Aristotle which distinguished the active life (praktikos bios) from the contemplative life (gnostikos or
theoretikos bios).285 This model distinguishes classes of people rather than steps of progress; for as
Guillaumont reminds us, Plato and Aristotle thought of artisans and workers as living the active life,
while the philosophers led the contemplative life. Basil and Gregory Nazianzen followed their own
modified version of the system of Plato and Aristotle;286 Origen draws from the Stoic system which
allowed him to develop stages of growth.

284

Guillaumont, Un philosophe, 205.

285

Columba Stewart, Cassian the Monk (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 50. See also Guillaumont’s survey
of the philosophical models, Un philosophe, 205-206.
286

Basil and Gregory see priests and bishops as living the active life, while monastics live the contemplative life. For
them, the distinctions apply only to those living conssecrated states of life. Guillaumont, Un philosophe, 206.

169

Evagrius therefore had several alternatives to choose from.287 Following the Stoic model of
spiritual progress as modified by Origen, Evagrius presents the praktik_ as a discipline which
involves both body and soul. One learns to restrict intake of food and hours of sleep; one learns to
study and pray the Scriptures; above all, one learns the moral struggle against evil, self-destructive
thoughts. Evagrius has departed from the Cappadocians; for the praktik_ is a moral and physical
discipline that must precede and accompany contemplation rather than an active type of life. When
fidelity to the praktik_ produces apatheia, freedom from selfish and inordinate passions, the
monastic moves on to the two stages of theoria physike: the contemplation of the visible creation
(“second natural contemplation”) and the contemplation of the invisible creation (“first natural
contemplation”). The monastic must maintain the praktik_ and engage in both degrees of natural
contemplation in order to be ready to receive the vision of God (theoria theologik_), which
transcends human knowledge.
I want to stress the non-linear nature of the “stages”; for the praktik_ is necessary through
the whole of monastic life. Evagrius is not talking of a detached observation here, but of a
contemplation that is also committed participation in the wisdom of Christ and the Holy Spirit,
through whom all creatures were made. The fruits of ongoing discipline in praktik_ are therefore
forms of being like Christ: apatheia and charity (Pr. 81). These states must continue if the monastic
is to remain in Christ’s wisdom and in the Holy Spirit. It is for this reason that the praktik_ can never
be abandoned without the risk of a moral fall into sin and its accompanying state of theological
ignorance. Through the praktik_, which includes both works of charity and the practice of prayer,
progress continues up the “ladder” of contemplation. As we continue to know the movements and
confront the passions within ourselves, we remain open to God and we grow in knowledge and
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understanding. This progress is also an anthropological movement: from “the image of God” to
God’s likeness (Genesis 1. 26).
Thus, by reducing the variations that Origen allowed, Evagrius can offer a consistent
pedagogical system which presents challenges to advanced students but provides firm guidelines
for all. Indeed, “one rarely goes far in Evagrius’s writings without encountering one of the
fundamental terms or concepts of his theological vision.”288 Plato’s vision of the intellectual journey
in Phaedrus also fit Evagrius’s own “decidedly noetic” monastic theology.289
Another reason for Evagrius’s choice to simplify Origen’s alternative doors to truth is his
sensitivity to the different levels on which human beings encounter evil. Plato’s model of the three
parts of the soul, all of which, without philosophical training, have different preferences and aims,
enabled Evagrius to show the effects of the “opposing powers,” to use Origen’s term, on three
distinct levels: the passions, or the level of drives and emotions, the thoughts, or the level of
cognition, and the demons, intent on causing chaos in the nous and necessitating spiritual warfare in
its strict sense. Keeping the model of the soul constant allows Evagrius to shift his focus rapidly from
one level of attack to another. Both from Origen and from monastic literature, written or oral,
Evagrius inherited a demonology.290 Athanasius’s Life of Antony provided what Stewart has termed
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“an ascetic primer for interpreting the reader’s own struggles.”291 Evagrius’s aim is, therefore, to
move beyond the first level, refining Origen’s insights and providing even fuller analyses of the
demons’ varied ways and common deceptions than Athanasius and Antony had provided. In Book
2I of On First Principles, Origen shows the soul to be poised between the opposing spirits and God.
Evagrius aims to improve the odds that his students will travel with God.
A theology of prayer emerges from the intersection of the doctrine of God and the
understanding of the self. Because Origen and Evagrius have three anthropologies to draw from
rather than one, their understanding of the self is complex. Each anthropological choice opens up
different possibilities for self-knowledge. In other words, each anthropology offers a point of view, its
own distinct perspective on what it means to know oneself as a person who turns to God in prayer.
The tripartite Platonic model of the soul allowed both Plato and Evagrius to explore inner conflict, as
the nous desires transcendent knowledge, while the desiring aspect of the soul (epithum_tikon)
focuses on bodily desires. The thumos defends desire. If it supports the nous, it gives the person
the energy and determination necessary for the ascent to truth. If, however, it supports the
epithum_tikon, the thumos defends the pursuit of pleasures and boils over with rage whenever they
are denied. Evagrius develops both aspects of Plato’s thumos.
Thus, the ascent of the nous to the intelligible world in Plato’s Phaedrus and Republic
provided the lens through which Origen and Evagrius— and Clement before them— understood the
mind’s ascent to God. Stoic thought opened up a way to consider the freedom of the will and the
significance of choice (whether for good or evil) in this visible and present world. Using the Stoic
model, Origen and Evagrius can explore the ways in which human beings help bring order to the
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world through their daily choices. Finally, Paul’s model of body, soul, and spirit enables Origen and
Evagrius to make a connection between moral choice, spiritual knowledge, and ontological rank.
Although the anthropological thought of Origen and Evagrius is greater than the sum of its parts, a
study of the sources on which they drew enriches our understanding of the true depth of their vision
of prayer.

B. Self-Knowledge and Prayer: Origen
Because Plato conceives of human beings as knowers, his main concern is the search for
the eternal truth that anchors the changing world we live in. For him, knowing is an ontological
process as well as an epistemological process; for knowledge means an “ascent” from the world of
becoming to the eternal world of being which culminates in the Good. Indeed, to make this ascent is
to become truly human. Thus, Plato’s conception of philosophy transcends modern distinctions
between epistemology, ontology, and anthropology. Philosophy is a process of becoming real
(immortal), a process of becoming fully human, and a process of knowing what is real. Having
absorbed Plato’s thought, Origen finds it supportive of his own thesis that human beings are
created to grow in their ability to contemplate God’s glory and participate in God’s life. For Origen
too, human beings have an innate desire for unending contemplation of God. In the mythic language
of On First Principles, derived from Plato’s Timaeus, Origen posits that pre-lapsarian human beings
(as well as pre-lapsarian angels and demons) were created intellects, graced to contemplate God’s
goodness and to preserve the good so that the good might become their own (Princ. 2. 9. 2). For
sinful human beings in the present, the consistent effort to grow in goodness, allowing oneself to be
formed by Christ, is the movement from creation in God’s image to creation in God’s likeness. Thus,
Origen bases his conception of spiritual growth on Genesis 1. 26.
Origen’s interpretation of Genesis 1. 26 entails an application of Plato’s figure of the divided
line of knowledge in Book Six of the Republic. In particular, we need to recall Plato’s concept of the
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relations between one level of knowledge and the next: “As the opinable is to the knowable, so the
likeness is to the thing it is like” (6. 510 a). For Plato, “the opinable” describes everything in the
material world, both objects and their images or shadows: visible, yet not enduring and not always
what they seem to be. Plato’s equation could therefore be stated in this way: As the opinable is to
the knowable, so the visible world is to the intelligible world, the world of the Forms, which provides
the truth behind all the visible appearances. The entire material world is merely an imperfect copy of
intelligible reality. The “really real” does stand behind the changing situation of this world; but it can
be known only intellectually, not sensibly. Yet, we are so used to knowing through our senses, that it
takes an ordered process of learning before we can know intelligible reality.292 Plato held that this
process was a paideia that first led the student from sense experience to mathematical knowledge,
which is reasoned from postulates down to conclusions that are valid regardless of particulars. In
proving that equilateral triangles have three equal angles and three equal sides, for example, one
reaches a conclusion that is valid for all equilateral triangles, not merely for one particular equilateral
triangle.
For Plato, mathematical reasoning is “thought” (dianoia), but not yet knowledge (noesis)
because it does not reach beyond its assumed postulates. In order to gain full knowledge, one must
be taught the use of dialectic (_λεγχoς) which questions all kinds of postulates, thereby separating the
true from the false and discovering the principles of truth, the Ideas or Forms. Grounding all of them
is the absolute first principle: “the unhypothetical first principle of everything” (Republic, 6. 513 b c). This First Principle is the Good. The discovery of the Good and of its role as the source of all the
Forms allows the philosopher to know them all without making a separate ascent from conventional
opinion in order to find each one of them (6. 513 b). In planning the ideal city, for example, the
philosopher can begin with the Forms of justice and reason and “copy” them, in the same way that
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the demiurge in the Timaeus creates the world, giving the Forms concrete expression here on earth.
The disposition of particulars falls into place when the Forms are known.
Thus, for Plato, the proper sphere of the human mind is the intelligible world; for just as the
creation is a copy of the intelligible world (Timaeus, 29a); the human mind is the image of the
divine intelligence.293 Because the human intellect is like the divine intellect, the soul naturally
desires to ascend from the unreliable images of physical reality to the unchanging world of the
Intelligible Forms. The “most sovereign part of our soul,” the intellect, “ raises us up away from the
earth and toward what is kin to us in heaven” (Timaeus, 90a).
Origen transforms Plato’s concept of intellectual kinship in his exegesis of Genesis 1. 26.
This passage is the scriptural source of Origen’s teaching in On First Principles that as creatures,
we are meant to preserve the good and make it our own. The created intellects could have reached
this goal by consistently willing to keep on contemplating the glory of God, that is, by willing to “be
with” God; for rational creatures are images of the Son, who himself is the exact Image of God,
“with God” eternally by eternal generation and willing participation in the Father’s divinity.294
293
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Although in Genesis, “image” and “likeness” are parallel, even synonymous terms, Christian
thinkers, notably, Irenaeus, had begun to interpret the Christian’s ascent to God as a moral and
intellectual movement from God’s image to God’s likeness. For Irenaeus, a somewhat-older
contemporary of Clement, Christians make this move through the grace of God in Christ, the new
Adam, whose obedience to God overcomes the first Adam’s sin and the death that resulted from it
(Proof, 31).295
Thus, Origen’s conception of making the good one’s own has its roots not only in Platonic
contemplation, but also in the exegesis of Genesis 1. 26 in the tradition of Irenaeus. Origen’s
conception of “contemplation” as participation in God’s Trinitarian life therefore differs from Plato’s
idea of envisioning the Good. In both systems, moral purification is necessary. As Plato asserts that
education and moral training are prerequisites to knowing the Good, so Origen asserts the need for
true teachings and good habits if we are to contemplate God’s glory and converse with God in
prayer. For Origen, however, purification takes place within a Christian community: in the Church,
through sacraments and worship, and in service to our neighbors, for whom we must be the Good
Samaritan as needed (Songs, Prol. 2. 29). Although the Word gives us innate rationality (Princ. 1. 3.
8), which makes us images of God the Son (Logos), capable of discovering the higher mysteries in
the Scriptures, we actually find only the literal stories and laws in Scripture unless we become like
God in charity through our loving service to each other. It is through our efforts to serve, that we
become like God, sharing in God’s operations. Otherwise, we undermine ourselves, praising Jesus
with our words, then allowing our deeds to shout, “Jesus, be cursed!” (On Prayer, 22. 3).
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As we have seen, the older way of interpreting Genesis 1. 26 was to posit that the uncreated
Son had a heavenly body which is the model of the human body. Thus, though made of cruder
“stuff” than the Son’s heavenly body, the human body is the physical image of God.296 Our destiny
is transformation from “the body of our humiliation” to “the body of his glory”(Phil 3. 21).297 Irenaeus
sometimes shifts the image of God to the human mind or spirit, although he maintains the older
model as well. We can see the older model in the Proof of the Apostolic Preaching:298
But man he fashioned with his own hands, taking of the purest and finest of earth, in measured
wise mingling with the earth his own power; for he gave his frame the outline of his own form, that
the visible appearance too should be godlike— for it was as an image of God that man was
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fashioned and set on earth (Proof, 11).
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Later in this work, referring to Genesis 2. 7, Irenaeus states that human beings were created “from
God’s Will and Wisdom (associated with the Son and the Holy Spirit) and from virgin earth” (Proof,
32). Eve is virgin of earth, from Adam, and virgin of spirit from God’s Will and Wisdom. Eve
disobeyed God, however; and she was the means by which Adam fell (33). The Incarnation both
recapitulates and restores the original creation. The Son is born of Mary, the Virgin who obeyed
God, and the Holy Spirit (32-33).300 Mary becomes the advocate of Eve, destroying “virginal
disobedience by virginal obedience” (33). Christ was born of Mary so that Adam could be restored:
“So the Word was made flesh in order that sin, destroyed by means of that same flesh through
which it had gained the mastery . . . should no longer be in us” (31).301 Thus, physically, human
beings resemble Christ, both Son of Man and Son of God; and through Christ, human beings also
have a spiritual likeness to God (the Father).
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In Book 4 of Against Heresies, Irenaeus comments on Genesis 1. 26 directly, asserting that
Adam was the image (eikon) of God, endowed with physical powers, reason, and choice. But he
was created human and immature, not yet ready to assume God’s likeness (homoi_sis). This state of
imperfection is a necessary consequence of being created “later,” that is, in time. God, who was
uncreated perfection, could have shown Adam the indescribable divine glory for which he was
destined; but Adam, who represents the human race, was too new to receive it, being
“unaccustomed to and unexercised in perfect discipline” (Against Heresies, 4. 38. 1).302 Jesus’s
contemporaries were not ready to receive divine glory either. “When our Lord came . . . he did not
come in the way he was able, but in the way we were able to see him.”303 Adam was meant to grow
into God’s likeness through obedience in the context of an education (paideia) provided by the Old
and New Testament. In sinning, however, Adam lost the image for all of us. We needed Christ to
“become what we are to empower us to become what he is.”304 We are destined to grow into the
likeness of God through Christ. But first, we have to learn how to be human; and this means learning
through the pain of disobedience the good of obedience to God. What Irenaeus says in Against
Heresies, IV. 39 is intriguingly similar to Origen’s discussion of the significance of human freedom in
On First Principles, 3. 1. 1-2:
[Human beings have] received the knowledge of good and evil. . . . Since God gave such mental
power, [human beings] knew both the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, that the
eye of the mind, receiving experience of both, may with judgment make choice of better things . .
. for just as the tongue receives experience of sweet and bitter by means of tasting, . . . so also
does the mind, receiving through the experience of both, the knowledge of what is good, become
more tenacious of its preservation by acting in obedience to God (Against Heresies 4. 39. 1).

Recall that Origen too said that we have the power to see both good and evil, then to follow
one or the other. Writing in Greek in the 180s and perhaps the 190s, Irenaeus also asserts the
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close connection of the intellect with the will; for both vision and choice are necessary to our
regaining the image of God. Although I have not been able to find that Origen had definitely read
Irenaeus, we know that Clement knew Irenaeus;305 hence, Origen well could have known his works
also, whether directly or indirectly. In the passage from Against Heresies just quoted, there is a hint
of God’s pedagogical role, as God allows human beings to learn from experience the difference
between good and evil. Origen develops this hint of God’s teaching role into a full theology of
temptation. Far from being an evil, temptation is God’s means of revealing to us what we are really
like. Although the evil deed, if committed, has outward consequences, these are important only to
facilitate the learning of the mind and spirit, where the struggle takes place. For this reason, God
sometimes allows sinners to escape punishment:
For God abandons most [people] by leaving them unpunished . . . in order that they may find the
way of healing at a later time; for they would not have known the benefit unless they had
condemned themselves. . . . [For it] will be to their advantage that they should not be helped
quickly to salvation but should be brought to it more slowly after having experienced many ills
(Princ. 3. 1. 12-13).

In accordance with his stress on spiritual education, Origen neither believes the image of
God to reside in the physical body, nor, according to On First Principles (1. 1. 6), does he believe
that God has any kind of body. Instead Origen follows Clement; and both follow Philo, for whom the
locus of the image of God in humanity is most emphatically the mind:
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Let no one, however, represent the likeness through the characteristics of body; for neither is God
in human form, nor is the human body Godlike. The word image is used here with regard to the
Mind, sovereign of the soul (vo_ς _γεμώv); for it is after the pattern of that unique and universal
Mind as an archetype that the mind in each individual was formed.306

Beginning with the Septuagint version of Genesis 1. 26, Clement distinguishes between creation in
God’s image (κατ’ ε_κόvα) and creation in God’s likeness (καθ ‘ _μoίωσιv). For Clement, “conformity with
the image and likeness is not meant of the body . . . but in mind and reason, on which fitly the Lord
impresses the seal of likeness, both in respect of doing good and exercising rule” (Strom. 2. 19. 52).
Thus, “image” means rationality, while “likeness” signifies a deeper resemblance to God.307
Rationality is an unmerited gift of creation. Likeness to God, however, results from “doing good and
exercising rule.” Clement enlarges on this idea in the next chapter (Strom. 2. 20. 52): “Endurance
also forces its way to the divine likeness, reaping as its fruit impassibility through patience (δι’
_πoμov_ς _πάθειαv).” “Impassibility through patience” conceivably means everything from enduring a

bad meal to the strength to face martyrdom if necessary: “‘The world . . . is crucified to him, and he
to the world.’ He, bearing about the cross of the Savior, will follow the Lord’s footsteps as God”
(Strom. 2. 20. 55-56).
Origen develops Clement’s distinction between image and likeness, making it the linchpin of
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his theology of prayer. He systematizes Clement’s distinction between the image of God given in
creation, and likeness to God, given by God in response to good works. First, in order to deal with
scriptures such as Philippians 3. 21, Origen adopts Paul’s distinction between the outer (physical)
and the inner man (2 Cor 4. 16): “Even though our outer nature is wasting away, our inner nature is
being renewed day by day.” This distinction allows him to reject the physical interpretation of the
image of God:
But it is our inner man, invisible, incorporeal, incorruptible, and immortal which is made ‘according
to the image of God.’ . . . But if anyone suppose that this man who is made ‘according to the
image and likeness of God’ is made of flesh, he will appear to represent God himself as made of
flesh and in human form. It is most clearly impious to think this about God (Hom. in Gen. 1. 13).

Of what, then, does the image of God in humanity consist? The image of God can only mean that
humans have been created in the image of God the Son (Logos), who is himself the exact image of
the Father; for “what other image of God is there except our Savior who is ‘the firstborn of every
creature’ . . . and the express figure of God’s substance” (Hom. on Gen. 1. 13). As the Son is the
image of the Father, so are human beings images of the Image, that is, images of the Son. But the
Son, as Origen says in On First Principles, 1. 2. 6, is not perceptible to the senses; for the Son is
divine Wisdom and Word. Therefore, it is the mind in which the image consists. Thus, the primordial
creation is intellectual.308
So too is Origen’s vision of human destiny in On First Principles. In a passage which was
probably the source of Evagrius’s conception of the first and second natural contemplations, Origen
conceives of the soul’s progress of knowledge after death: from knowledge of the “reason” of souls
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and the diversity of animals to the judgment of divine providence about each situation; “for now in
this present life we seek, but there we shall see plainly” (1 Cor 13. 12; Princ., 2. 11. 5). Through
these “reasons,” we finally come to the contemplation of God:
For as in this bodily life of ours we grew first of all bodily . . . the increase being supplied in our
early years merely by a sufficiency of food . . . so too I think that the mind . . . feeds on
appropriate and suitable food . . . but in all respects this food must be understood to be the
contemplation and understanding of God . . . through ‘purity of heart’ (2. 11).

Yet, the phrase “purity of heart” reveals that Origen, like Clement, stresses the need for
exertion of will if we are to become “like” God. As Duffy points out, likeness to God “is not a static
perfection, but a dynamic orientation . . . to God through imitation of God’s Logos.”309 Distinguishing
between Genesis 1. 26, which says that creation was according to God’s image and likeness, and
Genesis 1. 27, which mentions only the image, Origen argues that in the primordial creation we
received “the image” along with the potential for likeness.310 For him, the “likeness” is the “form” of
the “image” (Hom. on Gen. 1. 13), the reality of resemblance to God of which all that we know of
reason and virtue are shadows and types. By turning away from God, we act against our nature,
thereby obscuring the image of God in ourselves and losing the natural potential for likeness, our
fundamental orientation to God (Hom. on Gen., 1. 13).311 Without this orientation, reason is
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confused and the will weakened. Moreover, Origen holds, with Plato, that we come to resemble that
which we contemplate.312 Sin is “contemplation of the devil”; thus, the inveterate sinner will finish in
the image of the devil (Hom. on Gen. 1. 13). Yet, we retain enough of “the image” to turn back to
God, helped by Christ:
“For if man, made according to the image of God, contrary to nature by beholding the image of
the devil has been made like him by sin, much more by beholding the image of God, according to
whose likeness he has been made by God, he will receive that form which was given to him by
nature, through the Word and his power. And let no one, seeing his image to be more with the
devil than with God, despair that he can again receive the form of the image of God because the
Savior came not “to call the just, but sinners to repentance” (Hom. on Gen. 1. 13).

In On First Principles, Origen supplies the philosophical context as he explains the progress
from image to likeness in Aristotelian terms. Whereas the uncreated goodness of God is essential to
God’s being, creatures “possess [goodness] as an accident” (Princ. 1. 6. 2). Here, Origen follows
Aristotle’s definition of “accident” in the Metaphysics: An accident is that which can be truly said of
something, but does not belong to it necessarily (1025a, 14-16) or as part of its substance (1025a,
31-35). There are no accidents in God because God is eternal and “simple” in the sense of not being
an aggregate of compounds. Therefore, God alone is good essentially:
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and image” realized among human beings.
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Essential goodness is found . . . solely in Christ and the Holy Spirit and of course in the Father
also. For the nature of the Trinity has been shown to contain nothing that is compound, which
might . . . allow [good qualities] to belong to it as accidental consequences. (Princ. 1. 5. 3).313

Accidental goodness makes created being vulnerable; for what has been created has been given,
and everything given can be “withdrawn and taken away” (Princ. 2. 9. 2). Thus, even before the Fall,
creatures are subject to a built-in contingency by the very fact of being created by God.
However, as in his first homily on Genesis, Origen clearly states that God will never
withdraw from any creature. Rather, God gives the intellects an additional gift that also constitutes
their creation in “the image.” That gift is the freedom to move, which is really the intellects’ freedom
to choose the object of their contemplation:
But the cause of the withdrawal will lie in this, that the movements of their minds are not rightly
and worthily directed. For the Creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and
voluntary movement in order that the good that was in them might become their own, since it was
preserved by their own free will; but sloth and weariness of taking trouble to preserve the good,
coupled with disregard and neglect of better things, began the process of withdrawal from the
good (Princ. 2. 9. 2).

With the freedom to move toward God comes the possibility of “making the good one’s own,” that is,
of uniting with the goodness of God so completely that being good becomes a stable condition. In
the Commentary on John, we saw that the Son shares the Father’s divinity both ontologically, by
virtue of his eternal generation, and morally, through his continued will to participate in the Father’s
divinity (2. 18): “By being “with the God,” he [the Son] always continues to be ‘God.’ But he would
not . . . remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father.” In
On First Principles, Origen explains the Incarnation in an analogous way: The created soul
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Arian works.

We have seen already how Basil and Evagrius use Origen’s view of the “simplicity” of the Trinity in their anti-
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(“intellect”) of Christ was the only one who did not wander away from God but remained with God (2.
6. 3) in contemplation:
The soul of which Jesus said, “No man takes from me my soul” (John 10. 18), clinging to God
from the beginning of the creation and ever after in a union inseparable and indissoluble, as being
the soul of the wisdom and word of God . . . was made with him in a pre-eminent degree one
spirit, just as the apostle promises to them whose duty it is to imitate Jesus. that “he who is
joined to the Lord is one spirit” (1 Cor 6. 17; underlining mine).

Christ’s intellect is permanently united with God by his consistent will to be with the uncreated Son,
just as the Son’s unchanging will to be “with God” (the Father) secures his being God.
Origen posits two stages of the Incarnation: first, this inseparable union of Christ’s created
soul with the Son, then the union of the now divine and human soul of Christ with a body. For “it was
not possible for the nature of God to mingle with a body apart from some medium” (Princ. 2. 6. 3).
In the need for the soul to serve as a medium between the Son and raw matter, a trace of the
Timaeus remains.314

But the union of Christ’s created soul and the Word of God becomes the

guarantor of union of Christians with Christ. As Christ devoted himself to the Word of God in
inseparable union, if Christians cling to (imitate) Jesus, they will be joined to the Lord “indissolubly”
and in one spirit. Two sections later, Origen reiterates this point (Princ. 2. 6. 5): Christ’s soul “so
chose to love righteousness as to cling to it unchangeably and inseparably in accordance with the
immensity of his love,” adding, moreover, that by nature, Christ’s soul was the same as others. For
all were equal in the primordial creation. They all had the same “power to move,” and all could have
chosen to remain with God and grow into greater stability of union. For Origen, then, moral choice
and ontological being are interrelated as he rejects the Gnostics’ hierarchical anthropology.
Differences are not a function of creation itself–-all the intellects were equal— but a function of the
Fall, the choice to turn away from God. As we have seen, the degree of the intellects’ withdrawal
determined the world and the body that each received, as well as its moral and ontological rank:
314

In his introduction to the Timaeus, John M. Cooper points out that the Forms do not themselves create. Although
they provide the model for creation, they remain totally separate from matter. The demiurge is needed as a “medium.” See Plato:
Complete Works, 1224.
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whether angelic, human, or demonic. Origen also makes a connection between a creature’s moral
and ontological rank and its capacity to know, to contemplate the First Principles and God.
The return to God, however, means restoration to unity; for all souls will come into full
likeness to God. Since one is either like God or not, there can be no ranks in the eschaton. Although
Origen was undecided about the retention of the body, he was not in doubt that the soul’s destiny is
contemplation of God.315 Because likeness to God means sharing God’s wisdom, “contemplation” is
a participation in God’s divine life and God’s purposes. Thus, the process of moving from image to
likeness is a process of instruction which begins now and continues after death, where we will find,
“so to speak, a lecture room for souls, in which they may be taught about all that they had seen on
earth and may also receive some indications of what is to follow in the future” (Princ. 2. 11. 6). One
of the subjects of the eschatological school is the “judgment of divine providence about each
individual thing; about things which happen . . . not by chance or accident, but by a reason” carefully
thought out (Princ. 2. 11. 5). Origen considers such teachings beyond knowledge in this life
because few, if any, have grown sufficiently into likeness to God to understand them. Origen
imagines that the process will take “no small interval of time” (Princ. 2. 11. 6).316 The result of
growing likeness is transformation, as we grow into the reality of the humanity we now experience
as a blurred shadow. For example, just as physical food has been a necessity of earthly life,
contemplation of God becomes our food, a necessity of eternal life, (Princ. 2. 11. 7). Plato’s nous
has finally reached the pasture which has the right grass.317
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Origen is not consistent on the subject of the eschatological body. In On First Principles, 1. 2. 1, he argues that
only the members of the Trinity can live apart from some kind of body; but he later finds that our attainment to the likeness of
God requires that we no longer have bodies, for “wherever bodies are, corruption follows immediately” (Princ. 2. 6. 1). Within
the same chapter, however, Origen asserts that with long purification, through many ages, we will finally attain to the glory of a
spiritual body (Princ. 2. 6. 6). Evagrius for the most part follows Origen’s speculation that bodies would keep us from attaining
to the likeness of God.
316
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Although we cannot reach perfect likeness to God until the apocatastasis, we begin to
receive it in this life as we turn to God, just as the apostles, who first came to Jesus looking more
like the devil than like God, were transformed by following him (Hom. in Gen., 1. 13). Thus, we are
to “imitate” God in our lives so that we will be ready to have the perfection of God’s likeness
conferred on us (Princ. 2I. 6. 1). But growth in holiness is also the work of the Holy Spirit:
that those beings who are not holy in essence may be made holy by participating in this grace . . .
and such as have been deemed worthy of advancing to this degree through the sanctification of
the Holy Spirit obtain . . . the gift of wisdom by the power of the working of God’s Spirit (Princ. I. 3.
8).

Thus, for Origen, the whole sweep of the creation, fall, and redemption reveals that as God
possesses goodness essentially, human beings may possess it not merely as an accident, in
Aristotle’s sense, but as “their own” by participation in God’s eternal grace. Participation signifies a
created analogue to essential goodness, which belongs to God alone. That is, through Christ and
the Spirit, we are “in Christ.” Although participation “in Christ” does not mean ontological identity with
Christ, as the “isochrists” of the sixth century thought,318 Origen does seem to conceive of
participation as being an ontological advance over the original possession of good “by accident.”
“Likeness to God” is a participatory union with God, wherein God recognizes our efforts to make the
good our own.
To clarify the process by which we make the good our own, Origen must account for God’s
providence for us in this world; he therefore turns to a Stoic anthropology. Like the Gnostics, Stoics
began with the experience of a flawed, unjust world. But instead of explaining inequality as the
result of three orders of creation, as the Gnostics did,319 the Stoics believed that injustice and
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Although Evagrius posits in the Letter to Melania that through Christ, there will be unity between each created nous
and the Trinity, he would not have agreed with the isochrists that everyone will be equal to Christ. The isochrists interpreted his
stress on an eschatological unity of wills as a stress on equality of rank. In my opinion, their interpretation distorts his meaning.
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According to Rebecca Lyman, the rigid fatalism of the Gnostics was the result of their hierarchical anthropology;
the Stoics, in contrast, emphasized the choices that each individual is able to make, no matter what circumstances he or she may
have been born into and inherited. See Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius, and
Athanasius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
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misfortune are only apparent evils because everything works out for the best through the Reason
which pervades Nature. Whatever happens is therefore preordained, even “fated” to happen
because in the long run, it is the most reasonable and natural turn of events. Therefore, unfortunate
situations, such as poverty, are no bar to virtue, as Seneca wrote: “Virtue you will find in the temple,
in the forum, in the senate house— standing in front of the city walls, dirty and stained and with
calloused hands” (De Otia, 3. 5).320 Stoic ethics are kin to the AA Serenity Prayer: “God, grant me
the wisdom to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the
wisdom to know the difference.” The realm of “the things I can” was known as τ_ _φ’ _μ_v, what is “up
to us.”
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Peter Root, “The Stoic Sage,” http://www.ancientworlds.net/aw/Article/497576.
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“God,” for the Stoics is a spiritual, yet physical fire, the living “seminal principle” of the world,
the Logos Spermatikos. The Logos spermatikos generates both the physical world and the
microcosmic inner world of human beings.321 The “seed,” or “sperma” of reason in human beings is
truly a spark of Logos, with the result that humans can live in harmony with Providence if they so
choose.322 “As in the universe the logos permeates all things, so in the sperm, the logos permeates
all [people].”323 Because Reason pervades the universe (materially) and exists within us as human
reason, we have the duty to go with the flow and trust in Reason and Providence.324 We cannot
change the course of events; for what happens, planned and foreseen by Providence, is not “up to
us”; but we can decide on the best adjustment to each situation, thus cooperating with Providence.
The Stoics would have agreed with Origen, contra the Gnostics, that we are responsible for all of our
responses to the “realities” that surround us, whether to act on circumstances in some way or to
321

“Philosophical Background of the Hellenistic Age,” Classics Technology Center,
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entrust them to Providence, as being beyond “what is up to us.”
Stoic ideas about Providence and Right Reason allowed Origen to explain the Christian’s
situation in a fallen world. Yet, for Origen, providence is not an impersonal force or energy, as it is
for the Stoics. Rather, “providence” is the term for all the ways in which God works with human
beings to instruct them and assist their return. The purpose of providence is pedagogical. For
example, in fallen life, the body and the physical world signify both God’s judgment and God’s
mercy. “God . . . made the present world and bound the soul to the body as a punishment,” Origen
pronounces in On First Principles, 1. 8. 1. We can recall Plato’s Phaedrus, in which bodily
concerns drag the soul down to earth when it tries to ascend to intelligible reality. On the other
hand, “the world was made . . . to hold all those souls which were destined to undergo discipline in it
and also those powers which were appointed to be at hand to serve and assist them” (Princ. 2. 5. 4).
Thus, the punitive cause of the material creation is an aspect of its pedagogical purpose. The
“penalty” of having a body which so often interferes with the mind’s intent tallies with God’s lessonplan:
When the soul is found apart from that order . . . in which it was created by God for good action
and useful experience and not at concord with itself in the connection of its rational movements, it
must be supposed to bear the penalty and torture of its own want of cohesion and to experience
the punishment due to its unstable and disordered condition (Princ. 2. 10. 5).

God’s intention is always education; for “when the soul, thus torn and rent asunder, has been tried
by the application of fire, it is undoubtedly wrought into a condition of stronger inward connection
and renewal” (Princ. 2. 10. 5).
In both On First Principles and On Prayer, Origen transforms Stoic concepts in order to shed
light on the ways in which God “provides” education for us in order to prepare us for the move from
“creation in the image” to “creation in the likeness.” In both contexts, Origen warns against the
following deterministic argument against prayer:
Since God foreordains everything that happens (so that it has to happen) and foresees everything
that happens, there is no sphere of human choice at all. Therefore, it is unjust for God to blame
anyone for wrong actions, since God foreordained that such a person would do them; indeed,
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Scripture even says that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart (Ex 4. 21) and that God saves and destroys
people at will (Rom 9. 18-19). For some, it will be useless even to attempt to improve because they
are preordained to fail (Princ. 2. 1. 7). It is equally useless (by the same argument) to make
requests of God; for either you have been ordained to receive your request from all eternity, or you
have been ordained not to receive it from all eternity (On Prayer, 5. 2-6). In either case, God does
not respond to prayer.

The logical conclusion of such an argument would make God responsible for the Fall.
Origen’s use of Platonic thought in conceiving of creation in On First Principles allows him
simply to state that God gave the created intellects the freedom to move; for Origen agrees with
Plato that intelligent beings have freedom. For a Christian influenced by Stoicism or Gnosticism,
freedom and moral responsibility would need to be established. Therefore, both in On First
Principles and in On Prayer, Origen begins by describing how different kinds of created beings
move. Inanimate objects must be moved from the outside. Animals, like humans, are sentient
beings; therefore Origen uses the spider as a test case. The spider will move when its animating
principle causes the image of a web to arise within it; that image, in turn, will generate the impulse to
weave the web; and the spider will weave it. For Origen, that is all a spider can do: respond to one
image and one impulse. This response is action, but not really choice. People, in contrast, are
rational beings possessed of a much more complex imagination plus “reason, which judges the
images,” rejecting some, approving others (Princ. 2. 1. 3). We actually go through three stages of
“movement”: contemplation (or “seeing”), choice, and action:
The rational animal . . . has . . . reason, which judges the images. . . . So it happens that, since
there are in the nature of reason possibilities of contemplating good and evil, by following out
which and contemplating them both, we are led to choose good and avoid evil, we are worthy of
praise when we devote ourselves to the practice of good and of blame when we act in the
opposite way (Princ. 2. 1. 3).

Because we are rational (λoγικoί or ζ_α λoγικά), we see (θεωρέω) both the good and the evil. When we
choose (α_ρέω) one or the other, then we act, giving ourselves (_πιδίδωμι) to the practice (πράξις) of
either good or evil. We must see both possibilities because it is the intellect’s nature to see; we
must also choose, then move toward one, because freedom equally belongs to our nature. Both
dimensions are included in the word h_gemonikon, governing reason (from _γέoμαι, to lead). A spider
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might be able to get away with saying that its movement was predetermined; but a rational being
both by definition and by God’s gift at creation has the freedom to choose (move) and the
responsibility for choosing well (Princ. 2. 1. 24; On Prayer, 6. 2).
This essentially Stoic anthropology is incomplete, consisting of reason and will, with the body
being only hinted at, inasmuch as in this world we need it in order to engage in praxis. As we have
seen, Origen tends to allegorize Clement’s analysis of the body’s part in prayer. Physical gestures
become the mind’s attitudes. But Origen’s connection between contemplation and action through the
decision of the will means that one’s actions in real life are interrelated with the contemplation of
God in prayer and with all other “contemplative” activities. As a consequence of this connection,
several conclusions follow: Struggling with a difficult passage of Scripture becomes an important
aspect of the moral struggle against passions and demons; prayer necessarily flows into action and
is itself an action; and our good actions in the outer world become a kind of prayer that moves
mountains. The inner world and the outer world are necessarily interrelated.
What, then, is the answer to those who deny that God responds to prayer? For Origen,
God’s providence takes account of human freedom. As Clement implied when he conceived of
prayer as “speeding” toward salvation, Origen thinks of salvation as an exchange between the
participating hypostaseis of the Trinity and a human being in the image of God who wills as
consistently as possible to become like God. Prayer is part of this exchange:
If, then, our freedom is preserved, however vast the number of inclinations it has to virtue or vice .
. . it, along with everything else from creation and from the foundation of the world, will be known
to God before it comes to be for what sort of freedom it will be. And among all the things God
foreordains . . . there has been foreordained according to merit for each motion of our freedom
what will meet it from providence and still cohere with the chain of future events (On Prayer, 6. 3).

Origen’s distinction between foreknowledge and providence allows our prayers to be “useful for the
ordering of the world”; for one aspect of “the ordering of the world” is God’s response to the choices
we make. Not that God has to wait for our decisions in order to decide how to order the world; in
eternity, knowing and ordaining are one action, outside time. By distinguishing between God’s
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providence and God’s foresight, however, Origen gives the created order its own integrity. We are
created, hence in some sense “other” than God in both our contingency and our freedom. Yet, we
are also created in God’s image and destined, if we will it, to attain to God’s likeness. Therefore, we
can live in true relationship with God and God with us. Although we experience this relationship as
unfolding in time, while God has eternally seen it, it is yet a true relationship.
When human beings pray, they turn their attention back toward God, thus reversing the
direction of the Fall, conceived as wandering away. Prayer, then, is an action; and it has two results.
First, and most important, prayer is a deepening understanding of God’s wisdom, the very wisdom
which is incarnate in Christ:
And who could say that it is possible for a human being to know the mind of the Lord?
Nevertheless, even this is given by God through Christ . . . If no one knows the thoughts of God
except the Spirit of God, it is impossible for a human being to know the thoughts of God. But now
consider this— how it becomes possible . . . [For we] have received . . . the Spirit which is from
God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God (1 Cor 2. 12: On Prayer, 1)

If prayer were merely the task of human reason, it would fail; instead, says Origen, we receive God’s
Spirit, that we might understand the gifts God has already given us. Thus, prayer is a great mystery
which allows us to anticipate the eschatological Return.
Second, God, in response, sends ministering spirits to encourage the one who prays: “I will
send this ministering angel, who will begin to work with [the one praying] from such and such a time
and will stay with him until such and such time” (On Prayer, 6. 4). Those who keep their attention
turned to God receive stronger, holier angels. Thus, Origen posits a direct proportion between grace
and merit: the more one prays and acts in virtue, the more help God can send.325
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Augustine argued against Pelagius that God’s grace is given “ not only where there are no good merits, but also
where there are many previous merits that are evil” (Grace and Free Will, 6. 13: trans. Robert P. Russell, FC 59 (Washington, D.
C.: Catholic University Press, 1968). For Origen, virtuous action increases one’s capacity for receiving grace. If we are too set on
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sinning to be open to God, then God has to help us by abandoning us to our own devices. Origen compares God’s
“abandonment” to the doctor who prescribes bitter medicine (Princ. 2. 10. 6). Thus, everyone must receive God’s grace.
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For Origen, then, prayer becomes part of the educational system of sanctification that God
has designed. Anyone can enter the school, including the demons if they choose to. The point of
entrance is the turning of one’s attention toward God because this turning reverses the direction of
the Fall and opens us to God’s wisdom. Human beings have not entirely lost the image of God
through sin; yet they do retain “the seeds of sin,”326 which the governing reason is not strong enough
to get rid of. Therefore, we need to learn the discipline of fixing our attention on the Lord. In order to
defeat this aim, the demons, or “the opposing powers,” attack us through our natural appetites, like
hunger and sexual desire; and they are forever trying to push us into excess.327 Often we are
unaware of the line between nature and sin. Nor is Christian life lived only in despite of the devil and
the demons. We ourselves are at times “the enemy.” Origen does not buy the line of “the devil made
me do it.” We are always responsible for what we do:
What then? In regard to foods and drink it would be possible for us to go wrong even apart from
the instigation of the devil if we happened to be caught at an intemperate or careless moment;
and are we to suppose that in regard to the control of the sexual appetite . . . we should not be
affected in a similar way? My own opinion is that the same process of reasoning can also be
applied to . . . covetousness, anger, sorrow, or any others whatever which, by the fault of
intemperance exceed the limits of their natural measure (Princ. 3. 2. 2).

Since evil thoughts can lead to evil actions, the Christian life demands ongoing vigilance: an
awareness of our thoughts and temptations,328 plus the acceptance of responsibility for them. Origen
points out that we cannot prevent evil impulses from arising or the demons from tempting us; but
nothing bad will happen unless we assent. It is always possible, he says, “to cast away the wicked
suggestions and . . . to do absolutely nothing worthy of blame” (Princ. 3. 2. 4).
What happens if we surrender to the demons’ promptings? Origen gives two alternative
answers to this question. In On First Principles, God hires even the demons as teachers (against
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their will); that is, if we really desire to sin, God will, for a time, allow us to do it so that we will learn
for ourselves what the evil of sin really means.329 As the primordial intellects were satiated with
goodness and wandered away, so hardened sinners will eventually be satiated with sin and
disgusted by it. Then God can heal them (Princ. 3. 1. 13). Therefore, God does not convict us of sin
too soon, lest we not appreciate the healing and fall once again. “For God deals with souls not in
view of the fifty years, so to speak, of our life here, but in view of the endless world” (Princ. 3. 1. 13).
Taking the long view in On First Principles, Origen holds that God uses even the demons’ hostile
temptations for our discipline and education.
For Origen, Romans 1. 23 sums up the Fall: we freely chose to lose our likeness to God:
For though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks, but they became
bankrupt in their thinking, and their foolish heart was darkened. For claiming to be wise, they
became fools and they exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of the image
of corruptible man and birds and four-footed animals and reptiles (Rom 1. 21-23).

The search for external images of God results from the deliberate loss of the internal image of God:
“On this basis, . . . men become without excuse, since although they knew God . . . they have not . .
. worshiped God or given thanks, but through their own futile way of thinking, while they seek after
forms and images for God, they have destroyed the image of God within themselves” (Comm. on
Rom. I. 17. 2). Therefore, God handed them over to the desire of their hearts, to impurity”— not
forever, though, but with the intention that they would be satiated with sin and be converted.
This passage is key for Origen as he probes further into the conflict we experience between
temptations to evil and the direction of God. For this purpose, Origen shifts to Paul’s tripartite
anthropology of spirit, soul, and body (1 Thess 5: 23). This passage Origen combines with
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Galatians 5. 17: “For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is
opposed to the flesh.” In Greek, the same word, pneuma, denotes both the human spirit and the
Holy Spirit. Although the NRSV capitalizes “spirit,” thus placing the conflict between the flesh and
the Holy Spirit, Origen places the conflict within the soul, caught between the flesh and the human
spirit:
And when it is said [in the Scriptures], “The flesh desires contrary to the spirit and the spirit
desires contrary to the flesh,” the soul is undoubtedly placed in the middle. Either it gives assent
to the desires of the spirit or it is inclined toward the lusts of the flesh. If it joins itself to the flesh, it
becomes one body with it in its lust and sinful desires; but if it should associate itself with the spirit
it shall be one spirit with it (1. 18. 5).

Where we “set our minds”is the question; for “to set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the
mind on the Spirit is life and peace” (Rom 8. 6). One contemplates either “flesh” (sin) or spirit, death
or life. In On First Principles, Origen thinks that the soul can be neutral, following its own will; and
he associates this third possibility with the “lukewarm” rejected by Christ in Revelation 3. 15. He
prefers an outright choice of “flesh,” for then enough evil would result that the soul would “be
satiated” with it and voluntarily turn back to God (Princ. 3. 4. 3). In the Commentary on Romans,
however, Origen denies the soul the possibility of refusing the choice. The soul must choose
between flesh and spirit; and this (and every) choice determines whether that soul will turn toward
the lusts of the flesh or toward the way of Christ. Although the good angels support the soul’s choice
of the spirit’s vision and all the demons push the soul to choose the flesh, only the soul can actually
make the choice. At the point of choice, we stand or fall on our own: “out of both sides’ support, the
duty of choice is preserved” (Comm. on Rom. 1. 18. 7). We must face the choice ourselves because
“the freedom of will is preserved in all things . . . the soul therefore makes its own decision whether it
wants to choose life, that is, Christ, or to turn aside to death, the devil (Comm. on Rom. 1. 18. 7).
Thus, for Origen, the soul is effectively the will; and each time the soul has a choice, the
original opportunity for the Fall (the wandering away) is recapitulated. The result of the choice is, on
a small scale, ontological. If the soul chooses life, it becomes “one body” with spirit, and one spirit
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with its own human spirit. Then, both soul and spirit are united with the Holy Spirit, as Origen
suggests by quoting Romans 8. 9: “You are not in the flesh but in the Spirit.330 The body itself
becomes a true “temple of the Holy Spirit” and a “member of Christ” (Comm. on Rom. 1. 18. 10).
The good choice integrates a person, unifying body, soul, and spirit in Christ. Evagrius develops this
conception of transforming choice, as we shall see.
If, however, the soul chooses the option of “flesh,” it “becomes one body with it in its lust and
sinful desires.” With this choice, “body” and “flesh” (sin-nature) come together; and when treating
sin, Origen does not always separate the two terms. Origen implies that the result of choosing
“flesh”(i.e., sin) is

loss of identity and purpose, loss of one’s true humanity through the

disappearance of soul into flesh. Whereas good choices restore a person to inner unity and to unity
with Christ, the result of making the wrong choices is anthropological collapse, loss of the charity
and reason which are the image of God in us. Origen quotes Galatians 3. 6: “My Spirit shall no
longer abide in these people, for they are flesh.” We are cut off from God. Or, as Origen says in On
Prayer, we cut ourselves off from the God who dwells in our midst and walks among us” (Dt 23. 14;
2 Cor 6. 16); for “everyone who sins hides himself from God, flees his coming, and is removed from
boldness” (Comm. on Rom. 1. 23. 4).
Yet, even in the darker vision of Romans, Origen does not close out the possibility of
repentance and return, saying in Book 2:
Let us suppose there is a soul in which dwells ungodliness . . . and the entire multitude of evils to
which it has openly subjected itself as servant and slave. But suppose this soul comes back to
itself and opens the door of its mind once again to piety and the virtues. Will not piety, when she
has entered, immediately drive ungodliness out of there (Comm. on Rom. 2. 1. 3)?
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For included in the package of the gifts of creation, rationality and freedom, is conscience, the
“pedagogue of the soul” (Comm. on Rom. 2. 9. 3). Conscience is connected with self-knowledge;
and it reveals the Holy Spirit’s guidance so that, provided that it is willing to undertake the hard work
of vigilance, the soul can reverse direction before drowning in flesh.
Thus, Paul’s division of body, soul, and spirit is not a rigid template for Origen, since the soul
can unite either with flesh or with spirit; and the body will take on the characteristics of either choice,
flesh or spirit. We are headed for being spirit in union with the Holy Spirit; but we are not yet there.
In analyzing the Lord’s Prayer in On Prayer, Origen sees “lead us not into temptation” as an
impossible prayer because “the whole of [human] life on earth is a temptation” (29. 2 and 9). We are
not delivered from temptation; “we are in temptation by the very fact that we are on earth,
surrounded by flesh that wars against the Spirit, the mind of which is hostile to God” (On Prayer, 29.
2). Origen concludes that we cannot be delivered from temptation because temptation tells us who
we are: either “those who have disciplined themselves” (if we resist) or those who need further
discipline in order to grow (if we fall). For we are not yet spiritual, but we are being trained to be
spiritual (On Prayer, 30. 3). This is why we cannot approach the Lord carelessly; there is always
some vestige of evil suggestion to be rejected first. Thus, in speaking of the position of prayer,
Origen uses his recommendation to comment on the inner position of the sinner who comes to God:
The person who is about to come to prayer should withdraw for a little and prepare . . . should
cast away all temptation . . . and remind himself . . . of the Majesty whom he approaches . . . This
is how he should come to prayer, stretching out his soul, as it were, instead of his hands,
straining his mind toward God instead of his eyes, raising his governing reason from the ground
and standing it before the Lord of all instead of standing (On Prayer, 31. 2).

Yet, the literal position of eyes upraised and hands outstretched is the best because it allows the
body to share in the attitude of the soul (On Prayer, 31. 2). The whole person should express
reverence for God.
Thus, Origen’s theology of prayer incorporates the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
whose eternal will towards all created beings, from angels down to demons, is love. We know God
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in his providential works, through Scripture, and from seeing with spiritual eyes God’s action within
ourselves. We ourselves have an “inner person” who is a “soul” with fallen intellect and will, yet our
way of making the return to God. Origen formulates many models of “stages” of spiritual growth by
which we can gauge our progress; for example, those based on the Israelites’ journey across the
desert in Homily 27 on Numbers and Homily 5 on Exodus. The one most relevant to prayer is
probably the three-stage model given in Book Six of the Commentary on Romans: slaves of sin,
slaves of righteousness, and slaves of God. Origen’s biblical source is Romans 6. 16-22:
Do you not know that . . . you are slaves of the one whom you obey, either of sin, which leads to
death, or of obedience, which leads to righteousness? But thanks be to God . . . that you, having
been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness . . . so now present your members
as slaves to righteousness for sanctification. . . freed from sin and enslaved to God, the
advantage you get is sanctification. The end is eternal life (NRSV).

When we stop being slaves of sin, Origen says, we receive “the form” of teaching and
become slaves of righteousness. “The form of teaching” is the image of the true teaching, the
mystery of the Trinity, which we are not yet ready to receive; we have to start with the earthly Jesus.
Similarly, we learn and practice “the form and shadow of the virtues” rather than the virtues
themselves because we are still too involved with earthly goals to recognize a true virtue if we fell
over it. For “at heart we are obedient to sin because the vices of the flesh are still exercising
dominion over us” (6. 3. 6). Yet, we must “present our members” for the service of one another:
A little while ago your feet were running off to the temples of demons; now let them run off to the
Church of God . . . Earlier your hands were stretched forth to plunder the property of others; now
stretch them forth to lavish your own goods upon others. Previously your eyes were looking
around for a woman or some property to lust after; now let them look around for the poor, the
weak, the needy, in order to show them mercy (Comm. on Rom. 6. 4. 2).

For we “live by the law of God with the mind but are led to the law of sin by the flesh” (Comm. on
Rom. 6. 11. 2). We cannot leap in one jump from being slaves of sin to being slaves of God “in
Christ” because we all retain those “seeds of sin,” that is an inner attraction to evil. Therefore, “in
each person righteousness searches for its own portions and it tests to see if one has been
reformed and corrected . . . [or] still found to be defiling his obedience to the truth . . . with lying”
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(Comm. on Rom. 6. 11. 2).
Slavery to God is an eschatological stage which has only its beginnings here. In the
Commentary on Romans (6. 5. 6), Origen quotes Romans 6. 22: “Now that you have been freed
from sin and have become slaves to God, you have your fruit leading to sanctification. But the end is
eternal life.” As slaves of righteousness, we have been living and serving “in the shadow of
righteousness,” struggling with passions and seeing God “as in a riddle” (Old Latin version) or “in a
mirror dimly” (NRSV). At the Return, however, Christ hands over the kingdom to the Father, and
God is all in all (1 Cor 15. 24-28). Then we know as we are known and see what virtue actually is.
Origen does not say much about this stage in his Commentary on Romans; but in the Commentary
on John, Origen indicates that slavery to God would be the “slavery” of Christ who empties himself,
taking the form of a servant” in order to serve human beings (Phil 2. 6-11), then both as Word and
servant, hands over the kingdom to the Father so that God is all in all (Comm. on John, 6. 294-296).
It is the same Christ who does both, and this is a mystery which Origen doubts that we can truly
understand: “And if we understand what it means to be subjected to Christ . . . we will understand
the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world in a manner worthy of the goodness of the
God of the universe.” Because for Origen no one reaches the stage where there are no temptations
to passion or misunderstanding, we are all still slaves of righteousness and not yet ready to
understand God “face to face.”
Prayer, however, gives a true foretaste of this eschatological intimacy and wisdom. Taking
off from Clement’s description of conversation with God in Stromateis, 7, Origen thinks of prayer as
the meeting-point of self-knowledge in the “inner person” and the knowledge of the Holy Spirit, who
fills us with God’s own vision and God’s own words through the Son who is Word:
For souls that have become for the most part barren (_γovoί), when they perceive the sterility of
their own governing reason (_γεμovικόv), and the barrenness of their own mind (_γovίας τo_ vo_
_αυτ_v), through persistent prayer they conceive from the Holy Spirit saving words filled with
visions of the truth; and they give birth to them (γεγεvvήκασιv; On Prayer, 13. 3).

Origen’s use of the perfect tense for “they give birth” implies the Holy Spirit’s power to complete the

203

action of salvation through sanctification. The recipient of saving words is empowered to speak them
against demons and to other people. We might also hear a far-off echo of Plato, whose character,
Diotima, instructs Socrates in the importance of giving birth in the beautiful (Symposium, 206 c-e).
Thus, Origen’s thought is this: By ourselves, we are barren; but when, in self-knowledge, we
discover our emptiness, then if we persist in prayer (the soul holding to the purpose of the spirit),
then by the power of the Holy Spirit, we become pregnant with salvific words. Finally, we give birth
to these words and speak out in praise of God. And the one who speaks in praise often cuts down
“the chief captain of the Adversary, that deceptive and plausible word, who makes many . . . cower
in fear” (On Prayer, 13. 3). Many are the words; but the Word is one (Comm. on John, 2. 21). For
Origen, prayer signifies our participation in the Word that is Christ.

C. Self-Knowledge and Prayer: Evagrius
We return to Evagrius, whose preferred model of the human soul was Plato’s schema of
intellect (nous), the spirited element (thumos), and desire (epithumia). These terms acquire an
intriguingly different range of meaning through Evagrius’s explorations of the inner conflicts which
confront the monastic who is learning to pray. Perhaps a better way of expressing the endeavor
would be “learning the way of prayer”; for according to Evagrius, prayer is “the best and most
uncontaminated activity and use of the mind . . . the prelude to immaterial and undiversified
knowledge” (De Orat. 84; 86). Thus, the ultimate goal of prayer is entering the eschatological unity
with God and with all other created beings. Yet, in Evagrius’s hands, “prayer” also becomes a
synecdoche for the entire monastic way of life, which begins and ends with the mind’s desire for
connection with God in purer and purer prayer. Such a desire is only natural because whatever
stage we have reached, prayer is the mind’s proper activity (De Orat. 83).
We have seen that Origen envisioned human destiny as moving from God’s image to God’s
likeness through a lifetime spent in battling temptation and choosing the good, in cooperation with
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God’s grace. For Origen, sin is the result of wrong choice. As a result of the Fall, the human intellect
is weakened. With human reason now goes a seed of evil which weakens the will. Both in intellect
and will, the image of God has been obscured. Given Origen’s Platonic understanding of “image”
and “likeness,” it is logical that he would understand Genesis 1. 26 as revealing God’s promise of a
noetic return to unity. However, Origen also uses Stoic and Pauline anthropologies to highlight the
significance of moral choice. It is not enough to know that we are created in God’s image. We must
also obey the commandments, fight demonic temptation, do deeds of charity, and pray. These
practices integrate soul and spirit, allow the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and give the body its proper
role as the “temple of the Holy Spirit.” Prayer, in particular, is a turning to God which, each time,
reverses the direction of the Fall for us. In prayer, we anticipate the return to God in the end times.
With Origen as his guide, Evagrius makes use of the same anthropological building blocks,
but with somewhat different emphasis. With his acceptance of Origen’s Platonic schema of the
creation and fall goes a noetic eschatology: the return of the mind to God. This return proceeds
along Plato’s line of knowledge in a way that Plato (and some of the Stoics) would have cheered:
from practical discipline to apatheia, to the contemplation of the visible creation, to the contemplation
of the intelligible creation, to the contemplation of God. Contemplation begins with the visible world
because its beauty is an easily accessible sign of God’s wisdom and love: “De même que ceux qui
apprennent les lettres aux enfants les tracent sur les tablettes, de même aussi le Christ, en
enseignant sa sagesse aux logikoi, l’a tracée dans la nature corporelle” (KG, 1. 57). “In the same
way that those who teach letters to children write them on tablets, so Christ, teaching his wisdom to
the logikoi, has written it into corporeal nature.” In the Letter to Melania, Evagrius compares the
world to a letter from God “written” to those who are far off. The creation can be “read” only by those
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who are free enough of the passions to perceive the love of God in it.331
Evagrius’s immediate source for the order of contemplation is Origen’s exegesis of
Philippians 1. 23 in On Principles, 2. 11. 5: “My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far
better.” Origen explains that Paul refers to the instruction he will receive with Christ concerning “the
reasons for things,” in a “school for souls” after death. In this “school,” souls first learn the causes
of all things on earth, then “the things which are not seen” (2 Cor 4. 18); and finally they advance to
the contemplation of God (Princ. 2. 11. 7). Evagrius, however, locates this “school” on earth, within
the monastic life, systematizing it into the stages of praktik_, theoria physik_ (includes the
contemplation of the visible creation and the contemplation of the intelligible creation, or the second
and first natural contemplations), and theoria theologik_ (theologia), the contemplation of the Trinity.
Each level functions as an image of the one above it until the contemplation of the Trinity, which, for
Evagrius,

has no analogue below it because, as we have seen in our study of the Arian

Controversy, Evagrius holds with the Cappadocians that God transcends human knowledge.
Therefore, there is an ontological gap between contemplation of the Trinity and all other levels of
contemplation:
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To those who enter into the intelligible church and marvel at the contemplation of created things,
the Logos says, “Do not think that this is the final end which is held in store for you by the gospel
promises. All that is vanity of vanities before the knowledge of God himself. Just as after perfect
health is restored, medicine is in vain, so also vain are the reasons of aeons and worlds after the
knowledge of the Holy Trinity” (In Eccl. I. 2).332

Yet, disagreeing with Origen and Gregory Nazianzen, Evagrius holds that a person can attain to
knowledge of the Holy Trinity in this life. This knowledge is paradoxical because it is beyond human
conception, stretching the limits of language. It is a formless knowledge which is “pure prayer.”
It is the nous that is capable of receiving the mysteries of God. In the Kephalaia Gnostika,
Evagrius asserts the final dissolution of body and soul. Body and soul result from the Fall, the loss
of unity with God. They are the measure of how “far” different intellects fell. When all wills are united
with God in the apocatastasis, diversity is at an end. In this union of wills, ontological distinctions
between created and uncreated being are all but gone. Since soul and body belong to the second
creation, one of moral diversity, Evagrius reasons that they will no longer be needed: “L’intellect qui
possède le vêtement dernier est celui qui connaît seulement la contemplation de tous les êtres
seconds” (KG, 3. 8).333 Because God is not a body, the “clothing” of the body would only hinder the
union between God and the nous. Clearly, Evagrius adheres closely to the Platonic hierarchy of
being. As Gregory Nazianzen, his “wise teacher,” points out, “Ο_τως _ _κ θεo_ λόγoς . . . _π_ Θε_v _μ_ς
_vήγαγεv _κ τ_v _ρωμέvωv”334: “Thus, the reason which is from God . . . leads up to God from visible

332

Jeremy Driscoll’s translation, “Spiritual Progress in the Works of Evagrius,” in Steps to Spiritual Perfection (New
York: Newman Press, 2005) 15.
333
334

Guillaumont, Un philosophe, 394.
Oration 28. 16. SC 250, ed. Paul Gallay (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1978).

207

things.”
In the Letter to Melania, however, Evagrius uses Paul’s model of body, soul, and spirit.
Modifying Paul’s terminology to body, soul, and nous, he asserts the eschatological unity of the nous
with God. There is a difference from his statements in the Kephalaia Gnostika. Body and soul do not
merely disappear in the apocatastasis. Although the nous is no longer attached to a body, Evagrius
posits that the soul and the body are taken up in some way by Christ and the Holy Spirit. Thus, in
the Letter to Melania, unity with God does involve the whole person, composed of the same three
parts; but there is a shift to a higher anthropological key wherein body, soul, and nous are healed in
order to take on a new significance and new roles. The raising of body, soul, and spirit to new levels
suggests Origen’s “movement from image to likeness” of God. Also relevant to Evagrius’s analysis
in the Letter to Melania is Origen’s idea in his Commentary on Romans that making the right choice
integrates a person, uniting soul and spirit with the Son and the Spirit and making the body “a
temple of the Holy Spirit” (I. 18-19). While the weight of conviction is with the final disappearance of
body and soul, as it is for Origen also, Evagrius’s speculations in the Letter to Melania should
remind us that no one of his statements contains the whole truth. Concerning the destiny of body
and soul, Evagrius appears to have thought of more than one possibility.
With regard to spiritual progress, Evagrius begins a monastic’s spiritual formation335 on earth,
with the praktik_, the stage which includes identifying and resisting the demons that attack the
thoughts and inflame the passions in order to lead the soul away from God.336 Without an elder’s
assistance, the monastic is vulnerable because demons capitalize on ignorance, attacking even the
right-hearted in the dark (Pr. 50).337 For his analysis of demonic practices, Evagrius uses Plato’s
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anthropology to suggest “a divided line of ignorance,” a degeneration into the convoluted and
progressive depths of self-deception.
Finally, from Stoic anthropology, as mediated through Clement, Evagrius sheds light on
these powers of the soul and on the monastic’s goal of apatheia. For him, apatheia means the
restoration of the will’s freedom, brought about by the practical discipline of monastic life (praktik_).
Apatheia breaks the connection between the passionate faculties and the demons, who lose their
power to seduce or goad a monastic into sin. Apatheia therefore allows true knowledge of beings,
undistorted by demonic influence. The resulting freedom is part of what Evagrius understands by
“the kingdom of heaven” (Pr. 2). Judging from the many warnings against anger in the Gnostikos,
Evagrius’s manual for monastic instructors, apatheia is not acquired all at one time.338 But it can
become a habitual response, thereby freeing the monastic for the higher contemplations. Evagrius,
then, fully defines the kingdom of heaven as “passionlessness of the soul together with true
knowledge of beings” (Pr. 2).
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Thus, the monastic turns from sin and progresses from concrete disciplines of body, soul,
and mind to a freedom from passions which allows contemplation of the creation as it actually is,
from the mind of God.339 From contemplation of visible creation, one moves to the invisible creation
and is then in a position to receive the contemplation of the Holy Trinity. All these stages can and
should be accompanied by prayer. The form of prayer, of course, changes as one grows in selfknowledge and in understanding of the ways of one’s own particularly troublesome thoughts and
demons. But at every stage, prayer remains the turning of the nous to God. For Evagrius, as for
Clement and Origen, the importance of merely turning to God can hardly be exaggerated. In order to
shed light on the full meaning of turning to God for Evagrius, I will consider the perspective on
prayer that each of his chosen anthropological models offers. It will first be important to examine
Evagrius’s view of the opposite choice, that of wandering away from God.
Modifying Plato’s anthropology in the Republic and the Phaedrus, Evagrius arrives at the
nous, thumos, and epithumia. The nous is as damaged by the Fall as are the thumos and the
epithumia. Translated as “mind” or “intellect,” the nous is supposed to function as the ruling mind,
the h_gemonikon.340 The nous is the faculty which both sees and chooses, like Origen’s logos in On
First Principles, 3. 1. 3. Thus, Andrew Louth points out the error of equating the nous with the
modern sense of “intellect,” which, in common parlance, is the faculty which plans, calculates, and
figures things out. Instead, the nous “is that in virtue of which we human beings are created in the
image of God and [are] therefore capable of entering into communion with God” and of
understanding God’s creation.341 Therefore, nous is closer to “spirit” (pneuma) or the biblical sense
339

Evagrius insists, however, that one never “graduates” from the practical life; to neglect it is to risk a fall.

340

The term, of course, was originally Stoic. Evagrius makes some use of h_gemonikon, which Stewart details in
“Eight Generic Logismoi,” 22. He makes little use of pneuma as a term for the human spirit; for example, he substitutes nous for
pneuma in the Letter to Melania.
341

“The Theology of the Philokalia,” in Abba: The Tradition of Orthodoxy in the West, ed. John Behr, Andrew Louth,
and Dimitri Conomos (Crestwood, N. Y.: St. Vladimir’s Press, 2003) 358. See also Gabriel Bunge, Èvagre le Pontique: Traité
Pratique ou Le Moine, trans. Paul Petronell (Abbaye de Bellefontaine: Maine & Loire, 1996) 28.

210

of “heart.”342 than it is to the secular sense of “intellect”; for like Paul’s “spirit,” the nous was
“created for knowledge of God.”343 Although the nous does reason and analyze, it is meant to do so
as a spiritual faculty, in cooperation with the will of God. Thus, the nous has a moral dimension. For
Evagrius, as for Origen, the nous is both morally and intellectually the locus of the image of God
(Genesis 1. 26).
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In its fallen state, however, the nous has only a weak orientation to God. Hence, it can easily
be moved, talked out of what it knows is right, especially by the irrational faculties.344 It is through
these lower parts of the soul: epithumia (desire) and thumos (aversion) that the demons first attack
the nous. They attack in the form of “thoughts,” logismoi. These range from passion-filled images or
depictions (no_mata) to passion-filled memories to intellectual rationalizations of evil choices
(whether these have actually been carried out or not). Rationalizations are logismoi in the form of
false reasonings, as, for example, in Evagrius’s Antirrhetikos: “For the thought that urges us to deny
our brother, on the grounds that we have nothing to give— “Give to him who begs from you, and do
not refuse him who would borrow from you.”(Philargyria, 40).345 Origen would recognize them as
words below the ladder of knowledge, as “words which are altogether corrupt and godless, which do
away with providence . . . and which approve some other goal than the good” (Comm. on John, 2.
31).
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Evagrius thus develops Origen’s tenet that spiritual warfare is not only against demons, but
also against the disordered desires and the moral laziness of one’s own fallen self. Yet, as Stewart
points out, both the desiring and the irascible parts of the soul are “powers” (dunameis) to be used
legitimately, according to nature: epithumia is meant to be desire for virtue, the thumos aversion to
vice.346 Thus, choosing in accord with nature, “the contemplative mind— by moving the irascible
part of the soul (thumos)— chases down, like a dog, all impassioned thoughts” (Skemmata, 9). The
thumos should fight for virtue.347 Yet, the demons “drag us off towards worldly desires and try to
force our rage unnaturally against [human beings]” (Pr. 24; underlining mine). The evil thought thus
“rises up through the passionate part of the soul and darkens the mind” (Pr. 74).

Passionate

memories assist the demons, since “whatever things we welcomed with passion, we shall later
remember with passion” (Pr. 34). For example, the mental image of a person at whom we have been
angry, arising at prayer, makes us angry again, even though the actual conflict is over (Pr. 11). In
On the Thoughts, Evagrius analyzes our use of the mental images of people to engage in all kinds
of sinful interactions; we even have an image of ourselves (minus our own face): “The anchorite
must therefore keep watch over his own mind . . . for he will seize the figure of his own body [at the
instigation of a demon] and get involved interiorly in a fight with a brother or join with a woman”
(Thoughts, 25).348 The demons instigate these interior dialogues and actions to subvert our
“conversation with God,” thereby converting prayer into sin.
The demons also directly attack the nous. When someone is reading, for example, they try to
pervert the meaning of the scripture before him; failing that, they will “touch the eyelids and the
entire head” with their cold bodies in order to make their victim sleepy (Thoughts, 33); in the
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Kephalaia Gnostika, they induce heavy sleep (VI. 25). Because the demons are icy cold, their effect
is the opposite of that of the angels, who help us reach the fiery prayer. They also attack the mind
by urging it toward vainglory and pride and by distracting it with false visions of God during prayer
(De Orat. 68). Since God is without quality or shape (De Orat. 68), one can neither locate nor
visualize the divine; following Basil in his conflict with Eunomius, Evagrius insists that no human
word, concept, or mental depiction reveals the essence of God.
The “divided line of ignorance” is now visible through the dynamics of demonic temptation.
False visions of God during prayer, for example, mislead the nous, leaving it vulnerable to evil
thoughts and active sin. When the evil thought has done its work, the mind’s resulting darkness
signifies its move away from true knowledge. Here, Evagrius builds on Origen’s Commentary on
John:
This light . . . “shines in the darkness” of our souls. It has come to stay where the world rulers of
this darkness live (who by wrestling with the human race struggle to subject those who do not
stand firm in every manner to darkness), that, when they have been enlightened, they may be
called sons of light. And this light shines in the darkness and is . . . not overcome. (2. 167).

The demons’ “words” approve some other goal than the good. The light of Christ is never
overcome; but in order to stand in light, the nous must do two things: refute the false words with the
truth of Scripture, the word of Christ, and refuse all visions that give God a form or a particular
shape. A particular form or shape would at once prove the vision false because “the divine is without
quantity or shape” (De Orat. 68).
We need to recall that the demons themselves are other fallen intellects, those that fell the
most deeply when they turned away from God. Thus, they are motivated (“moved”) by jealousy and
hatred of human beings, who are “higher” than they are, at the mid-point of fallen nature. Evagrius
envisions a created hierarchy of being for which the elements of fire, earth, and air are symbols:
“There is a predominance of mind (nous) and fire in angels, but among persons desire (epithumia)
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and earth, but among demons passion (thymos) and [cold] air” (KG, 1. 68).349 In Stoic thought,
which took inspiration from Heraclitus, the eternal Logos was thought to be an intelligent, designing
fire, structuring matter according to its plan.350 Scripture would have included the purifying fire of
Luke 3. 16: “He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire.” For Evagrius “fire” signifies a holy
energy, the holy concentration of the angels on God. Human beings can reach “fiery prayer” through
intense concentration of their whole being on God.351 In the Praktikos, Evagrius tells the story of the
solitary with whom the demons played ball for two weeks. Yet, “they were entirely unable to drag his
mind down from its fiery prayer even for a moment” (111). “Fiery prayer” is, then, the opposite of the
carelessness of “wandering away.”
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In his ninth conference, Cassian also associates the ecstasy of fiery prayer with intense
concentration upon God. For him, fiery prayer is a sharing in the intense prayer that Jesus offered to
the Father during his agony in the Garden of Gethsemane; and its purpose becomes redemptive.
Fiery prayer, therefore, can take place in the midst of intense pain and stress; what matters is the
readiness of the whole soul to turn to God. For Cassian, Jesus “represented this condition [of
intense concentration] . . . in the form of these prayers that he . . poured out alone on the mountain .
. . he even shed drops of blood as an inimitable example of his intense purpose” (Conf. 9. 25. 1).352
In their different ways, Evagrius and Cassian both develop Origen’s insight that prayer reverses the
direction of the Fall. By using Christ as his example, Cassian stresses even more strongly that
prayer shares in God’s redemptive purpose.
“Earth,” in contrast, symbolizes the second creation, which itself means physicality, time,
and above all, mortality. The second creation will pass away: “Temporel est le mouvement des
corps, mais intemporelle la transformation des incorporels”: “The movement of the body is temoral,
but the transformation of the incorporeal [creation] is eternal” (KG, 2. 87).353 The human problem is
intensely desiring ephemeral goods while being careless about God. Demons have gone beyond
carelessness into opposition. With cold air and thumos go rage, hatred, and virtual ubiquity. They
swarm like gnats around the person trying to pray, suggesting irrelevant memories (De Orat. 10) or
thoughts of greed (Thoughts, 8); instilling anxiety, which is a denial of God’s providence (Thoughts,
6); distracting the mind and moving it aimlessly from one thought to another (Thoughts, 9). Finally,
they even manipulate the veins in the brain to bring on false visions (De Orat. 73). They cannot be
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seen, but they are in the spiritual and perhaps even the physical air. As in the Life of Antony, they do
not have real power; and they make up for their weakness by swarming and making an unholy
racket. As seen by Athanasius, Antony is the man of God empowered to expose this truth:
[Antony said] “If there were some power among you, it would have been enough for only one of
you to come. But since the Lord has broken your strength, you attempt to terrify me by any means
with the mob . . . If you are able, and you did receive authority over me, don’t hold back, but
attack. But if you are unable, why, when it is vain, do you disturb me? For faith in our Lord is for
us a seal and a wall of protection” (#9: p. 39).354

For Athanasius, the demons lack power because they have already been defeated by Christ.355 With
some qualification, Evagrius seconds this conviction: “If it is God you are waiting on in prayer, God
the Almighty, the creator of the universe, [the one foreknowing] everything,356 why do you wait on
him so irrationallly as to bypass the unsurpassable fear of him and tremble at gnats and beetles?”
(De Orat. 100).
The weakness of the demons results from their sin of opposition to God and to other created
354
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beings. Hostility to God means a lack of capacity to be nourished by contemplation. In their present
state, the demons cannot ascend the ladder of contempation from visible to intelligible being and
truth, thereby preparing themselves for the direct vision of God: “C’est le propre des anges de se
nourrir en tout temps de la contemplation des êtres, celui des hommes de ne pas (s’en nourrir) en
tout temps, et celui des démons de ne (s’en nourrir) ni à temps ni à contretemps” (KG, 3. 4). “It is
proper to the angels to nourish themselves all the time on the contemplation of beings; it is proper to
humans not to nourish themselves all the time, and it is proper to demons not to nourish themselves
[on contemplation] either at one time or another.” In the spiritual world, eating is knowing. Demons
have no knowledge outside their rage and jealousy to “eat” for sustenance, no direction other than
opposition. Because they too have freedom of will, they could conceivably choose the good and
begin their return to God. The return would be extremely difficult; for demons live in a state of
hostility to God and to the creation. They therefore lack enough integrity of nous to be able to help
(nourish) themselves by contemplating the creation. In this regard, Evagrius probably follows
Origen’s conviction that demons are the hardened souls whom God leaves in their sins until they
are satiated, sick, and ready to turn back to God. The turn needs to be their own choice (Princ. 2. 1.
13). By opposing the higher intellects in the creation, however, the demons only drive themselves
lower, from air to water to the abyss, which they fear the most.”Persons fear Sheol, but demons fear
the abyss. But there are among the evil ones serpents for which there is no word” (KG, 1. 57). In
contrast, angels can contemplate both the visible and the intelligible creation all the time, and human
beings, though unable to prevent demons from trying to bully them, can nevertheless contemplate
both creations some of the time (KG, 1. 64).
Yet, in the second creation, the demons retain some power, if only through their ability to
deceive. Therefore, Evagrius sees them as dangerous to the unwary. He says, for example, in On
the Thoughts, quoting 2 Timothy 6. 9: “All the impure thoughts that linger within us on account of the
passions bring the mind down to ‘ruin and destruction’”(22). The power of the demons is threefold.
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First, they have insight into human souls even though they cannot read the nous directly, because
our bodily movements reveal the state of our souls (Pr. 47). Second, demons are persistent,
approaching again and again, always seeking to distract and deceive and sometimes even seeking
to do bodily harm (De Orat., 91). “Stand on your guard,” says Evagrius, possibly referring to 1
Corinthians 16. 13357, “protect your mind from thoughts (no_mata) at the time of prayer, and take
your stand on your own desolation,358 so that he who has compassion on the ignorant will . . . visit
you too”(De Orat. 70). To the extent that we are still caught up in passions (De Orat. 72) and
material things (De Orat. 71), the demons can attack, preventing prayer and putting us in danger of
giving assent to evil. Although Evagrius insists (with Origen) that the human will is always
responsible (De Orat. 81), the struggle is relentless.
Third, to the extent that the demons can persuade or provoke us to assent to their
suggestions, they succeed in making us like them, darkened in mind and hostile toward God and
toward each other. They provoke anger, either during prayer or afterwards; they can also incite us to
illicit and irrational pleasures (De Orat. 46-48). In all, their aim is to make our minds more like
theirs:
“Of what interest is it to the demons to produce gluttony, fornication, love of money, anger and
resentment and all the other passions in us, except that they weaken the mind so that it cannot
pray as it should? . . . They do not permit [the mind] to operate rationally and to seek the Word of
God” (De Orat. 51).

Therefore, since even in their state of defeat by Christ, the demons can confuse us and prevent our
“exodus to God” (De Orat. 47), it is always necessary to stand guard by maintaining our focus on
God: “A monk becomes the equal of the angels through true prayer, desiring to see the face of the
Father who is in heaven” (De Orat. 113). To become instead the equal of the demons by

357
358

“Be on your guard, stand firm in the faith, be courageous, be strong.”
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descending the ladder of ignorance is not good.359 Always, Evagrius emphasizes the importance of
choosing to pay attention to God. In return, God helps, sending angels to support us and sometimes
directly intervening:
The Holy Spirit, sympathizing with our weakness (Rom 8. 26), comes upon us even while we are
unclean, and if he finds the mind just praying to him in a truth-loving way, he mounts it and
disperses the whole array of schemes (logismoi) and thoughts (no_mata) that is circling around it,
urging it on to the love of spiritual prayer (De Orat. 63).

As Evagrius reiterates in the next section, God sometimes communicates directly. The first effect of
divine knowledge is to banish the demons and “calm the imbalance that there is in the body,” which
could have brought on the attack or perhaps resulted from it (De Orat. 64). The Holy Spirit is known
by his fruits of banishing demons and inspiring love of God (De Orat. 63).
For Evagrius, as for Origen, another effect of sin is inner conflict and fragmentation. The
inheritance of Plato’s tripartite anthropology allows Evagrius to explore the conflict between one part
of the soul and another and thus present an analysis of the way in which sin is experienced by the
monastic trying to navigate the way to God. The nous embarks on the monastic life, having decided
to pursue virtue alone only to find that vainglory has taken over, causing the nous to pursue virtue in
order to get the praise of other people (Pr. Prologue, 3). Having puffed up the nous with the
expectation of glory, even the honor of becoming a priest, the demon hands its victim over to the
demon of fornication and leaves (Pr. 13). Under attack by gluttony, the monastic consults others
more experienced in self-control— but only to complain about the ascetical training (Pr. 7); for the
nous is now operating against its own nature (of leading by rational decision) and is following the
359
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dictates of epithumia. One part of the person fights against another; and the nous does not lead in a
consistent direction, but goes first one way, then another. In current rituals for entrance into
monastic life, the candidate has to respond to an initial question: “What do you seek?”Although the
nous may seek the way of God, under demonic attack it will make choices that lead in the opposite
direction.
In answer, Evagrius uses the Stoic emphasis on “what is up to us,” inherited from Origen, to
hold firmly that resisting the demons and their illusions is, in fact, “up to us.” For Origen, temptation
was designed by God both to reveal to us what we are really like and to strengthen the will by giving
it practice in choosing the good. What is up to us? In the first place, Evagrius says that we can guard
our hearts, doing what we can to be self-aware. Because we can entertain only one idea or
depiction at a time, we can drive a thought out by the simple expedient of thinking something else,
“use a nail to drive out a nail (Pr. 58).” An application of this principle is driving out vainglory with a
thought of fornication (since that thought would tend to humble the Holiest Monk of the Desert).360
However, as Evagrius indicates in Praktikos, 58, driving out one demon with the thought of another
is for the strong. A number of other, presumably safer, tactics were well known in desert tradition;
and Evagrius asserts them:
A wandering mind is stabilized by reading and vigil and prayer.
Inflamed desire is quenched by hunger and toil and withdrawal.
Seething fury is abated by psalmody and endurance and mercy.
And all of this only at appropriate times and in the appropriate measure (Pr. 15).

Note that “work” is part of the remedy against thoughts. In Gnostikos, 7, Evagrius states that the
true “gnostic” works for others as a way of giving alms to others; in fact, a knower who does not give
of self and time generously is like the five foolish virgins in Matthew 25. 1-13.
360

Thinking voluntarily about fornication in order to drive out vainglory is not dangerous to Evagrius, although he
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It is also possible to use our inner divisions to our favor instead of letting them be used
against us by the demons. Against the demon of ak_dia (listlessness), Evagrius recommends that
we divide our soul in two, making one part encourage the other, in David’s words: “Why are you
depressed, my soul? Why do you disturb me? Hope in God because I will praise him, the Savior . . .
and my God (Ps 41. 6: Pr. 27). This passage is an example of antirrhetic prayer, the technique of
using the word of Scripture against the chaos of our inner rationalizing words.
All of these measures are steps that we can take toward apatheia, that state of freedom
from the rule of the passions and stability in the face of demonic pressure. Evagrius says that
apatheia is the flower of the practical life and the parent of charity (Pr. 81). Thus, it is the gateway of
“true knowledge of beings,” assuming that beings created by God in love can only be known in love.
Evagrius also inherits the definition of Clement of Alexandria, who Christianized the Stoic virtue of
apatheia by associating it with faith. According to Clement, the Law ordained that the sinner must
be destroyed that he might change from death to life, to the life of impassibility born of faith: “_κ
θαvάτoυ ε_ς ζωήv, τ_v _κ πίστεως _πάθειαv”; Stromateis, 7. 3. 14. 3).361 God, in turn, appears to the one

who, practicing apatheia, keeps a steady direction, not betraying justice, either through fear (φόβoς)
or through the promise of better gifts (δώρωv _πoσχέσειμειζόvωv; Stromateis, 7. 3. 15. 1). For Clement,
those who remain just under pressure are like God, who cannot be bribed by sacrifices or votive
gifts to swerve from justice.
Evagrius’s use of apatheia keeps the connotation of steadiness of purpose. There is need
for steadiness because the passions and the demons do not disappear the minute one wins the first
victory over them. Evagrius cautions those who teach others to guard against their own anger (for
361
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example, in Gnostikos, 5, 31, and 32). Those judged to have the spiritual maturity to engage in the
contemplations and to teach others can still be led into error by passion: “Le péché du gnostique est
la science fausse des objets eux-mêmes ou de leur contemplation, qui est engendrée par une
passion quelconque, ou parce que ce n’est pas en vue du bien qu’est faite la recherche” (Gnostikos,
43). “The sisn of the knower is false knowledge of objects themselves or false contemplation of them
which is caused by some passion or because it was not with the view of the Good in mind that the
search was made.” To sum up, self-knowledge is a task that is “up to us.” Practical “work” against
the passions and false thoughts must be maintained throughout life as needed. Someone who has
mastered the praktik_ will have the right orientation to the world: “A vo_ς πρακτικός always receives the
thoughts of this world _παθ_ς” (Skemmata, 16). The praktikos mind does not waste time on passions
or imaginary sinful scenarios (Skemmata, 36). Yet, one risks losing this state of harmony if one
neglects the practices of charity and loses touch with what is going on inside. Because the demons
are persistent and deceptive, true conversation with God takes life-long willingness to work with the
mind in order to make sure that its energies are concentrated toward God in “undistracted prayer.”
I have been reflecting on prayer as paying attention to God, an act which requires selfawareness as well because of the temptations of the opposing powers. We have to “work and keep
guard” at all times (De Orat. 48). Yet, Evagrius envisions a “pure prayer” which is beyond passion
and even beyond thoughts. This is the height of prayer, the spiritual goal for human beings: “The
whole war between us and the unclean demons is about nothing else except spiritual prayer
because spiritual prayer is particularly offensive and intolerable to them and particularly beneficial
and propitious for us” (De Orat. 50). What is spiritual prayer, and why should it be particularly
offensive to the demons? The answer lies, I think, in Evagrius’s faith that human beings are
destined for a union with the Holy Trinity that is, in a paradoxical way, ontological. The “place of
God” to which pure prayer leads anticipates this unity.
Stewart’s study of “imageless prayer” furnishes a solid foundation for any further
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consideration of Evagrius’s conception of spiritual prayer. Stewart brings out Evagrius’s awareness
of need for theological care, his concern to ground his teaching in Scripture, in particular in the
theophanies of Exodus (24. 10-11: LXX) and Ezekiel (1. 26 and 10. 1).362 In the Greek version of the
passage from Exodus, Moses and the seventy elders ascended Mt. Sinai and “saw the place where
stood the God of Israel . . . and what was under his feet was like a work of sapphire brick/tile, and in
its transparency it had the appearance of the firmament of heaven.” Ezekiel’s theophanies place
God upon a throne but keep the same sapphire blue pavement. Stewart points out that Evagrius
shifts “the place of God” to the human nous, where the sapphire blue light suffuses it in a way that
one who prays can “see,” even though all normal activities of the mind have been transcended.
What one “sees,” in a way that is free of imagery and thought, is the mind as “the place of God.”363
As Stewart says, “the place of God” is “a place of visitation rather than a location of essence,” since,
as we have seen, Evagrius held with the Cappadocians that God is not knowable essentially.
Finally, referring to Isaiah’s vision of the Lord “seated on a high and exalted throne” (Isa 6. 1),
Evagrius interprets this to mean that Isaiah saw “his own truest self (i.e., his ‘rational nature’)
become the throne of God as he received the knowledge of God . . . anticipating the eschatological
journey from diversified knowledge to essential knowledge of the Trinity.”364 This vision of the “truest
self,” one’s own rational nature as the throne of God, suggests the reason for the demons’ loathing
of spiritual prayer: their will to deny their own true nature, their creation in the image of God.
Because they are of the same primordial creation as human beings, they cannot oppose human
beings or God without opposing themselves. Thus, Evagrius is careful to say that as we honor the
angels for their virtue, not their nature, we should hate the demons for their malice, but not for their
nature: “Nous honorons les anges non pas à cause de leur nature, mais à cause de leur vertu et
362
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nous insultons les démons à cause de la malice qui est en eux” (KG, 5. 47): “We honor the angels
not because of their nature, but because of their virtue; we insult the demons because of the malice
which is in them (not because of their nature).” For the nature of both angels and demons is the
same as our own.
Without the imagery from the Old Testament theophanies, the Letter to Melania develops the
same theme: how human beings can be so intimately related to God that the human nous is to be
seen as God’s throne. In this letter, Evagrius presents an extended interpretation of Genesis 1. 26:
creation in God’s image and likeness. For Evagrius, it is not enough to understand demonic tactics.
It is also vital that we come to know ourselves in God’s image, so that we can know who we are,
then progress to life in God’s likeness. Comparing his own letter to Melania to the visible creation,
Evagrius explains that the world around us is a “letter from God (the Father) to those who are far
off.” The creation is “written” by the Son, who is the Father’s hand, and by the Holy Spirit, the “finger
of God”(LM, 2. 43 ff.). This “letter” is necessary because of the Movement365; and the created
intellects are entirely responsible both for moving away and for the loathsome works that result:
For those who are far from God have made a separation between themselves and their Creator
by their loathsome works. But God, out of his love, has provided creation as a mediator; it is like
letters. He did this through his power and wisdom, that is, by the Son and the Spirit, in order that
[all people] might come to know and draw closer to his love for them (LM, 36-41).

Here, Evagrius identifies the Son with the powerful “right hand” of the Lord in Psalm 118. 15 and
Exodus 15. 6; for the Spirit, he points out that Matthew’s Jesus says that he casts out demons by
the Spirit of God, while Luke’s Jesus says that he casts them out by “the finger of God” (Matt 12. 28
and Lk 11. 20). Both word and spirit (or power and wisdom) are needed to create the world; and the
visible world carries out their eternal will to reveal the Father’s love to all who live in it.
Whereas angels and other higher rational beings can receive from the Son and the Spirit
directly and can share their knowledge of true prayer with us (De Orat. 75-76)— recall Origen’s tenet
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that the “other gods” of Scripture get their divinity from the Son, who has it by virtue of will and
eternal generation— we need mediators to know God’s love: the visible creation, angels, and other,
wiser people. In addition, Evagrius assumes that we will at least be able to hear the scriptures, if not
read them for ourselves. All of these mediators teach us not only God’s love, but also our own
capacity for union with God which is ultimately participation in the essential knowledge and the will
of the Father through Christ. With their assistance, we learn and we begin to proclaim the wisdom of
God inasmuch as it is discernible in the visible and intelligible creations:
For just as the contents of letters remain hidden to those who cannot read, even so [they] who fail
to understand the visible creation equally fail to perceive the intelligible creation which is hidden in
it, however much [they] observe it. [They]. . . who have probed the visible creation in diligence
and purity know what it tells about the invisible creation. Once [they] have come to perceive this,
[they] shall also have insight in[to] the power and the wisdom of God’s steadfastness and
unceasingly proclaim the intention of his incomprehensible love which is realized in creation in
power and wisdom (LM, 3. 104-112).

Thus, instructed human disciples have the wisdom and the power to begin to share with others and
to lead them, not all at once, but gradually into deeper understanding that God’s wisdom and power
pervade all things.366 As “a precise image and true reflection of the Father’s essence” (LM, 4. 140),
the Son, the Spirit are “direct signs” of the Father and his love. The members of the rational creation
are “true images of the Image”;367 hence, the Son and the Spirit communicate directly with human
minds that are ready to receive.368 Human minds are to become signs of the Son and the Spirit and
so, of the unity of the Trinity:
And as the Power and the Wisdom which are the Son and the Spirit are glorious signs in which
the love of the Father is recognized, just so rational beings are signs . . . by which the power and
wisdom of the Father are recognized. The Son and the Spirit are signs of the Father, who is
366
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recognized in them, and rational creatures are signs by which the Son and the Spirit are
recognized because of the “in our image” (Genesis 1. 26; LM, 92-98).

For Evagrius, moving into God’s image and likeness means moving into the eschatological unity
with God. This unity involves changes of rank and being from what we are now to the mystery of the
new creation: the nous becomes the body of the Father; the soul is raised to the level of nous; and
the body is taken up by the soul. According to Evagrius, each one of these changes has been
established to nourish the logikoi. Those to whom these changes are nourishing will be all set to
change for the better; while those who oppose them will change for the worse (KG, 7). This schema
is suggestive of Origen’s analysis of moral choice in the Commentary on Romans.
According to Origen’s analysis of choice in his Commentary on Romans, the soul is the
faculty of choice, poised, theoretically, between the body and the spirit. In practice, the soul
chooses between flesh (sin) and spirit (Gal 5. 17). Perhaps because sinful pleasure has a strong
physical component, “body” and “flesh” become hard to distinguish once the soul makes a wrong
decision. Although the soul receives encouragement from angels to make its choice in favor of the
spirit, the demons entice the soul to choose in favor of the flesh. If the soul chooses the way of the
flesh, it degenerates, becoming assimilated to flesh: “it becomes one body with it in its lust and sinful
desires”(I. 18. 5). But whenever the soul chooses the way of spirit, it is assimilated to the spirit and
to the Holy Spirit as well, while the body itself becomes less fleshly, assuming its dignity as “temple
of the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor 6. 19). Origen envisions an anthropological transformation; for as the soul
chooses the good, the whole person becomes “a habitation of the Holy Spirit and a dwelling place of
the Father and the Son, who said of the one who abides in his commands, ‘I and the Father will
come and make a dwelling place with him’” (John 14. 23; Comm. in Rom. 1. 18. 10).
In order to present this vision of the movement from image to likeness, Evagrius begins with
Paul’s anthropology of body, soul, and nous/spirit.369 Evagrius too envisions a unity of being with the
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hypostaseis of the Trinity both in the eschaton and now, proleptically, in spiritual prayer. The unity of
the rational creation with God is an ontological configuration which depends on a union of wills (as it
does for Origen) and a unity of “essential knowledge.” Thus, “prayer is the activity which befits the
dignity of the mind” (De Orat. 84) because “prayer is the prelude to immaterial and undiversified
knowledge” (De Orat. 85). This undiversified knowledge is the knowledge of the Holy Trinity made
possible through the Holy Spirit and by Christ’s choice to open the way for us to participate in his
knowledge of the Father. Hence, the soul is raised to the level of nous because of a change in its
will. The same is true for the body: “In time, the body, the soul, and the mind, because of changes in
their wills, will become one entity [and] . . . the mind will stand again in its first creation” (LM, 6. 196198). The entryway to this transformation is always the same: the concentration of one’s attention
and, as much as possible, one’s whole being upon God.
In preparation for his analysis and in order to show the full significance of Christ’s
transforming grace, Evagrius first makes careful definitions of the nature of body and soul. It is the
soul’s nature to rule the body and the body’s nature to be subject to the soul. Note that in the
second creation, in which the simplicity of the original intellects has been lost, there is still, for
humans, an order to be followed which points in the direction of unity. If human beings consistently
worked on their praktik_ and sought the gift of pure prayer, the soul would already tend toward the
nous; and both would rule the body. The soul would then be strong enough to lift the body to its own
level, effectively raising it above some of the evil conditions to which it is subject, like sickness and
anger (LM, 354-359). However, the soul “ceased to be the image of God and voluntarily became the
image of animals” (Rom 1. 23)370; as a result, the soul and the nous lost their power to rule the body.
Indeed, Evagrius remarks, not only does the soul fail to free the body from evil conditions, but it

synonym of “nous” (mind).”
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“even confers on the body things which do not belong to it, for pride, vainglory, and avarice do not
belong to the body” (LM, 9. 364-368). The Movement, then, is ongoing, for the most part, with the
result that disorder prevails. Both soul and body are “outside their nature”; that is, it is easiest for
them to act unnaturally. For the soul to rise to its true nature (of virtue) is such a feat that it seems
supernatural; but it is only a natural necessity to the soul, in the same way as breathing is to the
body (LM, 402-403). It is an ongoing struggle even to act according to nature; we cannot rise above
our nature, that is, perform supernatural acts.
This state of living outside or below one’s true nature is, for Evagrius, “the curse” which could
only be reversed by Christ, God and man, who in coming down to us and bearing “everything which
we have earned because we have left our nature,” acted both naturally and unnaturally. Christ acted
naturally in extending divine love to fallen humanity (LM, 11. 437), and unnaturally in descending
from a higher level of being to a lower (LM,12. 442 ff.). For example:
What was unnatural was that God was born of a woman. But God, because of his love for us, and
because his nature is not bound by or subjected to any law, was born of a woman because he
wanted it so . . . He, while remaining what he is, in his grace took upon him at birth all the things .
. . which are not only unnatural to him but also, I would say, unnatural to us. For we have fallen
into these things because of the sin we have committed of our own free will (LM, 12. 442-453).

The Incarnation is supernatural to us, but only natural to Christ, whose love makes a natural gesture
when he descends to sinful humanity. Yet, his descent is “unnatural”because he makes it for no sin
of his own, whereas the intellects’ original descent to humanity was a consequence of the Fall (LM,
458-459). Borrowing from a similar discussion in Gregory Nazianzen’s fourth theological oration,371
Evagrius explores the mystery of the Incarnation, concluding that God remained God and raised
human nature, separating it from its original cause, the Movement, and restoring it to the image and
likeness of God: “That which is natural to man, is that man is created in the image of God. What is
supernatural is that we come to be in [God’s] likeness, according to the word, “I have come that they
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Gregory expands on the paradox of the Incarnation at length. For example, “He was baptized as man–but he
remitted sins as God . . . He is called a Samaritan and a demoniac— but he saves him that came down from Jerusalem and fell
among thieves” (Oration 30, 20).
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may have life and that they may have it in abundance” (John 10. 10; LM, 484-487).
Although the Incarnation is discussed later in the letter than the apocatastasis, it undergirds
Evagrius’s conception of the final unity of body, soul, and nous with the Trinity. Origen had shown
how the soul was assimilated to the spirit through making a right choice. For Evagrius, the
assimilation to the Trinity is made possible by Christ because we were not even able to live
consistently according to nature, let alone rise above it to join ourselves to God. It is Christ’s choice
to descend in love that is the cause of the final unity.
Some questions remain. What happens to the body in the final restoration? Evagrius
distinguishes between the physical body and the intelligible body, a kind of Platonic “form” of the
visible body (LM, 9. 316). During mortal life, the physical body is fit to move about the world,
expressing the will of the mind and soul. The deeds and the movements of the body serve to reveal
what the soul is like, just as the “movements” of the soul toward good or evil reveal what the nous is
like (LM, 4. 113-115). As to the fate of the physical body, Evagrius conceives of the apocatastasis in
two stages. In the first, the heavy physical body will be replaced by a lighter, more spiritual body; in
the second stage, diversity and number give way to unity.372 The “intelligible body,” however, is a
different story. It has a will of its own, as the soul does, but in the eschaton, both soul and intelligible
body become one in will and being with the nous: “In time, the body, soul, and mind, because of
changes in their wills, will become one entity” (LM, 195-196).373 Thus, body and soul do disappear,
but in the special sense that they are ontologically configured, first, the body to the soul, then both to
the human mind and to the Trinity.
This ontological configuration of humanity (and all the rational creation) to the Trinity means
that the same anthropological terms apply to both God and humanity. God the Father is the Nous.
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For Evagrius’s two-stage eschaton, see Guillaumont, Un philosophe, 384-395.

Currently, we may experience an “intelligible body” in the “gut reactions” we have to physical danger or in other
apparently instinctive reactions we have to situations and people.
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Evagrius conceives that the Son and the Spirit, God’s power and wisdom, are the Soul. Finally, the
human nous, having assimilated the human soul and intelligible body and accepted its destiny of
contemplating God, takes on its new role as the Father’s body. The language of “body” in relation to
the Father could be interpreted anthropomorphically; but Evagrius intends it to express both unity
and community between the Trinity and rational creatures:
Therefore, if letters, serving those who are far off, can communicate what has happened and
what is about to happen, how much more do the Word and Spirit who understand everything,
communicate this to the human mind which is their body! . . . But the Word and the Spirit are
direct signs of the Father . . . Therefore, every human mind has understanding because the Word
and the Spirit make everything known to it, as it is itself their true image and their likeness is
communicated to it (LM, 4. 126-143).

In the end, for Evagrius, diversity disappears. Only the names of the Father, the Son, and the
Spirit are eternal; and the numbers disappear. The wills, however, remain, but in unanimity, so that
God can be all in all. Evagrius compares the apocatastasis to many different rivers flowing into the
sea. The sea changes their natures into its own nature. “How much more then is this not the case
with the intelligible sea, which is infinite and unchangeable, namely, God the Father (LM, 6. 204209)? The rational beings retain their created nature; thus they are not absorbed wholly into the
Trinity (LM, 6. 231-236). Yet once the barrier of sin has been removed, they fully become “the place
of prayer.”
For Evagrius, then, to converse with God in prayer requires an alignment of will with God as
well as a turning toward God which anticipates the final unity and sometimes also reveals it, through
the experience of spiritual prayer. Although the present world abounds with signs of the Fall, they do
not overshadow the “letter of God,” the signs of God’s love in the world. Evagrius is convinced that
an underlying order grounds its chaos. That order, which is the letter to us from God, is the sign of
God’s love which embraces all creatures, however far they may have wandered. As a result of
choosing to read God’s letters, we become full of God’s spirit and therefore able to teach others. But
we can never afford to forget to engage in the praktik_. If we become careless, we will lose the
ability to “read” God’s love.
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IV. Conclusion: Review and Further Study
The theology of prayer emerges from the intersection of the doctrine of God and the
understanding of the self. Reflection on God and the self do not take place in a vacuum, however.
Origen’s effort to refute the teachings of Marcion and the Gnostics helped shape his teaching; for
Evagrius, the campaign against Enomian Arianism was crucial. To these tasks they brought their
considerable education in the Hellenic philosophies. Their knowledge of Platonism and Stoicism
was of a different order from classroom memorization; they had deeply absorbed Hellenic
teachings. For both Origen and Evagrius, then, these philosophies become an interpretive
framework for the understanding of Scripture, and it was natural for them to assume the
appropriateness of classical stages of education when they thought of the journey of the soul.
Nevertheless, in their view, Scripture provides the ultimate paideia. It is through turning to God,
receiving right teachings, and engaging in spiritual warfare that one gains access to higher wisdom
and to the knowledge of God. In the process of becoming free of the passions, we face many
temptations, thereby following the human figure of Jesus, who is our pedagogue. Christian life is
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increasingly contemplative as, through making the right choices, we become free enough to see the
reality of God’s love. The coming together of the philosophies and Scripture gave Origen, whose
mind was speculative, many doors to the higher wisdom; and it gave Evagrius, who was a
systematizer, a large-enough system to accommodate both his psychology and his stages of
spiritual progress.
In both Platonism and Stoicism, anthropology, ontology, and epistemology are interrelated; it
is impossible to consider one branch without considering the other two. As we have seen, for Plato,
human beings are born to learn. The nous (or sometimes logistikon) reaches its full potential only
as it finds more reliable objects of knowledge than the sensible world provides. It must discover the
intelligible forms, or principles of reality, and finally the Good, in which all other forms participate.
The Good is the ultimate fulfillment of the human mind. In order to refute the elitist anthropology of
the Gnostics, then, Origen borrowed Plato’s cosmology from the Timaeus, as well as his “divided
line” of knowledge from Book Six of the Republic. Origen’s purpose was twofold: to uphold God’s
involvement in all of creation and the contemplative destiny of all created intellects and to argue
their responsibility for the Fall, which resulted from their careless and lawless choice to “wander
away” from God.
To meet the challenge of fatalism in all its forms and to analyze the significance of freedom,
Origen needed the Stoic anthropology, which concerns itself specifically with human choice and
responsibility. For the Stoics, understanding of Providence is impossible. Yet, though inscrutable,
Providence is not hostile because it is not even personal. The workings of Providence are the best
and most rational arrangement for the whole of creation. It is not “up to us” to understand those
workings; indeed, we cannot. What is “up to us” is to make decisions that will put us into harmony
with Providence. This task is not beyond us because we have reason, that small seed of logos
implanted by the Logos, the overarching Right Reason. Origen developed the Stoic insistence on
individual responsibility; but he did this in connection with a Providence that is personal and loving;
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for God is the source of “Providence.” The events that confront us do so in order to teach us who
we really are and prod us to turn more completely to God. With time to form good habits, we come
to trust God.
Thus, when Origen used Platonic and Stoic thought as a framework for interpreting the
Scriptures, he could show that as Trinity, God is an ontological and moral “community” of love. The
Son and the Spirit “are” with the Father because they will to be with the Father, sharing and
contemplating the Father’s divinity. As One, the Three choose to reach out to all fallen creatures
and assist them to return to God. Each hypostasis of the Trinity has its special operation in the
economy. Origen’s Platonic lens led him to see “being with God” as a chosen contemplative union,
whether for the hypostaseis of the Trinity or for rational creatures. Because prayer is always a
choice to be with God, it is always a form of contemplation.
Origen’s knowledge of Stoic thought underlies his answer to the perennial question of how it
can make sense to address petitions to a God who knows all and has ordained everything from all
eternity. He inverts the Stoic precept that we choose to act in harmony with God to show that God’s
providence works in harmony with our choices. Thus, God takes our choices into account when he
orders the world— all of our choices, including the choice to pray for our needs at any given time
(On Prayer, 6. 3). Stoic concepts also undergird his exploration of the dynamics of choice, hence
his understanding of the moral preparation required for prayer. In order to explore the spiritual
significance of human freedom, however, Origen uses Paul’s anthropology of body, soul, and spirit,
as expressed in 1 Thessalonians 5. 23: “May your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and
blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Here, the body is to be sanctified along with the
soul and the spirit. However, in his Commentary on Romans, Origen conflates this tripartite schema
with the model in Galatians 5. 17: “For flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.”
Here, “flesh” means the sin-nature, the “old man.” In analyzing the dynamics of choice, Origen
does not clearly separate “body” (soma) from “flesh” (sarx) because for him, bodily desires easily
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tend toward sin.374 The soul must therefore choose between the desires of the flesh and those of
the spirit.
Origen shows that the effects of sin are a debilitation of the whole person, as the soul,
habitually choosing according to the mind of the flesh, becomes one with the flesh and its desires,
hence progressively more enslaved to sin. In contrast, if the soul habitually chooses according to
the guidance of its spirit, it will become one with the mind of the (Holy) Spirit. Becoming then a
“slave of righteousness,” soul and spirit will then enter the school of the Holy Spirit and be on their
way, through many temptations and some set-backs, to holiness and a higher degree of wisdom
and being. For by right decisions, the soul “makes the good its own” and increasingly belongs to
God. Prayer, then, is part of the process of learning to orient oneself to God through paying
attention to God. In turning to God, one reverses the direction of the Fall; for the intellects fell by
refusing to pay attention to their Creator and Source. God, in turn, fills the mind with saving words
and wisdom. The one praying can then share these with others who are in need.
Participating in the Arian Controversy with Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, Evagrius followed
their lead by addressing the question of how human beings can know God. Eunomius’s insistence
that theological language reveals the essence of God as ingenerate pushed those who wanted to
refute him into reflecting on just how we do know God. For Basil and Gregory, God is not
knowable essentially. We know God only through the revelation of God’s operations in the
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Some sin arises from the needs of the body which can easily move us to excess even without the instigation of the
devil: (Princ. 3. 2. 2). The hostile powers involve themselves in pushing their victims into further excess. Thus the needs of the
body easily become the lusts of the flesh against the spirit (Princ. 3. 2. 3).
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economy: the saving deeds recorded in Scripture which manifest God’s love for us. From these
deeds we derive God’s “characteristics” and form our theological reflections. All God-talk is
analogical; and it can be better to honor God in silence. Another term used by Basil is “energy”; we
know God’s energies which reach out from the Father, through the Son, and in the Spirit. We know
them as we pray in the Spirit, through the Son, who as Word, reveals the Father to us. But we never
reach knowledge of the infinite and mysterious essence of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.
Thus, the conflict with Eunomius led Evagrius in an apophatic direction. Over and over, he
counsels against forming an image of God, for all images of God are false. Some may even be
produced by demons (De Orat., 57, 68, 94). Moreover, he counsels against trying to “define” God
because God is illimitable; and definitions impose limit (De Orat. 116). He agreed with Basil that
the categories of number and quality, automatic features of the way we think and operate in the
created world, are useless in the effort to define the Trinity because God is beyond number and
quality. Categories divide and distinguish, but God is simply One. Thus, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen,
and Evagrius arrived at “the New Math” of the First Council of Constantinople: One plus One plus
One does not equal Three, but One— “by nature, not by number.” It remained for Gregory of Nyssa
to clarify this teaching in Not Three Gods, by showing that the Three participate in all actions
without division of essence or will.
Yet, it would be a mistake to see Evagrius as merely “apophatic,” if, indeed, there has ever
been anyone who was “merely apophatic.”375 For God has written “letters” to those who are far off,
having separated themselves from God by their “loathsome works.” In the Letter to Melania, all the
visible creation is “letters,” telling all of us who can “read” about God’s love. Thus, for Evagrius,
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On previous efforts to categorize Evagrius as apophatic or cataphatic, see Stewart, “Imageless Prayer,” 184, both
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human friendship, preserved by letters, becomes a viable metaphor for the love of the transcendent
God, as does the beauty and order of the visible world. For those who can “see,” both friendship
and the creation are sacraments of God’s redemptive purpose.
As for the philosophies, Evagrius used Plato’s tripartite soul to good advantage to expose
the attacks of the demons against the warring urges within us. Because the demons work in teams,
they can even bounce their victims back and forth between a temptation to the nous, like vainglory,
and a temptation to epithumia, like fornication. The remedies for demonic injury involve directing the
attention: guarding one’s attention to God or shifting the attention away from the obsessing thought,
even if we have to shift attention to another thought, “driving out a nail with a nail.” Evagrius’s
example of driving out a nail with a nail is driving out vainglory with the thought of fornication (Pr.
58).376 Psalmody is a calming shift of attention; alms-giving means shifting attention to someone
else who is in need. As is evident in Evagrius’s Antirrhetikos, Scripture provides an arsenal for us to
talk back to negative thoughts because the words of Scripture carry the power of Christ.377 Although
“movement” is a generally negative term for Evagrius378, we can use movement for our advantage
as long as we shift attention away from the passion or thought to something else, preferably to God,
but to anything that leads in the opposite direction to the demon’s pull. The use of reason (nous) to
analyze our own train of thought will also remove us from the immediacy of the thought and expose
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See Stewart’s discussion of Evagrius’s teaching that the mind processes thoughts one at a time in “Imageless
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The belief that the power of Christ works through Scripture, as well as through his own name, was part of the
monastic tradition, as Stewart has shown in his analysis of the Life of Antony in “Eight Generic Logismoi,” 15.

237

its illusory nature. The goal of this struggle is a Stoic one: apatheia. But apatheia is the gateway to
charity and to contemplation, both of which are dimensions of Christianity.
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Finally, in the Letter to Melania, Evagrius moves from God’s friendship, shown in the “letters”
God has written to us, to God’s plan for our reunification in the apocatastasis. His notion of the
human nous as the Father’s body (through the Son and the Spirit, who are the Father’s soul) seems
to me understandable in the light of Origen’s analysis of choice in his Commentary on Romans. As
the human soul becomes aligned with its spirit, it becomes one with it and with the Holy Spirit. In the
Letter to Melania, Evagrius envisions the human nous as having become ready to be completely
filled with “essential knowledge” of the Trinity. As for Plato, the Good corresponds to the nous and
completely fills it, leaving room for no further questions,379 for Evagrius, God brings the nous into the
unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and this unity is essential knowledge. In this unity, the soul
becomes nous, and the physical body is left behind. The nous, in turn, becomes the body of the
Father. What results is an ontological reconfiguration of the human being to God— not a merging,
because the distinction between created being and uncreated being remains, but a reconfiguration,
so that “they may be one in us” (John 17. 22) and “God may be all in all” (1 Cor 15. 28).380 The
reason for this unity, in Evagrius’s view, is the unity of wills between creatures and God when all
have returned and the Son has handed over the Kingdom to the Father:
Just as the nature of the human mind will be united to the nature of the Father, as it is his body,
thus the names ‘soul’ and ‘body’ will be absorbed in the persons of the Son and the Spirit and
remain continually one nature and three persons of God and his image, as it was before the
Incarnation and as it will be again . . . after the Incarnation, because of the unanimity of wills (LM,
5. 169-174).

In the meantime, we have the praktik_, the two stages of physik_, and theologia, the height of
prayer, in which we are given a foretaste of the unity which is essential knowledge. “If you are a
theologian, you will pray truly; if you truly pray, you will be a theologian” (De Orat. 61).
What, finally, do Origen and Evagrius teach us? Their carefully worked-out pedagogy for
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body, mind, and spirit teaches us patience; their awareness of the need for spiritual warfare teaches
us vigilance to our own inner conflicts. Our psychological schemas differ from theirs; but the need to
get in touch with what is going on inside us does not. Many today could receive Evagrius’s idea that
the visible world reveals the glory and providence of God; however, the findings of Darwin in the 19th
century have appeared to explode that belief, and the pain of the explosion has split the Christian
world into “evolutionists” and “creationists,” with those who opt for “intelligent design” in the middle.
Acquaintance with the accompanying teachings of Origen and Evagrius that the world is God’s
“damage control” for the Fall might challenge an overly-facile belief that God’s providence is
manifest only in order and beauty. For them, God’s purpose is always pedagogical. Can we say as
much? They challenge us to reflect on providence for ourselves.
Issues remain for further study. We found a similarity between Origen’s analysis of choice as
“seeing both good and evil,” then deciding, in On First Principles, 3. 1 and Irenaeus’s account of
moving from the image to the likeness of God in Against Heresies, 4. Is it merely a coincidental
relationship, Irenaeus having written in the West, forty to fifty years earlier? Since Irenaeus wrote in
Greek, and since Clement knew his work, it is certainly possible that Origen knew it as well. One
could explore the question of whether their apparent relationship is connected with the fact that both
were fighting the Gnostics.
Another issue is the use of the different anthropological models by later writers, such as
Cassian, Diodochus, and John Climacus. How do they work with the anthropological and
epistemological heritage of Origen and Evagrius? Some work has already been done on this issue,
but there is more room for reflection. Finally, it would be a rewarding study to trace the concept of
self-knowledge as it develops in later writers. There is an intriguing similarity, for example, between
Antony, Evagrius, Cassian and the Carmelite reformers of the sixteenth century, Sts. Teresa of Avila
and John of the Cross. John presents a list and an analysis of “spiritual faults” which appear in their
psychological acuteness, to derive from much earlier writers. Actually, one does not need new
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topics of study for “further study”; deeper understanding of such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Stoic
writers, and Clement of Alexandria would probably yield new insights and would have resulted in a
different thesis from the one I have written. I end with Origen’s precept that one gains the knowledge
and understanding for which one is ready. As Evagrius says in the Letter to Melania, “Truly, many
‘doors’ full of all kinds of distinctions [and much wisdom] have presented themselves to me here” (4.
129-130).
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